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SECURING LAND LINES OF COMMUNICATION
IN INSURGENT WAR--A PROPOSED DOCTRINE(V)

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to determine a tactical concept for securing land lines of communication (LLOC) useable by US military advisors to an underdeveloped nation engaged in fighting an insurgency. In considering the problem, the following elements of that problem were identified: (1) What threat does an insurgent pose to the security of lines of communication? (2) What are the essential elements of a solution to the threat posed by an insurgent? (3) Does current US doctrine provide an acceptable solution? (4) Does the current doctrine of a typical indigenous force provide an acceptable solution? (5) Do typical indigenous units possess the capability of employing an effective solution? and, (6) What is the solution to the problem?

While seeking a solution to this problem, it was assumed that future nations to which the US may provide assistance, involved in an insurgency, will be underdeveloped nations with the same limitations in manpower, training, technology, and economic power as the Vietnamese of today. It was also assumed that a LLOC would be considered secure when: (1) the insurgent was deprived of its use, (2) it was available and useable for long enough periods of time to meet the economic needs of the nation, and (3) protection was provided for key installations along the LLOC so as to prevent their destruction.

The writings of the most successful and articulate revolutionaries, General Vo Nguyen Giap, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, and Mao Tse-tung provided the basis for the establishment of a set of strategic goals regarding LLOC

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security which insurgents feel will provide them with success. These strategic goals are: (1) preserve the guerrilla force, (2) annihilate the enemy, (3) gain and maintain the initiative, (4) provide a supply system for the insurgent, (5) deny the established government the free use of the roads, (6) gain the support of the people, (7) isolate the government's forces, (8) develop the war into a mobile war, and (9) establish a command relationship that permits centralized overall direction and decentralized execution.

Based on the guerrilla's strategic aims, seven counter strategies are identified as the elements of a solution that will lead to the guerrilla's defeat. These counter strategies are: (1) deny the insurgent the support of the people, (2) prevent the insurgent from isolating the government from the people and from other governmental forces, (3) prevent the guerrilla force from destroying the counter guerrilla force, (4) obtain and maintain the initiative, (5) prevent the guerrilla from obtaining supplies, (6) destroy the guerrilla force, and (7) keep the LLOC open for use by the people and by the counterinsurgent forces.

The development of the problem and the elements of a solution serve as a basis for examining the US Army field manuals to determine whether US doctrine provides an adequate solution to the problems inherent to securing the LLOC. It is clear that the doctrine presented in the field manuals assumes a limited view of the area of an LLOC and the problems of securing the LLOC, and as a result, prescribes only those techniques for securing convoys, trains, and key installations as techniques for providing LLOC security. When that doctrine is employed by the American units in Vietnam,

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however, they assume a broader view of the problem by considering the LLOC as being not only the road or railroad, but also that terrain on either side of the road or railroad that allows one force or the other to control the route. In accordance with this expanded definition, the American units in Vietnam have added the offensive tactics and techniques prescribed for the conduct of strike and consolidation operations to the standard security procedures already mentioned in an effort to control not only the road or railroad but also the area of the LLOC. When current doctrine, as it is applied in Vietnam, is compared to the essential elements of a solution, current doctrine is found to be adequate for providing security for the LLOC.

Although it was determined that current US doctrine is adequate for countering an insurgent who is interdicting the LLOC, this does not solve the problem. It merely indicates that there is a workable solution. With this in mind, a study was made of a typical indigenous force, as exemplified by the Vietnamese, to determine whether or not their tactical doctrine and organizational structure will enable them to secure the LLOC.

The Vietnamese concept for securing the LLOC is identical to the concept used by the US units in the field. It establishes in its basic guidance an aggressive program for securing the LLOC by securing trains, convoys, and key installations as well as providing for control of the total area of an LLOC by means of offensive actions. This fine concept, however, is no more than that. In practice, the Vietnamese tend to rely on defensive tactics for securing the LLOC virtually conceding to the Viet Cong, the

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initiative in all phases of LLOC security operations. The apparent reason for this emphasis on defensive tactics could be found in the organizational structure and equipment of the various units. The Vietnamese forces normally assigned the LLOC security mission, the Regional and Popular Forces, are without adequate supporting weapons, mobility, and communications equipment. They are also hampered by a particularly cumbersome chain of command.

Based on these investigations which defined the problem, identified the elements of a solution, determined a workable solution, and demonstrated the inadequacies of current indigenous units and tactics, a solution to the problem is derived and presented in the form of a proposed tactical and organizational concept for securing the LLOC. In arriving at these concepts, the term LLOC was redefined. The definition of lines of communication should include the roads, railroads, and pipelines used to transport personnel and cargo, and that terrain immediately adjacent to those routes that allows one force or the other to control access to, and use of the road, railroad, or pipeline.

The tactical concept for securing the land lines of communication derived in this study is based on the precepts that a guerrilla force interdicting the LLOC cannot be defeated or an LLOC secured by defensive actions; that the main battle for control of the LLOC would be fought on that terrain adjacent to the routes and not entirely on the routes themselves; and that the commander with the mission of securing the LLOC should have total responsibility for all aspects of LLOC security and he must be provided with the resources he needs to accomplish that mission.

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The tactical concept presented in this thesis emphasizes the need for a single commander to command all units in the area of an LLOC as well as plan and control all actions within that area. In the execution of a LLOC security mission, the commander will employ the tactics and techniques for securing convoys, trains, and key installations, and he will seek to eliminate the source of the problem by destroying the guerrilla through offensive actions. The tactics and techniques presented in this thesis are not new and revolutionary. What is new, however, is the manner in which they are employed to defend the redefined LLOC, and the emphasis that is placed on offensive actions.

The organizational concept and organizations that are presented in this thesis were developed based on the tactics and techniques that were prescribed for units with LLOC security missions. The organizational concept presented here stresses the need for unity of command and for providing the commander with adequate firepower, mobility, communications, surveillance, and intelligence. Although an organizational structure is presented for consideration, that organizational structure is not the solution to the problem. The solution to the problem lies in the tactical and organizational concepts that have been presented in this thesis.

It is recommended in this thesis that the proposed solution in the form of a tactical and organizational concept be adopted for the use of US advisors to an emerging nation, and that current printed doctrine for securing the LLOC be reevaluated and rewritten in the light of the findings of this thesis.

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

For many years the problem of combating an insurgency has plagued the nations of the world. Literally thousands of books and articles have been written about the guerrilla and how to defeat him. In most of the works read by this author, the problem of securing lines of communication was discussed, but few of them dealt with the problem in any detail.

I. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

A nation confronted with an insurgency must solve a wide range of political, social, economic, and military problems with each of these problem areas impinging upon the others. The security of a nation's lines of communication, while basically a military problem requiring the use of military and paramilitary resources, directly affects that nation's economy and indirectly affects the political stability of the established government. The economy of any nation is heavily dependent on the people of that nation being able to transport agricultural and manufactured goods to the consumer who needs them and to the ports from which they can be exported. Any disruption of the orderly flow of goods throughout a country and to foreign markets places a restriction on that nation's economy and causes the population to doubt the ability of the government to provide them protection. By interdicting lines of communication an insurgent accomplishes many things:

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he reduces the ability of a government to support a counterinsurgency effort by weakening the nation's economy; he causes political unrest among the people, many of whom may already be suspicious of the policies of the established government; and, by looting supply vehicles and convoys, he provides himself with the supplies and equipment he needs to sustain his operations.

The existence of adequate lines of communication and the ability to utilize those routes are valuable assets to any nation. It is apparent that lines of communication are among a nation's most vulnerable assets in an insurgent war. The insurgent need only wait until a time of his choosing and he can interdict any route in a number of ways. In his book, Guerrilla Warfare, "Che" Guevara stresses the importance a guerrilla force places on the use of sabotage and the interdiction of land lines of communication. He states that such interdiction is necessary to enable the guerrillas to replenish their meager supplies, to cause the suspension of industrial life, and to limit travel to and from cities to certain hours as a show of strength. In addition, it inflicts casualties on the enemy, causes the enemy to commit large numbers of troops to static security missions in an effort to protect vital installations, and gives the people the impression that the governmental forces are unable to cope with the problems of governing.¹ The methods used to interdict lines of communication are

¹"Che" Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, trans. J. P. Morray (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961) *passim*.

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limited only by the imagination of the guerrilla who employs them. These methods will vary from the use of one guerrilla to plant a single mine on a road or railroad, to a squad ambushing a small outpost or a lone vehicle, to a well organized guerrilla force attacking a convoy, a secured bridge, or an outlying camp.²

The problem of securing lines of communication is not a new one. In the past thirty years Germany, Greece, Yugoslavia, France, Great Britain, and the United States have all faced this problem under conditions of a guerrilla war. Each of these countries has encountered the problem under differing circumstances, each has applied a variety of tactical techniques to the problem, and each has met with a wide range of success and failure. The techniques used have varied from one extreme to the other. They range from the commitment of large combat forces against guerrilla bands with small security forces on key installations along the land lines of communication, to the employment of large static security forces on the key installations with relatively small forces operating against the guerrilla bases.

Current US Army doctrine for securing LLOC can best be summed up as the conduct of operations to accomplish four basic tasks:

- A. Provide detailed surveillance of the LLOC.
- B. Provide security for key installations along the LLOC.
- C. Provide escorts for convoys and trains.

²Ibid.

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D. Establish priorities for the protection of key or primary LLOC.³

It would appear that the aggressive application of current doctrine should provide adequate security for the LLOC. However, a close examination of the guerrilla's strategy and the doctrine presented in the field manuals raises the following questions:

- A. What are the geographical limits of the LLOC?
- B. What does the term detailed surveillance mean?
- C. How is detailed surveillance provided?
- D. Is current doctrine for securing LLOC offensive or defensive in nature?
- E. Will a defense oriented doctrine provide security for a LLOC?
- F. Do the units assigned the mission of securing the LLOC have the capability to accomplish that mission?

At this point it is important to determine what forces will be applying US Army doctrine in a counterinsurgency effort. In all cases involving American units, doctrine will be applied by those units. In most cases involving American advisors to indigenous forces, they, the advisors, will try to apply US doctrine with the units they are advising. Assuming the foregoing statements to be true, US Army doctrine for securing LLOC should fulfill the needs of both the advisor to an

³US Army, FM 31-23, Stability Operations - US Army Doctrine, (Washington: Government Printing Office, December 1967), pp. 81-82.

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indigenous unit and the commander of an American unit, or separate doctrine should be provided for each.

Current Army doctrine for securing land lines of communication has been somewhat modified for the use of American advisors to the armed forces of developing nations involved in an insurgency. The question now becomes one of whether Army doctrine, or that doctrine as modified, can serve the needs of the advisor. Examples of the type questions that must be answered in making such a determination are: What does the word surveillance mean? How do you accomplish surveillance? Surveillance is defined as, "The systematic observation of air, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means for intelligence purposes."⁴ To an American officer assigned to an American unit in Vietnam, surveillance means observation through the use of surveillance radar, infrared devices, seismic devices, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, photography, and anti-intrusion devices to support and augment manned outposts and patrols. To an American officer assigned as the advisor to a Vietnamese unit, the word surveillance means observation by outposts, foot mobile patrols, limited use of devices such as the starlight scope, an occasional helicopter, and a limited number of vehicular mounted patrols.

It is apparent that the two types of units, American and Vietnamese, do not have the same capability to accomplish the mission

⁴Ibid., p. 150.

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of providing security for land lines of communication. This disparity indicates a need for the development of a tactical and organizational concept that can be used by an indigenous force to secure the LLOC.

II. PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to determine a tactical and organizational concept for securing land lines of communication (LLOC) that can be used by US military personnel assigned to an advisory team in an underdeveloped nation engaged in fighting an insurgency. The tactical concept derived must be within the capabilities of the underdeveloped nation using their own resources and whatever assistance that may be provided by the United States under the Military Assistance Program.

III. DEFINITION, DELIMITATION, AND ASSUMPTIONS

Definition

Land Lines of Communication (LLOC). For the purpose of this thesis, land lines of communication will include the roads and railroads used to support the military effort and the civilian economy.⁵

Delimitation

This study will only consider those lines of communication specified in the definition of land lines of communication. These lines

⁵US Army, AR 320-5, Dictionary of United States Army Terms (Washington: Government Printing Office, October 1967), p. 239.

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of communication were chosen because of their relative importance to an underdeveloped country. They are the primary means by which goods and materials are transported to the markets and ports.

Throughout this study the LLOC will be considered in their broadest sense. This means that the LLOC will not be considered simply as a road or railroad, but will be considered as a piece of terrain through which these LLOC pass. The exact extent of the lateral limits of the LLOC cannot be specified. In this paper the limits will be considered as those necessary to enable a force to secure the road or railroad.

Assumptions

It is assumed that future nations involved in insurgencies and receiving aid from the United States, in the form of military equipment and advisors will be underdeveloped or emerging nations. It is also assumed that these nations will have much the same limitations in manpower, resources, arms, supplies, and trained personnel that are found in South Vietnam today. In view of the preceding assumption and the fact that most of the Army doctrine for securing LLOC in an insurgent war has been developed since the start of the American involvement in Vietnam, this study will utilize the experience gained from the Vietnamese conflict when analyzing the validity of that doctrine, and determining adjustments that should be made to that doctrine.

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One of the biggest problems in developing a tactical concept for securing LLOC is to determine what constitutes a secure LLOC. Is it necessary for the LLOC to be secured twenty-four hours a day, or will something less suffice? Is it necessary to prevent the insurgent from interdicting the LLOC completely, or is it acceptable to keep the interdiction incidents to a minimum? Which LLOC must be secured, or should all the LLOC be secured? These problems and others constantly plague the men who are responsible for securing the LLOC.

In this thesis it will be assumed that LLOC are adequately secured when the following goals have been achieved: (1) the insurgent has been deprived of the use of the routes; (2) the LLOC designated as primary LLOC are available for use for a long enough period of time each day to meet the needs of the populace and the military forces; and (3) protection is provided for the key installations on the LLOC in order to keep the insurgent from blocking the routes by destroying those key installations.

IV. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

The first chapter is a statement of the problem and a discussion of the general background of the problem.

The second chapter is devoted to the examination of the participants of insurgent wars. Sun Tze's law says, "Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without

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disaster."⁶ The purpose of this chapter is to arrive at such an understanding of the insurgent. This chapter determines the insurgent's strategic goals as they are related to the LLOC. It also determines the tactics he'll use in accomplishing those goals, as well as the strengths, weaknesses, and limitations with which the guerrilla must contend. Based on this analysis of the guerrilla's tactics and strategy, a set of principles is derived that will enable the counter-insurgent to defeat the guerrilla force. The information pertaining to the combatants was obtained from the writings of Mao Tse-Tung, "Che" Guevara, General Giap, Otto Heilbrunn, and other acknowledged experts in the field of guerrilla/insurgent war, as well as studies and pamphlets on counter guerrilla war prepared for the German, French, and American armies.

In the third chapter the US Army doctrine for securing LLOC is explained, analyzed, and evaluated. This doctrine, taken from applicable publications, is analyzed in terms of its ability to meet the general principles presented in chapter two as guidelines for defeating an insurgent force. The evaluation in this chapter will be primarily concerned with Army doctrine, as applied by American units. The purpose of this evaluation is twofold: first, to determine that the doctrine as prescribed by the field manuals is being used, and to determine what modifications have been applied by the units in the

⁶Mao Tse-Tung, Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, Vol. 2 (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 215.

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field; second, to determine whether current doctrine as modified provide the requisite security for LLOC. Combat reports, after action reports, combat studies, and the results of a questionnaire disseminated to appropriate members of the Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) class of 1969 are used in making this evaluation.

Chapter four consists of an evaluation of a typical indigenous force's tactics and ability to apply a valid doctrine for securing LLOC. In making this evaluation, South Vietnamese units presently having the mission of securing LLOC are used as models. The purpose of this evaluation is to determine whether such an indigenous unit has the capability of accomplishing the tasks inherent to the successful utilization of a valid doctrine. In evaluating the effectiveness of the Vietnamese units, combat reports tables of organization and equipment (TOE), and the results of a questionnaire disseminated to appropriate members of the USACGSC class of 1969 are used.

The fifth chapter presents a tactical doctrine and organizational structures which will provide security for LLOC. In this chapter a specific tactical concept is derived, tactical techniques are discussed, and type organizations for securing LLOC are developed.

The sixth and last chapter of this thesis contains the conclusions reached as a result of the research and analysis conducted in the study of the problem of securing LLOC. In addition to the conclusions, a number of questions that need further study are presented for consideration.

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CHAPTER II

INSURGENCY

I. INTRODUCTION

In order to solve the problem of securing LLOC in an insurgent war, it is necessary to understand both the character of the insurgent and the tactics that he will employ. The purpose of this chapter is to provide such an understanding.

It is important to realize that each insurgency will have its own national flavor and distinctive style; however, all modern insurgencies tend to follow the guidelines established by Mao Tse-Tung. These guidelines, as they have been enlarged upon by General Vo Nguyen Giap of North Vietnam and Ernesto "Che" Guevara of Cuba, will serve as the basis for the analysis of the insurgent conducted in this chapter.

This chapter examines the strategy a guerrilla hopes to utilize in interdicting LLOC, and presents a discussion of the tactics he will utilize in the accomplishment of that strategy. The analysis of the guerrilla establishes a set of military objectives which will, if achieved, lead to the defeat of an insurgent force contending for control of LLOC. The terms guerrilla and insurgent will be used interchangeably, as will the terms counter guerrilla and counterinsurgent.

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II. CHARACTER OF THE GUERRILLA

Guerrillas normally come from all walks of life. They may have been teachers, students, soldiers, peasants, intellectuals, or workers. Despite their varied backgrounds, the members of an insurgent movement have a similar outlook concerning the government and its real or imagined oppression of the natives or the common people. A basic quality shared by all guerrillas is their willingness to "do something about" their grievances.¹ This willingness to act must not be underestimated, for it is this force which enables the guerrilla to suffer hardships while in the process of achieving his goals.

The guerrilla considers himself as being in the "vanguard of the revolution."² He is a revolutionary who rarely compromises. On the subject of compromises, Mao says:

Revolutions rarely compromise; compromises are made only to further the strategic design. Negotiation, then is undertaken for the dual purpose of gaining time to buttress a position (military, political, social, economic) and to wear down, frustrate, and harass the opponent. Few, if any, essential concessions are to be expected from the revolutionary side, whose aim is only to create conditions that will preserve the unity of the strategic line and guarantee the development of a "Victorious situation."³

¹Otto Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 21.

²Mao Tse-Tung, Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, Vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 29.

³Mao Tse-Tung, Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. BG Samuel B. Griffith, USMC (Ret) (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 22.

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The guerrilla considers himself a teacher who is, of necessity, concerned with the psychological aspect of an insurgency. He will "constantly give orientation in ideological problems, explaining what he knows and what he wishes to do at the right time."⁴ This instruction will be given to the peasants, his fellow soldiers, and the prisoners whom he captures.

"As a person conscious of a role in the vanguard of the people," the guerrilla realizes his moral conduct must show him to be a true disciple of the reform to which he aspires.⁵ His role as a reformer is to redress the wrongs which have been perpetrated on the peasant, the worker, and the common man, in order to provide these people with more than a mere subsistence living, and in order to conduct meaningful land reform.

The hard core guerrilla has often proved to be a dedicated, brave soldier, who lives under a strict code and endures many hardships to achieve his goals. The modern code of the guerrilla was first established by Mao Tse-Tung for the Chinese communists, but it has been reiterated in one form or another by all other successful practitioners of insurgent war. Mao's code, presented below, is simple, direct, and easily followed by a simple and often poorly educated people.

1. Our Army's Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention have been practiced for many years, but their contents

⁴Guevara, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

⁵Ibid., p. 43.

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vary slightly in army units in different areas. They have been unified and are hereby reissued

2. The Three Main Rules of Discipline are as follows:

- (1) Obey orders in all your actions.
- (2) Don't take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses.
- (3) Turn in everything you capture.

3. The Eight Points for Attention are as follows:

- (1) Speak politely.
- (2) Pay fairly for what you buy.
- (3) Return everything you borrow.
- (4) Pay for anything you damage.
- (5) Don't hit or swear at people.
- (6) Don't damage crops.
- (7) Don't take liberties with women.
- (8) Don't ill-treat captives.⁶

A patient individual, the insurgent recognizes that it is "necessary to firmly grasp the strategy of a long term resistance, and to exalt the will to be self-supporting in order to maintain and gradually augment . . . [his] forces, while nibbling at and progressively destroying those of the enemy "⁷ The insurgents feel they must "accumulate thousands of small victories to turn them into a great success, thus gradually altering the balance of forces, in transforming . . . weakness into power and carrying off final victory."⁸ In order to accumulate these victories, the principle to which they adhere

⁶Mao Tse-Tung, Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, Vol. 5 (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 155.

⁷Vo Nguyen Giap, Peoples' War, Peoples' Army (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 28-29.

⁸Ibid.

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is to attack when success is certain and to refuse to give battle when a loss is likely to be incurred or when a hazardous action is presented.⁹

The hard core guerrilla members patiently and painstakingly prepare a detailed plan for each operation, war game it, and rehearse all phases of the plan until every member of the participating guerrilla forces knows his particular mission. The guerrilla is expected to be able to wait patiently for hours to spring an ambush he has spent days, weeks, or even months preparing and then not spring the trap if an unexpected enemy reaction occurs which would jeopardize the success of the operation.

The insurgent combat forces are composed of several units. An insurgent may be a member of a paramilitary or guerrilla organization, a regional unit, or a regular unit.¹⁰ As the member of a paramilitary unit in areas not under the established government's control, he would be concerned primarily with the security of base camps and the security of captured or liberated areas. In areas that are contested or that are under government control, the member of a paramilitary organization is concerned with starting and helping the regional forces to develop the war in the enemy's rear. This means he will engage in intelligence activities, carry messages, recruit, infiltrate the working force, spread propaganda, infiltrate the government offices, and conduct operations

⁹Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 51.

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against key industries and installations, lines of communication, and government officials. The regional forces develop the war in the enemy's rear that was started originally by the guerrillas and assist the regular units in the conduct of mobile war when the insurgency moves into that stage. The primary mission of the regular unit is to defeat the enemy in a mobile war. The insurgent's combat forces normally develop from a first stage where the only forces available to fight the government are guerrilla elements, through a stage where the available forces consist of regional units and guerrilla units, to a stage where all three elements are present and engaged in fighting the government forces. While an insurgent may start building regular forces early in the insurgency, those forces will seldom be effective in the initial stages of the war because they will lack the manpower, experience, and equipment with which to conduct a mobile war. It is normally only in the latter stages of any insurgency, when the size, experience, and equipment of the insurgent and counterinsurgent forces involved are more nearly equal, that the insurgents dare to commit their regular units in mobile war. Such was the case in both China and Vietnam when both the Red Army and the Viet Minh regular units were formed early in the insurrection but were at that time so poorly armed, manned and trained as to be ineffective in a mobile war against the Chinese Nationalists and the French.

, The problem of manpower and supply procurement, which on the surface might appear to be an insurmountable one, was solved by the

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Viet Minh, the Red Chinese, and the Cubans in the same way. They captured the majority of their arms from their enemy. On this subject General Giap said:

To organize an army, the question of equipment must be solved because arms and equipment are the material basis of the combativeness of the army The party pointed out to the army that it had to look for its equipment on the front line, to capture the enemy's weapons to arm itself and shoot at the enemy with his guns. We scored great success in implementing this principle.¹¹

An insurgent, who has literally fought for every piece of equipment he has and who will probably have to fight to secure more and better equipment in the future, is not prone to give up that equipment easily. For this reason, in a battle, great care is taken to retrieve those weapons dropped by fallen comrades.

The insurgent is an ingenious soldier capable of adapting his fighting techniques to his equipment, to the terrain over which he must fight, and to his opponent's weaknesses. One of the aspects of "guerrilla-ism" is its irregularity, i.e., "its decentralization, non-uniformity, and the lack of strict [formal] discipline, the simplicity of its methods of work, etc."¹² Since the guerrilla is not bound by techniques specifying how a battle should be fought, he is careful to note those techniques which work best and apply them with variations

¹¹Ibid., p. 134.

¹²Mao Tse-Tung, Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, Vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 246.

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again and again until he discovers the counterinsurgent force has developed an effective countermeasure. At the first sign of an effective countermeasure he will change his tactics.

Recent insurgent movements in underdeveloped nations have been caused or infiltrated by communism to one degree or another. In the case of China and Vietnam, the Communist Party became the driving force behind the revolution. In a case where communism is the force behind a revolution, the counterinsurgent is faced with the serious problem of dealing with a dynamic fanaticism that fosters the revolutionary movement. The Communist Party line is not only preached to the army, it is practiced by the army, and is the basis of all propaganda disseminated by both the party and the army. General Giap says:

The People's Army is the instrument of the Party and of the revolutionary State for the accomplishment, in armed form, of the tasks of the revolution. Profound awareness of the aims of the Party, boundless loyalty to the cause of the nation and the working class, and a spirit of unreserved sacrifice are fundamental questions for the army, and questions of principle. Therefore, the political work in its ranks is of the first importance. It is the soul of the army.¹³

This analysis of the guerrilla is intended to put him in perspective. Too often in the past, the guerrilla has been underestimated and as a result has won a war against a far stronger opponent when too little in the way of reform, manpower, and equipment was committed to the battle too late. The guerrilla is not a super-human. He is not blessed with any special intelligence. He is as prone as the

¹³Giap, op. cit., p. 50.

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next man to making mistakes. He gets hungry, needs sleep, and must be trained in order to be an effective soldier. Above all else, he must have the support of the people. In the absence of that support, he must have, as a minimum, public apathy to the war in order to succeed.

Not all members of a guerrilla band possess all the characteristics presented here. However, most of these characteristics are present in the key personnel of the guerrilla bands, often called the "hard core" guerrillas. This group forms the cadre and the leadership. This cadre, using all aspects of psychological warfare, fear, promises, and coercion is fully capable of instilling their personal attributes into the character of the entire force they are leading.

III. GUERRILLA STRATEGY

This section will discuss that strategy and tactical doctrine having an impact on lines of communication. Bear in mind that the government forces have a specific commitment to the people to provide them a means for marketing their products and for protecting them. The guerrilla does not have such a commitment. This means that the government must control the lines of communication, but that the insurgent need not. If, by interdiction, the guerrilla can deny the government and the people free use of the lines of communication, he will have made great strides toward the accomplishment of his goals.

It is difficult to separate the various aspects of strategy in order to isolate that which is concerned solely with lines of

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communication. An analysis of the insurgent's past war efforts reveals the following strategic goals which directly or indirectly affect the security of land lines of communication: (1) to preserve the guerrilla force, (2) to annihilate the enemy, (3) to gain and maintain the initiative, (4) to provide a system for supplying the insurgent forces, (5) to deny the government the free use of the roads and railroads, (6) to gain the support of the people, (7) to isolate the government's forces, (8) to develop the war into a mobile war,¹⁴ and (9) to establish a correct relationship of command.

A protracted war of quick decisions provides the vehicle through which the insurgent can best accomplish his strategic objectives. The guerrilla accepts a protracted war because he realizes that in the early stages of an insurgency he does not have the arms, ammunition, equipment, and trained personnel to compete with the counterinsurgency forces in a positional or mobile war. He further realizes that he must have time in order to gain those assets. In the conduct of a protracted war, the insurgent's strategy is to avoid prolonged battles, which he would lose, and to fight a series of smaller battles in which he attempts to achieve numerical superiority and the element of surprise.

The guerrilla's tactics for accomplishing his strategic objectives will vary depending on the stage of the insurgency. In the early stages of the war, before the insurrection progresses into a mobile war, the fighting will be accomplished by guerrilla units using

¹⁴For a definition of mobile war see appendix A.

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hit and run tactics. In the latter stages of an insurrection, regular units, using more conventional tactics, will bear the brunt of the fighting, while the guerrilla units keep constant pressure on the enemy's rear areas. Regardless of the stage of an insurrection, the tactics and techniques an insurgent will use against the LLOC remain basically the same.

When considering the tactics for accomplishing his strategic goals, the guerrilla keeps two points uppermost in his mind. First, he does not want to fight unless the odds are heavily in his favor, or he is cornered and has no other option. Second, the guerrilla wants to fight battles of quick decisions, that is, he will attempt to have the battle completed before the counterinsurgent's airpower, artillery, or reinforcements can influence the outcome.¹⁵

Actions in which the guerrilla engages normally take place at night or during periods of limited visibility. They are usually well planned, well rehearsed, and characterized by surprise, rapid assaults, violent action, annihilation of the enemy, the capturing or destruction of equipment, and the rapid dispersal of forces after the attack in order to avoid enemy counteractions.

Preservation and Popular Support

The key to the guerrilla's survival lies in his ability to win the support of the population and to avoid combat under unfavorable

¹⁵Mao Tse-Tung, Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, Vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 250.

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conditions. When a guerrilla movement is new to an area, the guerrilla must gain the acceptance of the people. His first step in gaining that acceptance is to secure the people's silence. Everyone in the area will be asked not to report what he sees or hears to the government forces.¹⁶ After the guerrilla has secured silence, he will attempt to gain the people's confidence. In order to do this, this guerrilla will develop an understanding of local problems and will help the people solve those problems. The official attitude toward the population will be both soft and hard. The guerrilla will assist and cooperate with those inhabitants who sympathize with the revolutionary movement, and he will deal very severely with those who are against the revolution.¹⁷

As the guerrilla gains the confidence of the people, he will seek to involve them in the revolution. At first he will have them act as messengers, guides and points of contact. As the insurgency develops, the people will be required to assist in the transport of goods and arms, to assist in the production of the necessities of life, and to assist in the organization of mass actions such as general strikes in critical industries. From the very beginning, the guerrilla will attempt to recruit those persons of military age for his armed force.

Very often winning the support of the people is dependent upon the insurgent's ability to win in battle. By numerous small victories,

¹⁶Guevara, op. cit., p. 22.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 79.

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the insurgent hopes to create an aura of invincibility in the minds of the people. To create this impression the guerrilla must engage the counterinsurgent at every opportunity. However, he exercises great care in the selection of the time and place for these engagements, so as to insure that he does not attack a force he cannot defeat. In these battles, which Mao calls "battles of quick decision," the insurgent's goal is to annihilate the enemy while preserving his own force.¹⁸

The insurgent is ever mindful of the government's capability to encircle and destroy his force. For this reason, a guerrilla will always secure his routes of withdrawal and he will not hesitate to break contact in a battle, even if he is winning, when those lines of withdrawal are threatened. If the guerrilla force is encircled, the counterinsurgent must expect that force to attempt to break the encirclement either by hiding his arms and mingling with the population or by massing his forces at a weak point and fighting his way out. It is important to note that the guerrilla will not hesitate to leave large items of equipment behind when he breaks out of an encirclement. When encircled the guerrilla has only one consideration, to escape with the majority of his force and their individual arms so that they can live to fight another day.

¹⁸Mao Tse-Tung, Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, Vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 250.

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Annihilate the Enemy

In order to annihilate his enemy, the guerrilla must possess the determination to attack whenever success is assured. This offensive spirit along with the ability to retain the initiative, maintain tactical mobility, possess flexibility, and prepare detailed plans is essential for the overall success of the guerrilla's efforts. The basic tactic the guerrilla will utilize in the destruction of opposing forces is that of encirclement and attack. In applying this tactic the guerrilla will isolate that unit or portion of a unit he is seeking to destroy and attack with a vastly superior force. For this technique to work effectively, the guerrilla must possess detailed knowledge of the area of operations and the ability to mass his elements at the point of attack while preventing his opponent from reinforcing the unit under attack in time to influence the action.

In the conduct of his war of attrition, the guerrilla will make maximum use of deception. He will conduct fake attacks in order to draw his enemy's attention from the area of the main attack. He will spread rumors exaggerating the size of his force in order to deceive the counterinsurgent commanders. He will conduct attacks on isolated outposts and on convoys in order to ambush the reinforcements sent to assist the besieged forces.

When large counterinsurgency forces conduct operations to encircle and destroy the guerrilla, the guerrilla can be expected to withdraw as the enemy advances, to harass him when he is stationary, to

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attack him when he is tired, and to pursue him when he retreats.¹⁹ Even when he is under attack, the guerrilla will attempt to regain the initiative by retreating to a remote point in the mountains or swamps, where the guerrilla's mobility and superior knowledge of the terrain places the counterinsurgent force at a disadvantage, in order to ambush and destroy the counter guerrilla force pursuing him.

Obtain the Initiative

In addition to attacking for the express purpose of annihilating his enemy, the guerrilla will conduct diversionary and harassing attacks in order to exhaust his opponent both mentally and physically, cause him to withdraw, and tie him to his static defensive positions. If the guerrilla is successful, he will have obtained the initiative, that is, he will have placed his opponent in the position of reacting to situations forced on him by the guerrilla. The basic idea behind the guerrilla's strategy is simply to cause the enemy to react in a manner favorable to the guerrilla. The Viet Minh manual of guerrilla warfare states:

If the enemy wants to move quickly, force him to slow down; if he wants to rest, force him to fight; if he wants to proceed on one road only, force him to use several so that he can be annihilated in small groups. The enemy must react to these techniques, and in so doing he must expose himself still more, thus offering us further opportunities for annihilating him.²⁰

¹⁹Heilbrunn, op. cit., p. 82.

²⁰Ibid., p. 80.

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The rules established by General Giap for gaining the initiative are:

A. Know your enemy. Know his troop disposition, the attitude of the troops, the state of their morale, the deployment of the intelligence units, the location and use of their transport, and the arrangement of the local guards.

B. Remedy the insurgent's weak points. The guerrilla's weak points are: (1) a lack of weapons, (2) a lack of soldiers, (3) fatigue, (4) unfavorable climatic conditions. These points should be corrected by capturing new and better arms from the enemy, by proper coordination and the massing of guerrilla units to secure a common objective, by keeping fit and ever on the alert, and by seeking favorable terrain over which to fight.

C. Know how to discover the enemy's weak points. The guerrilla must know such vital information as the state of the enemy's morale, the manner in which sentries are performing their duties, the presence of a general laxity on the part of the counterinsurgent, and the status of provisions and other critical items.

D. Achieve the seemingly impossible. Accomplish that which the enemy thinks can't be done. For example, if the enemy is about to attack the guerrilla must attack first, but from a direction which the enemy considered himself secure from attack.

E. If the enemy has no weak points, create them. In order to create weaknesses the guerrilla will use harassing attacks, diversionary

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attacks, attacks on the enemy's lines of communication, stratagems and provocations. An excellent example of a provocation and a stratagem that could be used during the course of any battle would be to give the impression that the guerrilla is beaten and forced to withdraw. When the enemy takes up the pursuit, he is drawn into an ambush and annihilated. In order to create weak points, the utmost secrecy about the guerrilla's plans must be maintained, but at the same time the other principles for retaining the initiative are followed with special emphasis on the principle, know your enemy.²¹

Isolate the Counterinsurgent

One of the insurgent's goals is to isolate the government and its agents from the people and from one another. In order to accomplish this goal the insurgent must drive a political wedge between the people and their government. Suffice it to say, that until the people have gained an empathy for the revolutionary movement, they represent a major source of intelligence, revenue, and manpower for the established government. It is not until the government has lost the support of the people that the insurgent can achieve the second aspect of isolation, that of militarily isolating units.

The purpose of isolating military forces is to allow the guerrilla to mass in sufficient strength to defeat the government's forces one at a time. To enable him to accomplish this task, the

²¹Ibid., pp. 80-81.

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guerrilla must possess the initiative. By so doing, the guerrilla is able to attack when and where he chooses, causing the counterinsurgent to react to the threat such a situation poses to the existence of units and key installations. The insurgent hopes to force a situation, whereby, the government feels it must reinforce the outposts and security guards threatened by the guerrilla.

By reinforcing his outposts and defensive positions, the counterinsurgent is dispersing his forces more, he is committing more and more resources to a static or semistatic security role, and he is decreasing the size, mobility, and capability of the forces operating in search of guerrilla units, base camps, and other safe guerrilla areas.

Once the counterinsurgent has become defense oriented and begins to build fortified enclaves, he begins to lose touch with the problems of the people in that area, thus opening the door for the guerrilla to gain more support from the people. When a counterinsurgent force becomes tied to their strong defensive positions for reasons of their own security, the guerrilla not only gains more of the people's support, he also gains in mobility and flexibility. Eventually the guerrilla will gain so much in strength, mobility, and flexibility that his forces will again present a serious threat to the existence of the outposts and key installations causing them to be either withdrawn or reinforced once more. This situation could deteriorate until the guerrilla has obtained enough strength to initiate the mobile war phase of the insurgency and is capable of defeating even strong garrisons despite their fortifications.

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Supply

In order to establish a supply system, the guerrilla must have a source of supplies, a means of passing those supplies to the personnel and units who need them, and a means of stockpiling critical supplies in preparations for future operations. The primary source of arms and ammunition will be the established government. By conducting raids and ambushes the guerrilla will obtain weapons, ammunition, equipment, food, and medicines. Primitive factories will be established in his base or safe areas for the manufacture of munitions, mines, clothes, and shoes. The guerrilla will attempt to grow his own food. He will buy critical supplies with money that he secures by donations or from taxation in the areas which he dominates.

Once the source of supply has been established, the guerrilla must move the supplies to the units needing them. The people are the primary source of transportation. Supplies may be carried by special porter units, moving mainly at night, over LOC used principally by the insurgents or they may be carried over the existing LLOC by the local populace. If the goods are transported by local people, they will be hidden on their persons or in their vehicles, or they will be disguised as products being taken to local markets.

The stockpiling of supplies presents a special problem for the guerrilla because of his primitive methods for preservation. The guerrilla stockpiles supplies for two reasons: (1) to store and preserve critical items, and (2) as a means of preparing for an

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operation. When the guerrilla stockpiles critical supplies and equipment, he will normally locate the caches near, but not within, his base areas. He does this to prevent his opponent from finding the supplies while conducting normal operations against a base area. The guerrilla can increase his mobility by stockpiling bulky items of equipment and ammunition near the area for a proposed operation. Not only does such stockpiling increase the speed of movement of the guerrilla forces, it also allows the force to arrive at the proposed site for combat in better physical condition.

If the guerrilla force has an outside source of supply, that is, he is being supplied by another power, his problem of procurement is eased. When this is the case, however, the guerrilla's problem of moving the supplies is greatly increased.

Command

The problem of command has proved a difficult one for guerrillas to solve. The most workable solution was presented by Mao Tse-Tung. His technique was to have centralized strategic command and decentralized control of campaigns and battles. In establishing his command structure, Mao realized that a tendency to retain tactical command at too high a level could be hazardous to the successful prosecution of the war. Mao felt that it should not be necessary for the higher command to have to say anything about specific actions, but that if they felt they must, they should do so in the form of directives not in the form of "irrevocable orders." The purpose of the

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decentralization of command in campaigns and battles is twofold; first, it is impossible for the higher commanders to know enough about a specific situation to be able to react to that situation in sufficient time to be effective, second, such a system makes the actions more pertinent to the local situation, while developing the abilities of the local leaders to handle complicated problems.²² Recognizing the problems of communication inherent to decentralized command and the somewhat parochial view that will be held by local guerrilla leaders, the insurgent leadership at the national level establishes centralized control whenever possible.

Mobile War

The guerrilla realizes that a revolutionary war cannot be won by guerrilla action alone. He realizes that the revolution must progress to a mobile war phase for the guerrilla to achieve the military victory he is seeking. Mao describes mobile war as, "that form of exterior-line quick decision attack in campaigns and battles which is undertaken by regular army corps along an extensive front in a vast theatre of war."²³ Mobile war is characterized by offensive action and a fluid situation, although it includes attacks on positions and some positional defenses. It permits corps and armies to advance and retreat

²²Mao Tse-Tung, Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 152-156.

²³Ibid., p. 222.

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in great strides, since its aim is to annihilate the enemy rather than gain and retain territory.

In developing the insurgency into a mobile war, some of the guerrilla forces will be transformed into regular units to augment those regular units which were organized for the express purpose of fighting such a war. This transformation includes the shedding of some of the guerrilla unit's preoccupation with their local situation. By making the change the guerrilla unit will be improved politically, organizationally, and militarily. The development of an insurgency into a mobile war and the upgrading of some guerrilla units to regular units will not affect the battle for control of the lines of communication other than to cause it to be intensified. The concept of mobile war envisions the extensive use of guerrilla operations to augment and supplement the actions of regular units.

When will the guerrilla move his revolution into the mobile war phase? Basically, the guerrilla will move into the mobile war phase when he feels that he can win a mobile war. Specifically it appears that the guerrilla will move into a mobile war when:

- A. He has obtained the initiative.
- B. The enemy has tended to become defense minded.
- C. The number of men in his force is nearly equal to that in the counter guerrilla force.
- D. He has enough weapons, equipment, and ammunition to initiate a mobile war. After the initiation of a mobile war the insurgent feels

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that he will secure large amounts of equipment in the subsequent battles.

E. He has a relatively stable base area for providing the basic necessities of life.

F. His leaders are well enough trained for fighting and winning a mobile war.

G. His units are well enough trained to successfully fight the counterinsurgent forces.

H. He has gained the support of the people or has effectively denied that support to the counterinsurgent force.

Lines of Communication

The battle for the control of the lines of communication is both a means and an end for the guerrilla force. It is the means by which the guerrilla can accomplish his strategic goals. It is an end, in that, when he accomplishes his objective of denying the government the use of the LLOC, he will have established one more link in the chain leading to a successful revolution.

The guerrilla's tactics for interdicting the LLOC are basically mining, ambushing, and the destruction of key installations. Those specific techniques for mining and ambushing which a guerrilla will utilize are well known and will not be discussed in detail here. The tactical techniques he will use in the destruction of key installations are adaptations of standard assault and raid tactics. Generally speaking, the guerrilla will employ all the strategies and tactical techniques

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discussed in previous sections of this chapter to support his interdiction effort.

IV. COUNTERGUERRILLA TACTICS

The problem of securing land lines of communication has political, social, economic, and military implications. Since this thesis is considering only the military aspect of the problem, the other subjects will not be developed except in those areas vital to a particular type of military action. Suffice it to say that, if the guerrilla can be deprived of his social, political, and agrarian reform programs, as was done in the Philippines, then the guerrilla movement will collapse.

The question of political, social, and agrarian reform must be resolved at the highest level and implemented by all elements of the government. Military and police units securing the lines of communication should be prepared to assist the government in the implementation of programs designed to promote an understanding of the government's goals for land reform, honesty in government, and social equality. Often the military units will be the only government agencies which will come in daily contact with the people of an area. For this reason, it is essential that they treat the people fairly, eradicate corruption, learn and understand the problems of the people, and help to solve these problems. Such actions are essential first steps in the accomplishment of all the counterinsurgent's goals.

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The efforts against the guerrilla must be designed to deny the guerrilla his popular support base and to force him to accept combat under unfavorable circumstances. The tactics that will be used to accomplish these objectives will vary from country to country in much the same manner that the character and nature of insurgencies vary. Just as the insurgent follows the principles established by Mao, Giap, and Guevara, the counterinsurgent should have a set of military goals that will prevent the guerrilla from accomplishing his objectives. These military objectives must be designed to counter the insurgent strategies and tactics that were discussed in the previous section.

Based on the analysis conducted in the previous section, this author has derived seven military goals that will lead to the defeat of an insurgent contending for control of the LLOC. These goals are: (1) deny the insurgent the support of the people, (2) prevent the insurgent from isolating the government from the people and from other governmental forces, (3) prevent the guerrilla force from destroying counter guerrilla units, (4) obtain and maintain the initiative, (5) prevent the insurgent from obtaining supplies, (6) destroy the guerrilla force, and (7) keep the LLOC open for use by the people and the counterinsurgent force.

Now that the counterinsurgent's military goals have been defined, it is necessary to consider the ways and means for accomplishing those goals. Each of these goals will be discussed in two parts, with the first part being a general discussion of the goal and the second part

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being a list of specific actions that must be taken to accomplish that goal.

Deny the Insurgent the Support of the People

A. General: This problem has both a military and a civil aspect. The civil aspects are basic to the defeat of any insurgency and have been covered in previous sections of this chapter. The military aspects of the problem are primarily concerned with supporting the government's social and economic programs and physically separating the people from the insurgent. The people must be made to believe that the government is not only capable of protecting them, but is willing to do so.

B. Actions: The military forces with the mission of securing the LLOC must know, understand, and help find solutions for the problems affecting the people living along the LLOC. The governmental forces must be completely honest and upright in their dealings with the people. The guerrillas are to be kept out of the hamlets, and the people are to be protected from acts of terror, from coercion, and from contact with the guerrilla. All military actions initiated by the guerrilla must be countered as soon as possible.

The Counterinsurgent Must Prevent the Guerrilla from Isolating Its Units

A. General: This goal is closely linked with the previous one. If the guerrilla has won the support of the people, it will be easy for the guerrilla to isolate the government's units stationed along the

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LLOC. Above all else, the guerrilla must not be allowed to successfully employ his favorite tactic of encirclement and destruction.

B. Actions: No force should be committed to a post or an area along the LLOC where sufficient support in the form of artillery and/or reinforcements is not readily available. The counterinsurgent has to maintain constant surveillance of the area between and adjacent to all units in order to prevent the guerrilla from massing unexpectedly for the purpose of encircling and destroying counterinsurgent units.

The Government Must Prevent the Destruction of Its Forces

A. General: The counterinsurgent must avoid combat under unfavorable conditions. That is to say, he must not allow himself to be placed in a position where he can be encircled by a superior force and destroyed. Nor, should the counterinsurgent be deceived by guerrilla ruses or false intelligence and commit his units to foolhardy missions where his forces will be subjected to ambushes. The prerequisites for avoiding combat under unfavorable conditions are:

(1) gain and maintain the initiative, (2) retain flexibility, (3) possess a greater mobility than the guerrilla, and (4) know the enemy. The goal of gaining and maintaining the initiative is so important to the overall success of every counterguerrilla action that it will be discussed in a separate paragraph. The counterguerrilla has to be able to react to rapid changes in the tactical situation, so that he can mass his forces whenever he makes contact with a guerrilla unit or whenever an outlying unit is threatened with isolation and

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destruction. An aggressive, alert intelligence network is essential to the detection of the guerrilla's ruses and false intelligence efforts. Mobility is as much a state of mind as it is the possession of vehicles and the roads on which to use those vehicles. It is extremely important for the counterinsurgent not to become road bound.

B. Actions: Establish an effective, aggressive, alert, intelligence net. Insure that a positive system of communications exists between all elements of every command as a measure designed to provide the commanders at every level with the maximum flexibility. When reacting to a guerrilla action, do the unexpected, i.e., come from a direction the guerrilla would not expect, mass more forces than he expects, or utilize air to prevent being surprised and to achieve the element of surprise. Be prepared both mentally and physically to maneuver units rapidly over any terrain the guerrilla attempts to utilize. When encircled and in danger of being annihilated, concentrate the available force on the guerrilla's weakest point and effect a breakout.

The Counterinsurgent Must Obtain and Retain the Initiative

A. General: The guerrilla must not be allowed to select the time and place for a battle. He must be made to fight the war on the counterinsurgent's terms.

B. Actions: Attack the guerrilla before he attacks you. Be aggressive, keep a constant pressure on the guerrilla by seeking him and attacking him at every opportunity. Be prepared to react immediately

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to any guerrilla attack. Every guerrilla action should be countered, if it is at all possible.

The Insurgent's Source of Supply Has to be Eliminated

A. General: The guerrilla's source of supply must be eliminated. Those supplies he has stored must be found and confiscated or destroyed. The insurgent has to be separated from the people so that he will not be able to use them for the manufacture and movement of supplies. In those cases where the guerrilla has a source of supplies that lies outside the country, the lines of communication between the source and the guerrilla must be severed.

B. Actions: All counterinsurgent forces must be trained to thoroughly police the battlefield for weapons and other supplies before they leave it, even if that battlefield must be evacuated under fire. Operations must be conducted specifically for the purpose of discovering guerrilla base areas, caches, and other in-country sources of supply. Re-locate those villages and hamlets that it is impossible to secure, provided such a relocation is politically and economically feasible. Build barriers, conduct extensive patrols, and employ units along the borders of adjacent countries that are supplying the insurgent.

Destroy the Guerrilla Force

A. General: The guerrilla force in being must be destroyed. Such a destruction may be accomplished by killing the members of a unit, capturing them, inducing them to surrender, or any combination of the

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three. The guerrilla must be prevented from reconstituting his forces through conscription, as well as, by recruiting. The guerrilla infrastructure located in the towns along the LLOC must be destroyed.

B. Actions: Seek to encircle and destroy or capture the guerrillas at every opportunity. Establish an effective program of population and resources control so as to provide security to villages and hamlets and deny the guerrilla recruiting teams access to the country's youth. Establish an amnesty program for those guerrillas who grow tired of the fighting or disenchanted with the revolutionary ideology.

Keep the LLOC Open

A. General: In the defense of lines of communication lies the key to defeating the guerrillas. It is impossible to defend the LLOC unless the actions listed in previous paragraphs of this section are accomplished; and yet, the accomplishment of these actions is dependent upon being able to utilize the LLOC to provide the supplies needed to sustain operations against the guerrilla. While many defensive techniques have been developed to combat the minings, ambushes, and raids, these tactics, although they may be somewhat successful, do not strike at the source of the problem, the guerrilla. Lines of communication, in and of themselves, cannot be secured without placing a major emphasis on the conduct of offensive actions along and adjacent to the LLOC. These operations should be designed to rob the insurgent of the initiative, to prevent him from isolating and destroying units guarding

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vital installations on the LLOC, to separate him from the people, to prevent him from being supplied, and to destroy the guerrilla forces in being.

B. Actions: Military units with the mission of securing LLOC should apply all the actions specified in previous paragraphs of this section in addition to the numerous specific defensive techniques designed to counter the guerrilla's techniques of mining, ambushing, and raiding.

V. SUMMARY

"Hard core" insurgents have proved to be dedicated revolutionaries whose personal characteristics are: (1) dedication, (2) refusal to compromise, (3) patience, (4) hardiness, (5) thrift, and (6) willingness to do something about their grievances. Realizing that in the initial stages of a revolution they do not have the men, weapons, and supplies to wage a war, recent insurgents have chosen Mao Tse-Tung's technique of fighting a protracted war with "battles of quick decision" as the vehicle for defeating the counterinsurgent. During the conduct of the protracted war, the insurgent will attempt to gain the support of the people and increase his manpower and armament, while avoiding combat that would lead to the destruction of his units. In the conduct of a protracted war, the insurgent has nine strategic objectives that directly or indirectly affect the security of the LLOC. These nine objectives are: (1) preserve the guerrilla force, (2) annihilate the

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enemy, (3) gain and maintain the initiative, (4) provide a system of supply, (5) deny the government free use of the roads, (6) gain the support of the people, (7) isolate the government, (8) develop the revolution into a mobile war stage, (9) establish a correct relationship of command.

The counterinsurgent, too, must have tactical objectives that will enable him to defeat the insurgent vying for control of the LLOC. Based on the analysis of the insurgent force presented in this chapter, the following military goals have been selected as those goals which will defeat a guerrilla force: (1) deny the insurgent the support of the people, (2) prevent the insurgent from isolating the government's forces, (3) prevent the destruction of the counterguerrilla force, (4) prevent the guerrilla from gaining and maintaining the initiative, (5) prevent the insurgent from gaining supplies, (6) destroy the guerrilla force, and (7) keep the LLOC open for use by the people and the counterinsurgent force.

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CHAPTER III

US ARMY DOCTRINE FOR SECURING LAND LINES OF COMMUNICATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Now that the problems facing an established government in an insurgency have been identified and strategic goals for defeating the insurgent have been set, it is proper to consider what is being done to accomplish those goals. This chapter will consider one aspect of what is being done to accomplish those goals by examining current American doctrine for securing LLOC, as it is presented in the field manuals and applied in South Vietnam. The doctrine examined in this chapter is taken from the appropriate field manuals, with FM 31-15, Operations Against Irregular Forces; FM 31-16, Counter guerrilla Operations; FM 31-23, Stability Operations - US Army Doctrine; and FM 31-73, Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations, serving as the primary sources.¹

Since this study is concerned with establishing a tactical concept for the use of an indigenous force, why examine American doctrine? The conflict in Vietnam has demonstrated that a well equipped and properly trained American unit can solve the problems inherent to securing lines of communication (this statement will be supported in a

¹Other sources are Field Manuals 31-20, 31-22, 31-22A, and 100-20.

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later section of this chapter). An emerging nation, however, will not have the same equipment, trained forces, and logistical support that the American units have. That is, an emerging nation will not have this support unless it is receiving aid under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). It is precisely because of the American aid in the form of weapons, munitions, training facilities, and advisors, that the examination of American doctrine is pertinent to this study.

It is important while examining the doctrine for securing the LLOC to realize that the fight for control of the LLOC is only one part of an overall program for defeating an insurgent. Many actions not directly related to LLOC security are going to be conducted in the vicinity of the LLOC. Obviously, any counter guerrilla force operating near an LLOC is going to have an incidental effect on the security of that LLOC. What is not so obvious, however, is the amount of incidental security provided by such a force, and the length of time that security will be effective once that unit has left the area.

Since a guerrilla's acknowledged tactics are to avoid contact with a superior force, it would appear that a regular force operating near the LLOC would have little lasting effect on the security of that LLOC unless that regular force was committed to the task of destroying the specific guerrilla force interdicting the LLOC. Or to put it another way, a regular unit must be committed to the mission of securing the area of a LLOC, by destroying the guerrillas in that area, in order to have a lasting effect. In that light, it is well to remember that

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the insurgent is organized into three distinct units, and that the forces normally committed to the interdiction of LLOC are his para-military and regional forces and not his regular units. The counter-guerrilla's regular forces have habitually been targeted against these regular units.²

Because of the transitory nature of regular units that are committed to other operations in, or near the area of an LLOC, and the transitory nature of the incidental support they provide the units committed to securing the LLOC, very little emphasis has been given to that aspect of LLOC security in this study. If units are committed to seek out and destroy the guerrilla in the total area comprising an LLOC, they have been in effect committed to LLOC security, and should be counted as such. If a unit is based in the area of an LLOC, but operates outside that area, it will have little lasting effect on the security of that LLOC.

II. PRECEPTS UPON WHICH US DOCTRINE IS BASED

The US Army doctrine is based on the following precepts:

A. The growth and development of the guerrilla force is based on that force gaining the support of the people.

B. Regardless of how many battles are won, the guerrilla will always be able to reconstitute his forces unless the factors causing the revolution are eliminated.

²A discussion on the targeting of counterinsurgent forces against the guerrilla is contained in Chapter IV.

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C. The goal of the government is to eliminate the insurgent and prevent the reconstitution of his forces. Tasks that will lead to the accomplishment of this goal are:

1. Establishment of an effective intelligence system.
2. Separation of the guerrilla from his support.
3. Destruction of the guerrilla force by death, capture or defection.
4. Correction of the political, social, and economic problems that created the insurrection.

D. The principles for the conduct of operations are:

1. Unity of command, the combination of civil and military authority under one commander.
2. "Military actions are conducted in consonance with specified civil rights, liberties, and objectives."³
3. Stress is placed on offensive operations.
4. "Police, combat, and civic action operations are conducted simultaneously."⁴
5. Elements committed against the guerrilla should possess better mobility than the insurgent.⁵

³US Army, Field Manual 31-15, Operations Against Irregular Forces (Washington: Government Printing Office, May 1961), p. 4.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., pp. 3-4.

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III. LAND LINES OF COMMUNICATION SECURITY PROCEDURES

Doctrine for Use by American Units

In establishing current doctrine, the field manuals appear to have taken the limited view that a LLOC is a road or railroad, rather than that of a LLOC being a broad avenue of approach which contains the road, railroad, or pipeline, or a combination of the three and that terrain necessary to control these routes. Field Manual 31-15 envisions that it may not be possible to secure surface lines of communication, stating:

Surface lines of communication which have proved particularly vulnerable to guerrilla attack and sabotage should be abandoned, at least temporarily, if at all possible. Long surface lines of communications cannot be completely protected against a determined irregular force without committing an excessive number of troops.⁶

The techniques for securing the LLOC are basically of three types: those procedures designed to protect the motor convoys, those procedures for protecting trains, and those procedures designed to secure the key installations on the road and railroad.

Convoy Security. Doctrine for providing convoy security states that all movements must be planned in detail and conducted as tactical operations. The close coordination necessary in planning convoy moves is to be conducted through the local area coordination center. While

⁶Ibid., p. 23.

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planning a move, provisions must be made to provide security for the convoy's front, flanks, and rear, air cover must be provided, and the utmost secrecy about the movement must be maintained. Great care must be taken when planning the time a convoy will depart and the route a convoy will take to insure that both the times and routes are varied to avoid setting a pattern. As a further precaution against setting undesirable patterns, the locations of the leaders and automatic weapons within the convoy should also be varied from convoy to convoy. In addition to the above planning factors, contingency plans for immediate action against ambushes must be prepared by the convoy commander and by the commander of the area through which the convoy will pass.

The local inhabitants along a route should be interrogated for possible intelligence about the enemy's action before a convoy begins to move. Troops should be committed to route and security operations if they are needed and/or are available. Whenever possible, combat engineers should accompany the convoy to make minor repairs and remove any mines that might be found, in order to keep the convoy moving.

Once a convoy has begun to move, close and continuous fire support should be made available along the entire route the convoy will follow. It is essential that the convoy have positive communications with the artillery located along the route and the reserve units provided for in the area commander's contingency plans, as well as throughout the convoy. Every possible means of avoiding an ambush should be utilized by the convoy commanders. Examples of the means recommended are aerial

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observations, scout dogs, and surveillance radars stationed at the outposts along the way. A very effective technique for providing convoy security, if the terrain will allow it, is that of having the security forces move by bounds and provide overwatching fire while the rest of the convoy is moving through an area.⁷

Train Security. The doctrine for securing trains is somewhat different from that for securing road convoys. It does not call for the train movements to be conducted as tactical operations. The manuals prescribe that the train crew is to control the train until it is stopped. Once a train has been stopped, the senior man aboard or the escort commander, if there is one, is to assume command and undertake the defense of the train. Radio communications with way stations are to be maintained at all times and will be used to call for assistance.

The field manuals state that railway installations are to be secured by establishing areas of responsibility for the various levels of command. When the railroad traffic is moving through an area, that unit having area responsibility is responsible for the safety of the train. This procedure is in direct contrast with highway convoy movement procedures which require coordination with the local area coordination center and military units along the route. Other operations conducted to

⁷US Army, Field Manual 31-16, Counter guerrilla Operations (Washington: Government Printing Office, March 1967), pp. 92-94.

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assist in the securing of the railroad include: (1) armored train patrols, (2) the positive block method of dispatching,⁸ (3) the use of the armored car, (4) railroad gondolas prepared for defense, (5) the locomotive being preceded by two or more flat cars, (6) the firing of weapons and flamethrowers when passing through likely ambush sites.⁹

The Security of Key Installations. FM 31-15 lists the following procedures for protecting the key installations along the LLOC.

A. Standard defensive measures for the protection of installations and repair and maintenance crews.

B. The establishment of permanent guards or continuous surveillance of the approaches to such things as cuts in mountain passes, underpasses, bridges, tunnels, locks, pumping stations, water towers, and terminals.

C. The clearing of the right-of-way of all inhabitants, brush, and woods for a distance of 300 meters on both sides of the LLOC and post it as a restricted zone.

⁸A method of dispatching used on a single track railroad. A train is not dispatched from a secured way station until the train which preceded it has cleared the track to the next secured way station.

⁹FM 31-16, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

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D. Conduct frequent air and ground patrols, day and night, along the right-of-way and to the flanks of the right-of-way.¹⁰

Other Considerations. It is envisioned in the field manuals that American combat units will not be used for the task of securing LLOC when they are committed to assist a host country in an insurgency. This task will be left to the "armed, paramilitary, and irregular forces, police, and intelligence agencies" of the host country as an integral part of populace and resource control operations.¹¹ In those instances where American units are committed to secure the LLOC, they will normally be committed as a part of a consolidation operation and those procedures listed on page 63 are to be used.

Doctrine to be Used by US Advisors

The doctrine presented in this section was specifically designed for the use of an advisory team whose advisory organization will parallel the organization of the police, military, and paramilitary units of the host country. The advisor's mission is "to administer US military assistance planning and programming in the host country and to support military requirements of the Country Team." In the accomplishment of this mission, advisory personnel will be required to advise, assist,

¹⁰FM 31-15, op. cit., p. 23.

¹¹US Army, Field Manual 31-23, Stability Operations - US Army Doctrine (Washington: Government Printing Office, October 1967), p. 82.

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and influence their counterpart in order to enable him to perform his duties effectively. While advisors are not specifically designated as instructors, their job will entail a great deal of instructing.¹²

The object of LLOC security, as stated in the manuals, is "to obtain the uninterrupted flow of government and civilian traffic, communications and materials."¹³ The basic operations envisioned to obtain this security are: (1) detailed surveillance of the LLOC, (2) security of key installations, (3) escort of convoys and trains, and (4) the establishment of priorities for the protection of key or primary LLOC. The forces utilized to accomplish those objectives "are organized to guard bridges and tunnels and to provide convoy security elements." All movements will be coordinated through the area coordination centers (ACC). Any specialized force organized on a national basis such as railway security forces should be under the operational control of the ACC in the province in which they are operating. Operations to provide security for LLOC require careful planning, careful training, and prompt reaction to insurgent actions.¹⁴

Like that doctrine prescribed for American units, the tactical doctrine for advisors whose units have the mission of securing LLOC assumes a rather narrow view of securing LLOC and it places considerable emphasis on defensive tactics.

¹²FM 31-16, op. cit., pp. 106-107.

¹³FM 31-23, op. cit., p. 81.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 80-82.

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Highway Security. FM 31-23 stresses the defensive nature of highway security measures by saying "the objective of highway security is to protect individuals, traffic, and convoys, and to secure bridges, tunnels, and other installations from destruction and sabotage."¹⁵ The measures recommended for securing the highways stress counterintelligence, clearing the roadsides to eliminate likely ambush spots, and the use of air cover to prevent or minimize the effect of an ambush. Troop units will be used to provide armed escorts and to conduct route and area reconnaissance prior to the movement of a convoy. Positive communications within the convoy and supporting forces must be established.

Railroad Security. The specific tactics for securing railroads are somewhat more aggressive than those proposed for securing highways. The manuals recommend the organization of special railway security forces on a national level. These units are to be given the mission of protecting the trains while moving, protecting the railroad operating personnel, and defending the terminals and key way stations. In addition to the railway security forces, the manuals recommend the formation of paramilitary regional forces to accomplish the mission of securing key installations along the railroad. These regional forces will also be charged with the responsibility for providing reinforcements for trains

¹⁵Ibid., p. 81.

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under attack and conducting tactical operations, patrolling activities, and ground and aerial surveillance along the rail lines. Daily patrols of the rail line will be conducted by railroad employees called track walkers. Periodic day and night armored train patrols of selected portions of the rail line are to be conducted by the railway security forces.

Additional security measures prescribed for the railroad are:

(1) aircraft patrol of the rail lines, (2) aircraft escort of selected trains, (3) aerial photo reconnaissance missions, and (4) close air support for trains under attack. Mine detectors, pilot cars with sensory equipment, and mine pre-exploders or neutralizer devices are mentioned as possible additional means for the prevention of minings.¹⁶

It is well to anticipate the future use of such sophisticated devices, but no such devices are capable of operating effectively at this time. Mine detectors are of little value because the mines can be, and normally are, buried beneath the metal rail making it impossible to detect them with a mine sweeper. To further add to the problems caused by metal rails, in many areas of the world the wooden tie has been replaced by a metal tie. A pilot car using sensory equipment to detect mines was developed and combat tested in Vietnam in 1967 and 1968. The combat test proved that the machine and the concept under which it

¹⁶Ibid.

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was built were both completely impractical.¹⁷ No useable mine pre-exploder or neutralized exists.¹⁸

The Security of Key Installations. Although this subject is not treated separately in the manuals, it was implied that the techniques prescribed for securing key installations are those standard defensive tactics that would be used in defending any position. These security procedures must stress the importance of retaining the key installation being protected, assisting other security sites by fire, and assisting the convoys or trains passing through the area when assistance is needed.

IV. THE APPLICATION OF US DOCTRINE IN VIETNAM

The Application of Doctrine

The manner in which the Army's doctrine is employed will be shown by means of a case study supported by a Combat Developments Command report, and a questionnaire completed by members of the USACGSC class of 1968-1969. The LLOC selected for the case study was Highway 19 from Qui Nhon to Pleiku. This highway was selected because it was, and is a critical artery needed to support major operations in the central highlands of South Vietnam. The French felt it was so important that in

¹⁷Railway Security Advisory Detachment, Evaluation of Railroad Ambush Detector, dated 3 May 1969, pp. 8-10.

¹⁸This statement was confirmed by a telephone conversation with Mr. Graham of the Materiel Readiness Command, Limited Warfare Laboratory, on 22 April 1969.

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the latter stages of the French-Indo Chinese War, they committed the elite Group Mobile 100, a force of about 3,500 men armed with the latest equipment, to include tanks and self-propelled artillery, and several smaller units to defend that LLOC.

The magnitude of the problem encountered in securing Highway 19 can be surmised by the fact that the French were eventually forced to withdraw these forces from the area due to intense enemy pressure. The extreme intensity of this pressure was clearly demonstrated when the Group Mobile 100 was completely destroyed during the withdrawal.¹⁹

When the American units arrived in Vietnam and were deployed into the central highland area, they discovered that the size and intensity of the problem of securing Highway 19 had not diminished. In the early stages of the American deployment it required a major tactical effort to open Highway 19 for the periodic supply convoys that were dispatched to carry necessities to the troop units. The remainder of the time the highway was closed and critical supplies had to be flown to the central highland area.²⁰

Since that time, major operations have been conducted along Highway 19 with outstanding results. As of the first part of 1969 the

¹⁹Jac Weller, "Highway 19, Then and Now," Military Review, XLVIII (December 1968), p. 58.

²⁰The information concerning the status of Highway 19 was obtained in an interview conducted on 24 April 1969 with Major V. P. McDonald, a member of the faculty at USACGSC who was located in Qui Nhon during the initial deployment of the American forces in that area.

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highway was open on a continuous basis and convoys moved along that route at the rate of 500 trucks a day. As further evidence of the effectiveness of the operations to open and secure Highway 19, in January 1969, one cavalry squadron was able to secure that critical 40 mile section of the highway that passes through the Nangyang pass where the Group Mobile 100 was destroyed.

While major forces were committed to the opening of Highway 19, the size of the force committed to the securing of the highway is not significant to this study. What is significant, however, are the tactics the units employed to open the road and to keep it secured once it was open. In any war, the force committed to a mission will be that force deemed necessary to accomplish the mission. If it is felt two divisions are needed to secure a road and that road is vital to the success of other operations, then two divisions will probably be committed to road security. This axiom is also true in an insurgent war for when the insurgents' regular units are operating in strength against the roads, major combat forces will probably be deployed to defeat them.

The emphasis throughout the conduct of all operations to secure Highway 19 was on mobility, firepower, and rapid reaction to Viet Cong attacks. For example, the nine bridges in the Nangyang area were secured by static security posts consisting of dug-in tanks and armored personnel carriers, fully capable of defending themselves. These tanks and armored personnel carriers were also fully capable of leaving their positions and moving to the assistance of other nearby elements. It was

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this ability to react rapidly to any threat, along with the multiple operations in the area of the LLOC which proved the key to securing Highway 19. Such rapid reaction, however, was not limited to units providing security for the road and conducting operations in the territory immediately adjacent to that road. Close air support, helicopter gunships, and artillery all provided quick reaction support until additional armor, mechanized infantry, and/or infantry units could be deployed.

Rapid reaction was possible only because of the mobility that the units enjoyed in the form of helicopters, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and, what is more important, the capability of using them anywhere along the road. In order to obtain this capability, the road was paved to help prevent minings. It was widened to allow for two lane traffic, thus preventing bottlenecks. Perhaps the most important step of all, however, was the clearing of the jungle along both sides of the road to reduce the danger of ambushes and to allow for the tactical movement of armored vehicles beside the road. As Mr. Jac Weller put it in his article on Highway 19, "Highway 19 is open because the armored cavalry units presently deployed along it can fight where they are, or move along it, or beside it, in spite of anything the enemy can do."²¹

Rapid reaction was not the only technique used to secure Highway 19. Each of the convoys that traversed the highway had modified trucks

²¹Weller, op. cit., p. 63.

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and jeeps with armor plating and automatic weapons that helped them provide convoy security, thus releasing combat units for other missions. Numerous patrols, both aerial and ground, along and adjacent to the road were conducted daily.

As can be seen from the above, the tactics employed in securing Highway 19 were not limited to those specified in the manuals for securing convoys, trains, and key installations. Numerous operations, patrols, and ambushes were conducted along the entire route, in order to eliminate the guerrilla and to deprive him of the initiative. These operations were conducted both day and night, not only directly on the road itself, but at distances from the road varying from one hundred meters to several kilometers.

Highway 19 is not an isolated case study. A meeting was held on 14 November 1967 at United States Army, Vietnam, Headquarters to discuss the problems of providing convoy and route security and to present recommended techniques for solving these problems. One of the techniques for securing a route presented at that meeting is called the "Sustained Outpost Method."²² This method calls for the establishment of strong defensive positions at critical bridges and defiles using protective wire and armored personnel carriers and tanks, much as was done along Highway 19. Patrols are to be conducted all along and adjacent to the route being secured. Quick reaction forces were visualized to

²²US Army Combat Developments Command, Liaison Detachment, Survey of Route and Convoy Security Methods (14 November 1967), pp. 6-7.

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assist any outpost under attack. Before the road is used each day, all outposts were to conduct simultaneous clearing of those sections of the road that were not physically secured. All convoys running on the route were to enter the communications net of the outpost system in order to reduce the danger of ambushes by reducing the response time for reaction forces. The symposium recommended that armored cavalry units be used to perform this type of security.²³

In Vietnam, those American units charged with securing the LLOC place a great deal of emphasis on the use of offensive tactics to accomplish their mission, as can be seen in the operations to secure Highway 19 and the report on the USARV symposium. Further evidence to support this statement can be found in the Combined Campaign Plan AB 144 which will be discussed at length in the next chapter, and through a questionnaire (see Appendix E) distributed to selected members of the Command and General Staff College class of 1968-1969. The questionnaire was structured to accomplish the following objectives: (1) to determine what type of tactics are being used in Vietnam to secure the LLOC, (2) to determine the extent to which American units are actively engaged in securing LLOC, and (3) to determine how the men in the field rated the tactics they employed.

The results of the questionnaire indicated that the majority of American units did not have a primary mission of securing LLOC, although most of them were responsible for securing their MSR, and virtually all

²³Ibid.

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of the units had been assigned operational missions at one time or another to secure a specific LLOC for a specific period of time. The questionnaire also showed that those units with a mission of securing LLOC tended to employ tactics typical of strike or consolidation operations as opposed to those previously presented as tactics for securing trains, convoys, and key installations. The questionnaire revealed that the men felt the tactics they employed were very successful.

US Doctrine for the Conduct of Strike Operations

In view of the offensive tactics used by American units in Vietnam, it appears that they consider those tactics for the conduct of strike operations as an integral part of any action for securing LLOC. Therefore, it is essential to examine the doctrine for the conduct of strike operations in addition to that doctrine already considered. The examination of doctrine for conducting strike operations will be divided into two parts: (1) operations against small guerrilla bands, and (2) operations against large guerrilla bands.

Operations Against Small Guerrilla Bands. Strike operations are offensive operations designed to destroy the enemy and his capacity to make war. The emphasis in conducting strike operations is placed on continuous offensive actions. Small mobile units will be employed to accomplish this offensive action by conducting day and night patrols, establishing checkpoints on routes of communications, visiting villages, and preserving law and order outside the boundaries of populated areas.

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Small units will also conduct numerous raids against towns along the LLOC suspected of harboring guerrilla personnel and materiel.

The larger units, company and battalion, must minimize the static defenses of outposts and other installations and hold a minimum number of forces in reserve so as to permit the employment of a maximum number of resources in operations against the guerrilla. In that vein, the forces conducting strike operations are directed to utilize the civilian police to patrol areas and exercise control over the population and resources. A critical element in the utilization of economy of force elements at outposts is the availability of support for those outposts when they are under attack. A great deal of dependence must be placed on artillery and mortar fire support, close air support, and/or small mobile reserves to relieve the units when attacked by a superior insurgent force. The artillery and mortars will have to be deployed so as to provide total area coverage as opposed to emphasizing the retention of the ability to mass their fires.

Since the ultimate aim in the conduct of strike operations is to destroy the enemy, the relentless pursuit, the encirclement, and the immediate destruction of all enemy forces must be emphasized. One of the techniques specifically mentioned for the accomplishment of this goal is that of conducting area ambushes using company and battalion sized units.²⁴

²⁴FM 31-16, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

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Operations Against Larger Guerrilla Bands. In combatting large guerrilla units, those principles mentioned above will be employed. Because of the size of the guerrilla forces, however, larger reserves will be maintained, the size of the operating units will increase, the need for massed artillery will be greater, and larger security and defense forces will be needed to protect the people and key installations. The threat of large guerrilla forces requires that provisions be made to concentrate larger counterguerrilla forces on short notice. If the conflict moves into the mobile war stage, attacks on guerrilla defensive positions will require the use of conventional offensive tactics.²⁵

Consolidation Operations

While consolidation operations are basically defensive in nature, they can be considered an aggressive type of defense and as such the doctrine presented for the conduct of such operations is pertinent to the problem presented in this study. In consolidation operations, the US military units are primarily concerned with neutralizing the guerrilla domination of the area and providing a secure area for the establishment of effective developmental programs. Consolidation operations are conducted in two phases. The first phase consists primarily of offensive strike operations, with internal defense and developmental operations being subordinated to the strike operations. In the second phase, emphasis

²⁵Ibid., pp. 50-51.

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is placed on defending against guerrilla attacks, denying the guerrilla access to support, and providing a secure base from which to expand consolidation operations. In consolidation operations, the Ministry of Defense (or equivalent) is clearly in a supporting role to the Ministry of Interior (or equivalent).

The conduct of the offensive phase of consolidation operations is no different than the conduct of any strike operation. The defensive phase places great emphasis on defending population centers, tactical bases, logistical installations, airbases/airfields, lines of communication, and total area defense. The purposes of these defensive actions are to: (1) deter guerrilla offensive actions, (2) reduce the guerrilla offensive ability, (3) keep the guerrilla out of the area, (4) deny the guerrilla support, (5) destroy the guerrilla, (6) develop favorable conditions for the conduct of counter guerrilla operations, and (7) provide for an economy of force.

In the conduct of the defensive phase, it is envisioned that the security echelons will conduct extensive patrolling and that the bulk of the defending force may be employed in the security echelon. Sufficient reserves must be available and located in such a manner that they will be able to react to a variety of situations in a variety of ways in support of the security forces and those forces committed to area and strongpoint defensive positions protecting military and civilian installations and population centers. Doctrine calls for the dispersion of artillery elements so as to provide total area coverage in support of the total force.

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A maximum effort must be made to train the host country personnel in defensive tactics and population and resources control. It is also recommended that host country laboring personnel be used to supplement troop labor. Doctrine cautions, however, that these personnel must be carefully controlled and that all possible security measures must be taken. Those security measures recommended are: (1) screening of personnel, (2) use of identification cards, and (3) close and continuous supervision of all host country personnel.

Doctrine envisions the armor, cavalry, and air cavalry units may be employed to defend an area, strongpoint, or LLOC in addition to their normal offensive mission. The procedures prescribed for these forces in defending LLOC are: (1) surveillance of the LLOC, (2) patrolling, and (3) the establishment of a system of static security posts to protect terminals, tunnels, pumping stations, bridges, and road or railway junctions.

The techniques recommended for providing security for area and strongpoints emphasizes the need to establish mutually supporting installations, reliable communications, and all around defense. Additional emphasis must be placed on elements from an installation patrolling to the limits of light mortars, utilizing the local paramilitary and irregular forces, protecting supply stocks, and providing illumination to counter the guerrilla's tactic of attacking at night.

In the overall concept of providing area security using the procedures of conducting consolidation operations, special emphasis was

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given to the rapid deployment of reserves to support a unit or installation under attack by a guerrilla force. Caution was advised, however, in the utilization of such a force in order to avoid falling into well prepared ambushes, while going to the assistance of a unit under attack. Another point mentioned that should be stressed was that of varying the routine means of defending the area, so as to preclude the establishing of patterns that the guerrilla can use to his advantage.²⁶

V. ADEQUACY OF ARMY DOCTRINE FOR SECURING LAND

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

In order to arrive at a valid analysis of the adequacy of current doctrine, that doctrine must be compared to the counterinsurgent's goals that were established in Chapter I. In this section each of these goals is examined individually and the US Army techniques for the conduct of operations are compared to the recommended actions that were presented in Chapter II.

Deny the Insurgent the Support of the People

The actions recommended to accomplish this goal are: (1) know, understand and help find solutions to the problems of the people, (2) be completely honest in dealing with the people, (3) keep the guerrillas away from the people, and (4) counter every guerrilla action as rapidly as possible.

²⁶Ibid.

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While the doctrine presented in this chapter did not place any emphasis on civic action type programs, such programs are an integral part of all US doctrine under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The technique of advising and providing guidance at the local level with the initiation of "self-help programs" which can be accomplished using the available resources was recommended for use in the conduct of military civic action programs.²⁷

The patrolling, ambushing, and defensive procedures for conducting consolidation operations provide the means for keeping the guerrillas away from the people so as to prevent acts of terrorism and coercion. The tactics for both strike and consolidation operations provide for, and stress the need for the rapid countering of every guerrilla action.

The Counterinsurgent Must Prevent the Guerrilla From Isolating Its Units

The actions recommended to accomplish this goal are: (1) no force is to be committed to an area without having adequate artillery support, (2) reinforcements in the way of firepower and/or units must be readily available, and (3) surveillance of the area between and adjacent to all units must be maintained.

Both of the doctrinal concepts for the conduct of consolidation and strike operations stress the need for dispersing artillery throughout the total area so as to provide support to all the units in that area. Both concepts also provide for combat power in the form of mobile reserves

²⁷FM 31-23, op. cit., p. 68.

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and close air support that can be used to assist units under attack and prevent their being isolated. The stress that has been placed on patrolling, ambushing, raiding, and surveilling the area by employing the maximum number of units in offensive or security type missions seems to provide for adequate surveillance of the area between and adjacent to the units conducting the operations.

The Government Must Prevent the Destruction of Its Forces

The actions recommended to accomplish this goal are: (1) the establishment of an effective intelligence net, (2) the establishment of positive communications, (3) the varying of patterns, and (4) the retention of the ability to move over any type of terrain.

All the doctrine presented in this chapter stresses the need for intelligence to some degree. While doctrine does discuss intelligence briefly, it should be covered more in detail. The techniques for providing security for trains, convoys, and key installations, strike operations, and consolidation operations all stress the need for positive communications, the varying of defensive and offensive patterns, and the retention of the ability to move.

The Counterinsurgent Must Obtain and Retain the Initiative

The actions recommended to accomplish this goal are: (1) attack the guerrilla before he attacks you, (2) keep constant pressure on the guerrilla, and (3) be prepared to react immediately to any guerrilla attack.

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The techniques for providing security for convoys, trains, and key installations, as presented in the field manuals, do not provide for the aggressive actions needed to accomplish these tasks. Those techniques specified for strike and consolidation operations, however, provide for those aggressive actions in the form of patrols, ambushes, raids, and relentless pursuit upon contact, that are so essential to the accomplishment of the three actions listed above.

The Insurgent's Source of Supply Has to be Eliminated

The actions recommended to accomplish this goal are: (1) police the battlefield, (2) conduct operations to discover and destroy the guerrilla's supply areas, (3) relocate hamlets it is impossible to secure, and (4) build barriers to ever out of country supply lines.

The need for policing the battlefield is not specifically mentioned in any American doctrine for the conduct of counterinsurgent operations. This is, however, standard procedure and taught as such in all training. The techniques specified for conducting strike and consolidation operations provide the means by which base areas can be discovered and destroyed. The building of tactical barriers across a border and the relocation of hamlets are addressed only briefly and somewhat superficially in the doctrine examined in this chapter.

Destroy the Guerrilla Force

The actions recommended to accomplish this goal are: (1) encircle and destroy the guerrilla, (2) establish an effective population and resources control program, and (3) establish an amnesty program.

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While the doctrine for providing train, convoy, and key installation security emphasizes the need for aggressive reaction to guerrilla attacks and ambushes, these actions which are aimed at destroying the guerrilla are primarily reactive in nature. That is, they will not be employed until the guerrilla has initiated an action. Both the doctrine for the conduct of strike and consolidation operations provide for aggressive offensive actions that will lead to the destruction of the guerrilla's forces. The establishment of an amnesty program was not discussed in the doctrine examined in this chapter.

Keep the Land Lines of Communication Open

The actions recommended to accomplish this task are all those mentioned in the preceding paragraphs to accomplish the other tasks. These other tasks are considered as an integral part of LLOC security and as such, essential to any successful LLOC security operation.

Adequacy of Current US Army Doctrine

It appears that current doctrine as presented in the field manuals and modified by the units in Vietnam provides adequate measures for securing the LLOC. This statement is based on the fact that the units in Vietnam, which have been assigned the mission of securing LLOC, have utilized the broad definition of a LLOC as it was presented in Chapter I and those tactical techniques for providing convoy, train, and key installation security, for conducting strike operations, and for conducting consolidation operations.

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V. SUMMARY

The precepts upon which US Army doctrine for the conduct of counterinsurgent warfare is based are excellent general statements which establish an overview of the manner in which the counterinsurgency effort should be conducted. These precepts meet all the requirements established in Chapter II for the successful conduct of LLOC security operations.

The doctrine for American units to secure the LLOC as presented in the field manuals appears to assume a rather limited view of the geographical limitations of an LLOC. As such, that doctrine for securing the LLOC consists primarily of the defensive techniques for providing train, convoy, and key installation security. That doctrine prescribed especially for the use of advisors also appears to be based on a limited view of the territorial limits of a LLOC and as such, does not add to those techniques specified for the use of American units. This doctrine does not enable a unit with a LLOC security mission to accomplish those tasks essential to providing LLOC security as presented in Chapter II.

The units that are applying doctrine, however, appear to have taken the approach that the LLOC can only be secured by controlling the terrain around it. In their application of doctrine these units have used not only those procedures for securing convoys, trains, and key installations, but they have utilized the more aggressive, offensive

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procedures specified in the doctrine on the conduct of strike and consolidation operations.

An examination of the expanded doctrine for securing the LLOC utilized by the forces in Vietnam in conjunction with the tasks established in Chapter II as essential to the successful execution of a LLOC security mission, shows that it fulfills the essential elements of those tasks and as such is valid doctrine for securing LLOC.

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CHAPTER IV

INDIGENOUS FORCE TACTICS AND CAPABILITIES (U)

1. (U) INTRODUCTION

(U) The purpose of this chapter is to examine the tactics, the makeup, and the capabilities of a typical indigenous force that would be assigned a LLOC security mission. While the South Vietnamese forces have been selected to exemplify a typical indigenous force of an under-developed country, in reality there is no such thing as a typical indigenous force. Each of the emerging nations will have its own style and peculiarities so that no one force can be considered as typical. However, all the emerging nations will have certain features in common, they will probably be lacking in an extensive industrial capacity, their economy will probably be agrarian oriented, they will lack skilled technicians, they will lack the arms and materials for making war, and they will normally have a poorly developed communications system. All of these features are, or were, present in Vietnam and in that sense it may be considered as a typical example of an indigenous force.

(U) A great deal of emphasis is placed on the missions, tactics, and capabilities of the Regional and Popular Forces in this chapter. This emphasis is due primarily to the mission they have been assigned in the Combined Campaign Plan AB 144 and to the fact that in Vietnam, regular force units normally will not be committed to LLOC security unless major enemy forces are working against that LLOC.

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(U) The second and third sections of this chapter are devoted to presenting the objectives and the mission assignments of the various elements that go to make up the Vietnamese forces. The concept for securing the LLOC and the tactical doctrine that is used to accomplish that concept are explained in sections four and five. Following the explanation of the tactical doctrine, it will be evaluated to determine its validity. The seventh and eighth sections of this chapter then examine the makeup of the various Vietnamese forces and evaluate their capabilities.

II. ^U(S) THE VIETNAMESE OBJECTIVES FOR LLOC SECURITY

^(U) (S) The Objective of LLOC Security

^(U)
(S) The Joint Vietnamese-American Combined Campaign Plan AB 144 lists two overall objectives to be accomplished in calendar year 1969: to defeat the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese forces and to "extend GVN [Government of Vietnam] control in the Republic of Vietnam."¹ The security of LLOC is included as a related task in the accomplishment of these objectives. The goals considered essential to the accomplishment of the LLOC security objectives are to "enhance the territorial security capability of the RF [Regional Force] and PF [Popular Force] by proper employment and deployment, and by completing the planned force structure

¹RVNAF Joint General Staff/US Military Assistance, Command, Vietnam, AB 144 Combined Campaign Plan (U) (30 September 1967), pp. 2-4.

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increase and modernization of equipment," and to "restore and secure to the greatest extent possible the road, railroad and waterline communication."²

(U)
III. (S) MISSION ASSIGNMENT

(U)
(C) The general mission to secure the lines of communication in Vietnam has been assigned to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), with the Free World Military Armed Forces (FWMAF) assisting and reinforcing the RVNAF units as needed. The FWMAF units will normally provide security for only those lines of communication needed for military operations.³ In accordance with this mission the RVNAF forces are responsible for opening and restoring the road and railroad.

(U)
(S) In the Combined Campaign Plan the specific mission of securing the LLOC has been delegated to the Popular Force (PF) and Regional Force (RF) units. The Popular Forces are designated as being primarily concerned with "local security for hamlets and villages (also security for population centers, resources, LOC, and key static security facilities). The PF are targeted against the Viet Cong local guerrilla units. The PF will also be trained to participate actively in Revolutionary Development as a part of their normal security role."⁴

²Ibid., p. 4.

³Ibid., p. E-2.

⁴Ibid., p. 6.

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(U)
(S) The Regional Forces are to support the pacification effort by providing adequate territorial security. They have also been specifically designated to relieve Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units of all responsibility for securing lines of communication. The Regional Force units have nominally been targeted against the Viet Cong Local Force elements.⁵

(U) The general missions presented above are those assigned by the Joint General Staff of the Vietnamese Army (JGS) with the concurrence of the United States Military Assistance, Command, Vietnam (USMACV) and are not necessarily in accordance with the missions specified in the appropriate tables of organization and equipment (TOE). In many cases the provincial and district authorities do not assign missions in accordance with this Campaign Plan as will be demonstrated in a later section of this chapter. (See Questionnaire Number 2, Appendix F.)

(U)
(S) While the specific mission for securing the LLOC has been delegated to the RF and PF units in Vietnam, these units will not be working without support. The total mission of providing LLOC security has been delegated to the ARVN Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) commanders, who have been directed to "assume primary responsibility for developing combined CTZ plans using assigned forces in coordination with FWMAF [Free World Military Armed Forces] and local authorities to accomplish the [approved] security goals . . . conduct tactical operations and

⁵Ibid.

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provide security forces to restore and protect the essential rail, road, and water LOC, critical bridges, and material assets of the VNRS [Vietnamese National Railway Service]."⁶ The FVMAF commanders, in coordination with the CTZ commanders have been directed to "develop combined CTZ plans employing assigned forces in coordination with RVNAF and local authorities to accomplish the [approved] security goals . . . conduct tactical operations which will assist RVNAF to restore and protect the essential rail, road, and water LOC, critical bridges and the material assets of the VNRS."⁷

(U)
(e) At the same time the Corps commanders have been directed to conduct operations to support the LLOC security program, they have been directed to employ the RF and PF units as stated above, and told that "ARVN divisional units will direct their primary effort to the destruction of VC/NVA main force units. In order to provide maximum ARVN strength for the accomplishment of the primary mission, a gradual phase down of ARVN battalions in support of pacification will occur." This phase down is to be based on the tactical situation, the local enemy threat, and the capability of the RF and PF to successfully assume a mission of supporting the pacification program.⁸

(U)
(S) In order to appreciate the amount of assistance the ARVN will provide the RF and PF in securing the LLOC, it is necessary to take a

⁶Ibid., p. E-3.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., p. 7.

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brief look at the enemy situation in Vietnam and assess the threat in general terms. The Viet Cong's current strategic goal as expressed in the Intelligence Annex to the Combined Campaign Plan AB 144 is that of "attacking cities to liberate the rural areas." In accordance with this strategic goal, the Viet Cong have concentrated their forces in the following areas in the priority they are listed: (1) the cities and principal towns, (2) the DMZ and western highlands, and (3) the coastal plains and the delta.⁹

(U)
(S) The manner in which it is anticipated that the Viet Cong will try to accomplish these objectives indicates that they feel the insurgency in Vietnam has progressed into its mobile war stage. This may not be true in the Fourth Corps Tactical Zone. In accordance with their concept of mobile war, the Viet Cong can be expected to employ the two aspects of mobile war. First, they will fight major battles using their regular forces to accomplish specific objectives. Second, they will conduct a "battle in the enemy's rear" to sever the lines of communication, disrupt supplies, and cause diversions that will result in diverting major forces to static security missions. This latter aspect of a mobile war is conducted by the Viet Cong's guerrilla and local force units.¹⁰

(U) The employment of the ARVN and FWMAF units to counter the Viet Cong's strategic goals will afford varying degrees of incidental

⁹Ibid., p. A-6.

¹⁰See the discussion on mobile war contained in Chapter II.

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security to the LLOC in the area they are operating. However, it should be realized that when the Viet Cong Main Force/NVA units leave a particular sector or shift their strategy to another area, the FWMAF and ARVN units will react accordingly and leave the problem of countering the VC guerrilla and local force units to the RF and PF units that remain in the area. It is because of the transitory nature of the support given to the RF and PF units by the regular forces, that little emphasis is being placed in this chapter on considering the capabilities of the ARVN forces.

(U)
(S) IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT
OF LOC SECURITY

(U)
(S) The concept of operations for securing the LLOC developed in the Combined Campaign Plan emphasizes those tasks specified in Chapters II and III as being essential to the accomplishment of secure LLOC. The Campaign Plan stresses the need for gaining the support of the people and for clearing and defoliating those areas immediately adjacent to routes of communication. The Campaign Plan further states:

Coordinated, unilateral, or combined offensive operations will be conducted along essential LOC to provide adequate security for opening and restoring efforts. Commanders will assign tasks for clearing operations, establishing outposts or operational bases and deploying artillery into critical areas. Close coordination will be required between RVNAF/FWMAF to maintain security of LOC Special emphasis will be given the use of day and night patrols, ambushes and the elimination of VC tax collection organizations.¹¹

¹¹AB 144, op. cit., pp. E-1 to E-2.

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V. ^(U)
(c) SOUTH VIETNAMESE TACTICAL DOCTRINE

(U) The tactical doctrine presented in this section is based on an analysis of the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES), two memorandums for record written by advisors to the Military Railway Service, and the results of Questionnaire Number 2 which was completed by selected members of the USACGSC class of 1968-1969. While this section is primarily concerned with the doctrine for securing LLOC, brief mention will be made of other missions assigned the RF and PF forces located in a district to provide the reader with a better perspective of the overall counterinsurgency effort at district level.

(U) The TFES is a reporting system designed to provide detailed information on the RF and PF units.¹² This report contains a listing of all the RF and PF units in South Vietnam, their mission and location. It also contains a section devoted to reporting on the manner in which these RF and PF units accomplish their assigned mission, and a section which reports on the status of their equipment and supplies. The TFES Advisors Handbook, which explains the system, establishes thirteen mission categories for the RF and PF units. The mission categories significant to this study are: (1) village and hamlet security, (2) security of district and province capitals, (3) key military installation security, (4) LLOC security, (5) a mission as a

¹²Headquarters, MACV, CORDS, Research and Analysis Division (RAD), Territorial Forces Evaluation System, District Senior Advisors Handbook (1 July 1968), p. 5.

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reserve, (6) security for key economic installations, (7) a mission conducting offensive operations, and (8) civic actions.¹³

(U) It would appear from the mission categories that the tactical doctrine for the employment of the RF and PF forces is such that it covers the full spectrum of those actions specified in Chapter II as necessary to secure a LLOC. In fact, what has happened is that the RF and PF forces have been assigned all the various types of missions that contribute to the accomplishment of all aspects of counterinsurgency warfare and the mission of providing LLOC security is considered as one of these aspects. There has been no effort made in the TFES handbook to integrate the various missions into a coordinated program. This function is left to the province or district commander.

(U) In addition to establishing the mission categories, the TFES establishes mission subcategories which provide an insight into the tactics that are to be used in accomplishing that mission. The specific tactics specified to secure the LLOC are, "clearing of road or waterway, patrolling of road or waterway, escort of convoys, protection of bridge or ferry sites, traffic control and resources control checkpoints, denial of road or waterway use by the VC with a checkpoint, [and] frontier outposts."¹⁴ Judging by the specific missions listed above, it would appear that the Vietnamese have assumed the narrow view concerning the area limitations of a LLOC and are employing a defensive

¹³Ibid., pp. 24-29.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 22.

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style of tactics in which they conduct limited patrolling on the LLOC, conduct convoy security missions, and protect key installations.

(U)
(e) The emphasis on defensive tactics is not limited to the units securing the LLOC. An examination of the TFES report (see Table 1) shows that the vast majority of the forces available to the district commanders are committed to static security type missions.

(U)
(e) TABLE I
SAMPLE RF AND PF MISSION ASSIGNMENTS^c

District Military Units	Binh Minh ^a		Ben Cat ^a		Phu My ^a		Phu Loc ^a	
	RF	PF	RF	PF	RF	PF	RF	PF
Security of LLOC	1	25	0	3	2	6	3	2
Hamlet Security	2	19	0	3	8	25	0	12
Security of District Capital	1	0	0	1	1	1	2	1
Reserve	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Security of Key Military Installation	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Intelligence Collection	1 ^b	0	1 ^b	0	1 ^b	0	0	0
Offensive Mission	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Civic Action	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission Unspecified	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1
Present for Duty Strength	430	1,388	120	209	996	949	641	453

^aIn numerous cases elements of a RF and PF unit have been assigned a separate static security mission and thus may be counted twice in this table.

^bRF intelligence squads.

^cHeadquarters, MACV, CORDS, Research and Analysis Division (RAD), Territorial Evaluation System Information Report as of 31 January 1969, pp. 15, 72, 172, and 301.

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Four districts, one from each corps area, were selected for this examination. In the four districts there were a total of 20 RF companies and 95 PF platoons with a total assigned strength of 5,186 as of the 31st of January 1969. Only one RF company with a total strength of 120 men was assigned an offensive mission, and only three PF platoons with an assigned strength of 103 men had been assigned a reserve force mission. The remaining forces had all been assigned defensive missions which place little or no emphasis on offensive tactics to defeat a guerrilla.¹⁵

(U) More often than not the manner in which the LLOC security missions are assigned by province and district or by the Corps Tactical Zone commander is restrictive in nature and does not allow the lower echelons freedom of action. Forty-six percent of the district advisors answering Questionnaire Number 2 stated that their counterpart received very restrictive type missions which specified the LLOC be secured by protecting the key installations with either limited or no patrolling. There were times, however, when the missions assigned to the province and district were given in broad general terms that provided the lower commander with a choice of tactical techniques. Such was the case in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces in Vietnam in the summer of 1968. The Corps Tactical Zone commander had allowed the provincial commanders

¹⁵Headquarters, MACV, CORDS, Research and Analysis Division (RAD), Territorial Evaluation System Information Report as of 31 January 1969, pp. 15, 72, 172, and 301.

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considerable leeway in the manner in which they could secure the railroad in their area. The provincial commanders had in turn allowed their district commanders the same freedom.

(U)
(e) At district level most commanders elected either to establish security on key installations, or to conduct patrols along the railroad right-of-way. This is another indication of the defense oriented tactics employed to secure LLOC. Neither solution provided for particularly aggressive tactics and the advisor in that area reported that neither system provided security for the railroad. He stated that because of poor equipment and leadership the static security sites generally affected only a small area in the immediate vicinity of the unit's camp leaving the rest of the rail line unsecured. No mention was made of the reason patrolling along the right-of-way did not provide adequate security.¹⁶

(U) Questionnaire Number 2 also indicated that the South Vietnamese tend to rely on static security as their primary means for protecting LLOC. Thirty-eight out of forty-one advisors assigned as province or district advisors stated in answering the questionnaire that their counterparts tactics for securing the LLOC were either static security with no patrolling or static security with limited patrolling. Questionnaire Number 2 also showed that the tactics employed by the ARVN units assigned the mission of securing the LLOC tended to be defensive

¹⁶Vallo Truumees, Memorandum for Record, Subject: Railroad Security Missions and Limitations of the RF and PF Units (20 June 1968).

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in nature. Twenty-two of the twenty-nine ARVN advisors whose counter-part had a specific mission of securing LLOC stated that their counter-part's tactics for securing the LLOC were those of static security or static security with limited patrolling. (See Tab F to Appendix F.)

(U)
(C) The best way to get a true picture of the overall tactics the South Vietnamese employ to secure the LLOC is to compare the security of two lines of communication, the road and railroad, which pass through the same general area. The road and railroad in Binh Dinh Province from Dieu Tri to Khanh Phuoc parallel each other, often being as close as 100 meters and never being farther away than 2,000 meters. In June of 1968 the entire length of road in that area was classified as being in the green security status,¹⁷ while one-third of the railroad was classified as being in the amber security status.¹⁸ In September of that same year, the security status of the railroad had deteriorated so that two-thirds of the railroad was now amber, but the road remained green.¹⁹

(U)
(C) An explanation of why the two routes of communication carried a different security status was given by Major Vallo Truumees in his memorandum for record dated 20 June 1968, which stated:

¹⁷See Glossary for definition of security status terms.

¹⁸Headquarters, MACV, Quarterly Evaluation Report (Quarteval): Period 1 April - 30 June 1968 (18 August 1968), pp. E-5 and E-15.

¹⁹Headquarters, MACV, Quarterly Evaluation Report (Quarteval): Period 1 July - 30 September 1968 (13 November 1968), pp. E-5 and E-15.

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With the exception of a few units in each district that have been assigned specific missions of securing the railroad, the PF units in the second MRS [Military Railway Service] Zone do not have missions of railroad security either as secondary or [sic] implied missions and therefore do not influence the security of the railroad to a great degree. Since the RF companies are subject to having their AO's [Area of Operations] changed they normally influence the security of the railroad only when they are located adjacent to the line. Such security is often of a transitory nature and cannot be depended upon.²⁰

VI. (U) EVALUATION OF THE CONCEPT AND TACTICS
USED BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE

(U) The tactical concept for providing security as stated in the Combined Campaign Plan AB 144 can hardly be faulted. In general it provides broad guidance which emphasizes the need for popular support, cleared right of-ways, coordinated efforts, and offensive actions to secure land lines of communication. When that concept is relayed to the units actually securing the LOC, however, it is converted to missions that tend to emphasize defensive tactics. This is true not only of the units assigned a LLOC security mission, but also the majority of the units assigned at district level. Considering the total lack of a balanced effort between offensive and defensive tactics, and the emphasis placed on the defensive tactics, it appears that the units with the mission of securing the LLOC are not employing tactics that will accomplish those actions deemed essential to winning the battle for control of the LLOC.

²⁰Truumees, op. cit.

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
(U)
VII. (e) VIETNAMESE FORCES

(FOUO) Command and Control

(U) Prior to examining the Vietnamese forces, it is essential to gain an understanding of their basic command organization. Figure 1 presents the normal Vietnamese chain of command from the ARVN Headquarters through district. Figure 2 presents another type organizational structure that is sometimes found in Vietnam.

(FOUO) Within a designated chain of command, the key to determining who has responsibility for the LLOC lies in determining who has control over the RF and PF forces, and who has territorial responsibility. In almost all cases the RF and PF forces are assigned directly to the province or district. The Corps Tactical Commander, however, decides how many forces are assigned to each province and in some cases how many in each district. In Figure 1 the province chief has been given territorial responsibility directly under the Corps commander. In Figure 2, the province chief has been given the territorial responsibility by way of the Division Tactical Area Commander.

(FOUO) In the command structure represented by Figure 1, the divisional units have no responsibility for conducting LLOC security unless they are specifically given that mission. In the command structure represented by Figure 2, the Division commander has the responsibility for the LLOC security and as such can direct coordination between the divisional units and the provinces under his command. It should be




^aDerived from a study entitled, "Command and Control and Advisory Elements at Province and District Level in the Republic of Vietnam," conducted by LTC Henry A. Hough, USACGSC Class of 1968-1969.

LEGEND

————— Command line.
- - - - - Coordination line.

Figure 1. Command structure.

**LEGEND**

- Command line.
- - - - - Coordination line.

^aDerived from Major Truumees Memorandum For Record dated 20 June 1968.

Figure 2. Alternate command structure.

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noted that in both cases the regimental commander and the province commander are on an equal level and as such, neither can direct the actions of the other. In many cases these forces will occupy the same general geographical area and be engaged in conducting different missions.

(U)

(C) Provincial Forces

(U) This section will examine the organization, mission, equipment, and capabilities of those units normally found under the direct operational control of the province chief. While the majority of the force in a province are assigned to the districts, the province commander has one intelligence platoon, one heavy mortar platoon, one RF mechanized platoon, and an occasional ARVN company assigned to him for performing special missions. The assignment of ARVN units to the province is not uncommon. In thirty-three percent of the answers to Questionnaire Number 2 the advisor indicated that his counterpart had some ARVN units under his command.

(U)
(C)

Intelligence Platoon. The intelligence platoon is authorized on the basis of one per province. The platoon's mission is: (1) to collect and check information, (2) maintain security within the platoon, and (3) apply counterintelligence measures when directed. The platoon TOE lists the following capabilities: (1) the conduct of clandestine operations, (2) the conduct of reconnaissance by teams, (3) the conduct of raids on given targets, and (4) internal counterintelligence operations.

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This unit is 100 percent mobile. This unit is authorized one officer and twenty-seven enlisted men. Significant items of equipment:²¹

<u>TECHNICAL SERVICE</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Ordnance	Launcher Grenade M-79	2
	Rifle 5.56mm M16A1	18
	Bicycle Motor Driver	1
	Truck Cargo 2 1/2 ton	1
	Truck Utility 1/4 ton	1
Signal	Radio Set AN/PRC-25	3
	Still Picture Camera	1
	Recorder RD-173/UN	1

(U)
(C) Heavy Weapons Platoon. The heavy weapons platoon is authorized on the basis of one per province. The platoon mission is to provide fire support to the Regional and Popular Force units throughout the sector. This platoon is 100 percent mobile and has the following capabilities listed in the TOE: (1) providing fire support as directed, (2) being attached to a RF group headquarters, and (3) fighting as infantry. This platoon is authorized one officer and twenty-seven enlisted men. Significant items of equipment:²²

<u>TECHNICAL SERVICE</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Ordnance	Carbine, M-2	20
	Launcher Grenade	1
	Mortar 81mm	2
	Recoilless Rifle 57mm	2
	Truck Cargo 1 ton	3
	Truck Utility 1/4 ton	1

²¹Joint General Staff, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, TOE 48-840A, RF Intelligence Platoon (August 1968).

²²Joint General Staff, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, TOE 48-843, Heavy Weapons Platoon (May 1968).

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<u>TECHNICAL SERVICE</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Signal	Radio Set AN/PRC-25	1
	Radio Set AN/PRC-6	5

(U)
(C) RF Mechanized Platoon. The RF mechanized platoon is authorized on the basis of one per province. The platoon mission is to: (1) secure points of interest, (2) conduct road clearing, escort, and patrol operations, (3) when reinforced, to provide reaction forces, and (4) conduct limited operations as directed by province headquarters. This unit is 100 percent mobile, and has the following capabilities listed in its TOE: (1) provide security for approximately forty-five kilometers of road, (2) fight as infantry, and (3) conduct anti-guerrilla patrols in large areas to prevent road and bridge destruction. The mechanized platoon is authorized one officer and forty-one enlisted men organized into a headquarters with two armored cars and two sections of two armored cars each. Significant items of equipment:²³

<u>TECHNICAL SERVICE</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Ordnance	Car Armored	6
	Carbine M-2	12
	Machinegun M-60	12
	Mortar 60mm	1
	Rifle 5.56mm M16A1	20
	Rifle Automatic	2
	Truck Cargo 1 ton	1
Signal	Radio Set AN/VRC-34	1
	Radio Set AN/VRC-15	6
	Radio Set AN/PRC-25	3
	Radio Set AN/PRC-6	3

²³Joint General Staff, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, TOE 48-883, RF Mechanized Platoon (March 1966).

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(U)
(c) ARVN Infantry Battalion. The mission assigned to this unit by TOE is to close with and capture or destroy the enemy. It is organic to the infantry regiment. It is capable of providing a base of fire and maneuver elements, maneuvering over all types of terrain, and seizing and holding terrain. The battalion is considered as being 100 percent mobile (transportable). The battalion is authorized twenty-five officers, and 689 enlisted men organized into one headquarters and headquarters company and three rifle companies. The battalion's main combat power lies in the rifle companies, however, it has a reconnaissance platoon with two reconnaissance squads, a 81mm mortar platoon with four mortars, and a 57mm recoilless rifle platoon with four recoilless rifles which can be used to augment the rifle companies.²⁴

(U)
(c) ARVN Rifle Company. The mission assigned to the rifle company by TOE is identical to that of the American rifle company, to close with and capture or destroy the enemy. Like the American company it is capable of destroying the enemy using fire and maneuver, repelling the enemy by fire and close combat, maneuvering over all types of terrain, and seizing and holding terrain. This company is classified as 100 percent mobile (this really means 100 percent transportable) and is allocated on the basis of three or four per battalion. The company is

²⁴Joint General Staff, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, TOE 4-665, Infantry Battalion Infantry Division (November 1965).

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organized into three rifle platoons, one weapons platoon and a company headquarters. The authorized strength is five officers and 152 enlisted men. Significant items of equipment:²⁵

<u>TECHNICAL SERVICE</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Ordnance	Carbine M-1	25
	Carbine M-2	33
	Rifle 5.56mm M16A1	62
	Rifle Automatic	18
	Launcher Grenade M-79	9
	Machinegun M-60	2
	Mortar 60mm	2
	Truck Utility 1/4 ton	1
Signal	Radio Set AN/PRC-6	6
	Radio Set AN/PRC-25	6
	Radio Set AN/GRC-87	1

(U)
(C) District Forces

(U) This section will examine the organization, mission, equipment, and capabilities of those units normally assigned directly to the district chief.

(U)
(C) Regional Force Battalion or Group Headquarters. The RF battalion and group is a control headquarters and as such has no combat power that can be used to augment the combat power of its subordinate elements. The RF battalion or group is normally assigned to a sub-sector (district) for the administration and logistical support of the RF and PF forces assigned to the district. It is capable of commanding

²⁵Joint General Staff, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, TOE 4-767, Rifle Company (November 1965).

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and controlling a maximum of five RF companies or their equivalent in PF platoons. The basis for allocation is flexible, depending upon the requirement.²⁶

(U)
(C) Regional Force Company. This company is allocated based on the determination of a need. The missions assigned to the regional force company by TOE are: (1) to destroy the enemy, (2) to protect key installations, (3) to maintain security and public discipline, and (4) to enforce the law. The TOE states that the unit is 100 percent mobile and that it has the following capabilities: (1) to conduct operational missions to maintain public discipline, enforce the law, and complete "mop up" operations; (2) conduct patrols, attacks, defenses, and intelligence collection; (3) reduce enemy installations; and (4) protect strategic points, installations, and lines of communication. The RF company is assigned six officers and 117 enlisted men organized into three rifle platoons and one heavy weapons platoon. Significant items of equipment:²⁷

<u>TECHNICAL SERVICE</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Ordnance	Launcher Grenade M-79	9
	Machinegun M-60	2
	Mortar 60mm	2
	Rifle 5.56mm M16A1	106
	Truck Utility 1/4 ton	1

²⁶Joint General Staff, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, TOE 48-642, RF/PF Group Headquarters (December 1967).

²⁷Joint General Staff, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, TOE 48-742A, Regional Force Rifle Company (24 October 1968).

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<u>TECHNICAL SERVICE</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Signal	Radio Set AN/PRC-6	6
	Radio Set AN/PRC-25	2
	Radio Set AN/GRC-87	1

(U)
(C) RF Intelligence Squad. This squad is authorized on the basis of one per district. The missions assigned to the intelligence squad by the TOE are: (1) to collect and check information, (2) assist the province intelligence platoon, (3) maintain security within the squad, and (4) apply counterintelligence measures when directed. This squad is capable of conducting clandestine operational reconnaissance by teams, raids on minor targets, assisting the province intelligence operations, and internal counterintelligence operations. The squad is authorized twelve men and is considered 100 percent mobile. Significant items of equipment:²⁸

<u>TECHNICAL SERVICE</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Ordnance	Bicycle Motor	1
	Launcher Grenade M-79	1
	Rifle 5.56mm M16A1	9
Signal	Camera Still Picture	1
	Radio Set AN/PRC-25	1

(U)
(C) Popular Force Platoon. The PF platoon is authorized on the basis of one or two platoons per village. The specific mission assigned the PF platoon in their TOE is that of assisting "in maintaining

²⁸Joint General Staff, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, TOE 48-940A, RF Intelligence Squad

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internal public security and order within assigned village, hamlet."

The platoon TOE lists the following capabilities: (1) assist the village officials in the performance of public security, (2) repel surprise attacks, (3) defend critical areas, and (4) patrol within the village limits. The authorized strength of the platoon is one noncommissioned officer and thirty-four enlisted men organized into three PF squads. Significant items of equipment:²⁹

<u>TECHNICAL SERVICE</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Ordnance	Launcher Grenade M-79	1
	Rifle 5.56mm M16A1	34
Signal	Radio Set AN/PRC-25	2

(U)
(c) Units Organized on a National Level With a Mission of Securing LLOC

(U)
(c) The Military Railway Service is the only unit in Vietnam organized on a national level for the purpose of securing a specific LLOC. The Military Railway Service is a regimental sized unit composed of four Rail Security (Infantry) Battalions. The Military Railway Service missions are coordinating the railroad security effort, serving on the National Railroad Security Council, coordinating the movement of Vietnamese cargo, and commanding the four Rail Security Battalions. The Rail Security Battalions are under the operational control of the Corps commanders.

²⁹Joint General Staff, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, TOE 48-891A, Popular Force Platoon

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(U)
(C) The Rail Security Battalions have been assigned the mission of protecting the Republic of Vietnam Railway System (VNRS) from guerrilla attack and sabotage. The Rail Security Battalions are assigned to the Military Railway Service based on track mileage, one battalion per 300 kilometers of main line track. The TOE of the battalions state the units are capable of providing train escorts, limited foot and train mounted patrols, and perimeter security for repair sites and rescue operations. The Rail Security Battalions are authorized 26 officers and 521 enlisted men organized into three Rail Security Companies and a headquarters company. The battalion headquarters is an administrative headquarters and as such has no combat power with which to augment that of the companies.

(U)
(C) The Rail Security Companies are authorized five officers and 142 enlisted men organized into three rifle platoons and one weapons platoon. The rail security companies have been assigned generally identical missions and capabilities to those of the battalion.³⁰
Significant items of equipment:³¹

³⁰ Joint General Staff, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, TOE 10-641, Rail Security Battalion (15 January 1966); and TOE 10-642, Rail Security Company (15 January 1966).

³¹ Only the items of equipment for a Rail Security Company are listed here because both the Military Railway Service and the Rail Security Battalion are administrative type headquarters and as such have no combat power to assign to the Rail Security Companies. When on an extended mission, a Rail Security Company will be assigned one radio set AN/GRC-87 by the Rail Security Battalion.

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<u>TECHNICAL SERVICE</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Ordnance	Launcher Grenade M-79	3
	Machinegun M-60	15
	Mortar 60mm	3
	Rifle 5.56mm M16A1	120
	Truck Utility 1/4 ton	1
Signal	Radio Set AN/PRC-6	12
	Radio Set AN/PRC-25	5

(U)
VII. (C) EVALUATION OF THE VIETNAMESE FORCES

(U) This evaluation of the Vietnamese forces will be conducted in two parts. Part one is an evaluation of the units assigned LLOC security missions located in selected districts. The district appraisal is based on the information presented in the Territorial Forces Evaluation Summary Information Report of 31 January 1969. For this evaluation four districts, one from each of the four Corps Tactical Zones, have been selected at random. The sole criteria used in the selection of these districts was that a major road and/or railroad had to traverse a portion of the district. The districts selected were Phu Loc District in Thua Thien Province, I Corps, Phu My District in Binh Dinh Province, II Corps, Ben Cat District in Binh Duong Province, III Corps, and Binh Minh District in Vinh Long Province, IV Corps. The purpose of this evaluation is to set the stage for part two of this section which will compare Vietnamese tactical doctrine and organizational structures, as they have been presented in this chapter, to the strategic goals and tactical techniques for defeating a guerrilla that were presented in Chapter II.

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(U)
(C) The examination of the four districts which follows points out the defensive nature of the tactics they employ and shows their limitations in forces and equipment. Although the districts possess firepower superiority or parity at the individual and squad level, it should be noted that they generally have insufficient forces to enable them to have an adequate reserve and no mention is made of supporting fires and their adequacy. The majority of the units in the district possess either a sufficient number of radios or just enough radios to allow them to accomplish their defensive missions. No mention is made of the districts having enough vehicles to give the district chief the flexibility needed to employ a more mobile concept of defense. In general it should be noted that the districts examined here do not patrol or conduct offensive actions and that the units are generally rated as satisfactory, but that they lack the supporting weapons, communications equipment and mobility to properly employ a more aggressive tactical concept.

(U)
(C) District Evaluations

(U)
(C) Phu Loc District, Thua Thien Province. Phu Loc District is a coastal district which lies about 30 kilometers south of the city of Hue. Route 1 and the railroad parallel each other very closely in the Phu Loc District and are fully operational throughout the length of the district.

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Three RF companies and two PF platoons have been assigned the mission of securing the district LLOC. These forces are located at six different sites and represent 35 percent of the manpower and 22 percent of the units available to the Phu Loc District chief. No RF and PF units in the Phu Loc District have been retained in a reserve role and no RF and PF forces have been committed to offensive roles. The province chief of Thua Thien Province has no RF and PF forces designated as being in reserve and none of the small force under his direct control has been employed in an offensive role that might assist the Phu Loc District chief. Two of the province chief's units are committed to province LLOC security missions.

(U)
(C) The units securing the LLOC in Phu Loc District are generally well armed, have adequate barrier material, munitions, and equipment, and have a sufficient number of operational radios to meet their needs. All the units except one PF platoon are generally rated as satisfactory or better in the performance of duties related to their mission. It is worth noting here that three of the five units involved in LOC security (one company and two platoons) were rated as seldom conducting reconnaissance missions. The unit effectiveness rating of these units shows that they generally possess a firepower superiority over the Viet Cong/ North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and that they usually conduct a defense of their assigned area that is well coordinated with neighboring units. These units conduct little on-site training and do not participate

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in civic action programs. These units are generally accepted by the people of their community.³² Route 1 in Phu Loc District was classified as security condition green in December of 1968, while for major portions of the railroad the security condition was listed as red.³³

(U)
(C) Phu My District, Binh Dinh Province. Phu My District is a coastal district located approximately 40 kilometers north of Qui Nhon City. Route 1 is fully operational throughout the district and the railroad which closely parallels Route 1 is operational from the lower portion of the district to the city of Qui Nhon. One RF company and four PF platoons are committed to LLOC security missions. One other RF company and two other PF platoons man outposts, estimated to be of platoon and squad sized strength, with LLOC security missions. The LLOC security forces are located at eleven sites and represent approximately 15 percent of the manpower and 16 percent of the units available to the province chief. No RF or PF units in the Phu My District have been retained in a reserve role and no such forces have been assigned an offensive mission. The province chief of Binh Dinh Province has retained no RF or PF forces in reserve under his command.

(U)
(C) The units securing the LLOC in Phu My District generally are adequately armed, but they are somewhat lacking in munitions, barrier materials, and equipment. The RF and PF units have just enough radios

³²TFES Information Report, op. cit., p. 15.

³³Headquarters, MACV, Quarterly Evaluation Report (Quarteval): Period 1 October - 31 December 1968 (19 February 1969), pp. E-5 and E-13.

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to maintain communications. The RF company is generally rated as being dependable, but needing some improvement in matters relating to the performance of its mission. This unit conducts frequent patrols. The remainder of the units are rated either as satisfactory or marginal in matters relating to the performance of their mission. All the units except the RF company mentioned above and one platoon are said to seldom conduct patrols. The one platoon is rated as being indifferent toward the conduct of patrols. The unit effectiveness of these forces shows that one half of the units are equal in firepower to the Viet Cong with the other half rated as being somewhat inferior. Generally speaking, the units coordinate their defenses with other elements working in their area. These units conduct little on-site training, conduct some civic action programs, and are generally accepted by the people of the community.³⁴ In December of 1968 the security condition of Route 1 was listed as green while that portion of the railroad which is operational was carried as amber.³⁵

(U)
(C) Ben Cat District, Binh Duong Province. Ben Cat District is located approximately 40 kilometers north of Siagon on Highway 13. Highway 13 runs through the entire district. Three platoons in the district have been assigned missions of securing the LLOC. One of these platoons has been assigned an additional mission of providing an

³⁴TFES Information Report, op. cit., p. 72.

³⁵Quarteval 1 October - 31 December 1968, op. cit., pp. E-5 & E-14.

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outpost to secure a hamlet or village. It is assumed that a squad sized unit will be committed to security of the hamlet or village. The forces committed to LLOC security are located in three sites and represent approximately 27 percent of the personnel and approximately 30 percent of the units available to the district chief. One RF company has been assigned the mission of conducting offensive operations in the Ben Cat District. No units have been held in reserve. The province chief has apparently retained his RF mechanized platoon in reserve and has assigned the mission of conducting offensive operations in the province to one of his RF companies.

(U)
(C) The units assigned the mission of securing LLOC are well armed and have adequate munitions, clothing and radios. These units do not have a sufficient amount of barrier materials. Two of the platoons are rated as dependable, but needing some improvement in matters related to the performance of their mission. The third unit is rated as satisfactory. Only one unit is rated as seldom conducting reconnaissance missions. The unit effectiveness rating of these forces shows that two of the three units have firepower approximately equal that of the Viet Cong and that one unit has firepower somewhat inferior to the Viet Cong. These units conduct some on-site training, generally coordinate their defenses with the units in their immediate vicinity, and conduct some civic action programs. These forces are generally treated by the local populace with indifference.³⁶ The security status of Highway 13 in

³⁶TFES Information Report, op. cit., p. 172.

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December 1968 varied. In a portion of Ben Cat District it was green, while in another portion it was amber.³⁷

(U)
(e) Binh Minh District, Vinh Long Province. Binh Minh District is located between the cities of My Tho and Can Tho along Highway 4. Highway 4 runs through the district. No RF companies have been assigned missions of securing the LLOC, although one company does have one element committed to a LOC security mission in the form of an outpost. Twenty-one PF platoons have been assigned LOC security missions at 28 sites. These units represent 40 percent of the manpower and 48 percent of the units available to the district chief. Three PF platoons assigned missions of securing the LLOC have elements of their platoons committed to other missions and three PF platoons not committed to LOC security missions have elements of their platoons assigned LOC security missions. Three PF platoons have been held in reserve by the district chief and no units have been assigned the mission of conducting offensive operations in the district. The province chief has retained nine RF companies, one boat company, and one RF mechanized platoon under province control. Three of the RF companies have been retained as reserves, the boat company and the mechanized platoon have been assigned missions securing key military installations and the district and provincial capitals.

³⁷Quarteval 1 October - 31 December 1968, op. cit., p. E-8.

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(U)
(C) The units assigned the mission of LLOC security are well armed, have adequate barrier material, munitions, and equipment, and have enough radios to maintain communications. All the units are generally rated as dependable, but needing some improvement in matters relating to the performance of their mission. Four of the units are indifferent toward the conduct of reconnaissance, but the rest are rated as frequently conducting reconnaissance missions. All units except four were rated as having superior firepower in comparison to the Viet Cong. The four not rated superior were rated as having equal firepower. Generally speaking the units coordinate and integrate their local defenses with neighboring units. The units are engaged in very little on-site training, however, they do actively participate in civic actions projects which have helped gain them the active cooperation of the local populace.³⁸ Highway 4 in this area was given a security classification of green in December of 1968.³⁹

(U) Evaluation

(U) The enemy threat to the LLOC in the different areas of Vietnam varies depending upon the importance of that area to the Viet Cong at any given time. Despite this varying emphasis, the enemy holds the capability of interdicting any LLOC in Vietnam at any point or time of his choosing. This interdiction may be in the form of mining the

³⁸TFES Information Report, op. cit., p. 301.

³⁹Quarteval 1 October - 31 December 1968, op. cit., p. E-9.

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road, attacking outposts and bridges, ambushing convoys, attacking installations and convoys by fire, or cratering the LLOC. These attacks may be conducted simultaneously at widely dispersed points, conducted in conjunction with a major effort in another area, or they can be conducted in isolation. It is against this threat that the Vietnamese forces are being evaluated.

(U) In section six of this chapter it was determined that the tactical doctrine utilized by the Vietnamese did not provide them with good tactics for securing the LLOC. An analysis of the unit capabilities that are presented in this chapter may provide an indication of the reason for the Vietnamese dependence on defensive tactics. Numerous advisors, who filled out Questionnaire Number 2, stated that their counterpart did the best he possibly could with the resources at hand. An examination of the organization and equipment of the various units finds that they are lacking in the firepower, mobility, and communications that would enable them to adopt more aggressive tactics, thus, bearing out the statements made by the advisors.

(U) While the individual's firepower was greatly increased by replacing the M-1 rifle with the M-16 rifle, the supporting fires of the various units are found to be totally inadequate. The provinces and districts have been assigned 105mm howitzers to augment the weapons organic to the other units assigned them. These howitzers, along with the 60mm mortars, 81mm mortars, and 57mm recoilless rifles are the only fire support weapons directly responsive to the RF and PF forces securing

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the LLOC. Based on the range limitations of these weapons⁴⁰ and their limited numbers, it is impossible for a district or province in Vietnam to provide rapid reaction fires to multiple far flung outposts. These same limitations make it next to impossible for adjacent camps within a district to be mutually supporting, unless the district is a very small one, and impossible for neighboring districts to support one another.

(U) The Vietnamese forces assigned to LLOC security are basically foot mobile. This type of mobility is adequate once the battle is joined or when operating in the hills and jungles along a LLOC, but it is totally inadequate for providing the rapid movement of reserve forces to outposts that are under attack. This lack of vehicular mobility appears to have caused the enlargement of the various defensive garrisons and the subsequent reliance on defense oriented tactics for securing the LLOC.

(U) The Vietnamese communications system is composed of both wire and radio means. Communications by wire is not considered militarily significant, because of the ever present danger of its being monitored and/or severed. The Vietnamese radio communications system relies in part on old radios, the radio sets AN/PRC-6 and AN/GRC-87, and on using short range radios, the radio sets AN/PRC-6 and AN/PRC-25, at their

⁴⁰The maximum range of the 105mm howitzer is 11,000 meters, the 81mm mortar 3,650 meters, the 60mm mortar 1,600 meters, and the 57mm recoilless rifle 1,600 meters.

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maximum ranges. This presents a problem, in that, the equipment by virtue of its very nature makes the communications system unreliable. When this is coupled with a lack of sufficient backup radios and/or an alternate means of communication, it is readily apparent that the commander's command, control, and flexibility are greatly limited.

IX. (U) SUMMARY

(U) The Vietnamese have adopted an excellent concept for providing security for the land lines of communication. That concept provides for an aggressive type of defense with emphasis on patrolling and ambushing to destroy the guerrilla force interdicting the LLOC. In accordance with this concept the RF and PF forces have been designated to secure the LLOC. In addition to their LLOC security mission, they have been designated to accomplish all other missions inherent to winning an insurgent war.

(U) Although they have an excellent concept for securing LLOC and have specific forces designated to accomplish the mission, the Vietnamese have not adequately solved the problem of securing LLOC. The forces assigned the LLOC security mission do not have the capability of coping with all the problems inherent to such a mission. The Vietnamese have established conflicting authority by establishing two chains of command in the same geographical area, and they have forced their commanders to assume the defensive by not providing them with the resources needed to employ more offensive tactics. All this is in direct contrast to their announced concept.

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CHAPTER V

A PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR SECURING LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN INSURGENT WAR

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis, as stated in Chapter I, is to determine a tactical concept for securing land lines of communication that can be used by US military personnel assigned to an advisory team in an underdeveloped nation engaged in fighting an insurgency. In order to accomplish the task established in the problem statement, it was necessary to define the problem, determine whether or not there is an available workable solution to that problem, apply the available resources to both the present solution and the workable solution to determine if they are adequate and then to adjust the tactics and organizations to solve the problem.

Chapter II defined the problem and provided general tactical techniques that would defeat a guerrilla force contending for control of the LLOC. In Chapter III that doctrine an American officer is most likely to know and understand, US Army doctrine, was examined to see if it met the requirements established in Chapter II for defeating the guerrilla. It was determined in Chapter III that the US Army doctrine, as presented in the field manuals and adapted by the units in Vietnam is a valid solution to the problem of securing the LLOC. The organizational structure and tactical doctrine of a typical indigenous force

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was examined in Chapter IV to see if they provided an adequate solution to the problem. It was determined that a typical indigenous force, as exemplified by the Vietnamese, could not accomplish those tasks established in Chapter II as essential to a LLOC security mission. It was further determined that the Vietnamese forces did not possess the capability of employing US doctrine.

This chapter presents a military solution to the problem at hand. In presenting this solution, due consideration was given to the many problems inherent to the civil administration of an emerging country. It was felt that the problems of establishing governmental reforms, "winning the hearts and minds of the people," and establishing governmental priorities for nation building were so complex that they were beyond the scope of this paper, even though they affect the very nature of the problem of securing the LLOC. In this light, it was pointed out in Chapter II, that the military and police units securing the land lines of communication must be prepared to assist in the implementation of all government programs. Within their capabilities, they must know, understand, and assist the people to solve the problems they face in every day living. They must treat the people fairly, eradicate corruption within their own organization, and provide a protective umbrella under which the civil administrators can safely conduct their work.

It is envisioned that civic action type programs to accomplish the above objectives are an essential element of any tactical doctrine for securing the LLOC. It is also envisioned that the civic action

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program will have a very low priority when compared to the tactical missions. This is not to say, however, that the civic actions programs can be ignored. Every unit must engage in those actions presented in the previous paragraph that are within their capabilities.

II. BACKGROUND TO THE PROPOSED SOLUTION

An essential element for the establishment of a proposed doctrine and organizational structure is an assumption about the nature of the enemy threat. In view of the irregular nature of an insurgent war, it is very difficult to estimate the extent and nature of the enemy threat that will face an organization assigned the mission of securing LLOC. In that light, the enemy threat assumed in this paper is based on the US experience in Vietnam and the writings of General Giap, "Che" Guevara, and Mao Tse-Tung.

The guerrilla is assumed to possess the capability of interdicting an LLOC at any time and/or point of his choosing. This interdiction may be in the form of mining the road or railroad, attacking outposts and bridges, ambushing trains and convoys, attacking installations, trains, and convoys by fire, and/or cratering the road or rail line. These attacks may be conducted simultaneously at widely divergent points in the same general area, or they may be conducted in conjunction with another major effort, or they may be conducted in isolation.

It is recognized that the tactical doctrine and organizational structures presented in this chapter are somewhat sophisticated and will

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require extensive training on the part of the indigenous forces to employ them. Another equally difficult problem inherent to this sophisticated solution is that of securing the equipment prescribed in the organization. While neither of these problems is going to be treated in this paper, the reader should have some idea of what the author envisioned while he was developing the tactics and organizational structures.

In developing the solution it was assumed that any further insurgencies would develop in a manner similar to that in which other recent insurgencies have developed. Based on this assumption it was felt an early diagnosis of a state of insurgency and an early commitment to the solution presented here would provide enough time to train the necessary personnel. It was further assumed that US policy, as represented by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, would remain the same. In accordance with that policy, the US will assist an emerging nation by providing materiel, advisors, and training facilities. It was also assumed that the US would continue to have a policy of nonintervention in foreign countries unless invited, and that the US would be most reluctant to enter another country in the same manner it did in Vietnam.

Based on these assumptions, it was considered feasible, in the early stages of an insurgent war, to train the leaders and selected men in modern tactics using modern weapons in the United States. Once the men have been trained, it would be feasible to organize, equip, and maintain a modern force such as that proposed in this thesis. The training of the men and the equipping of the forces is not an easy solution. It will take time and money. In considering the ramifications

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of this solution, an attempt should be made to visualize what could have happened in Vietnam if the Vietnamese had been trained in the United States and provided the latest equipment in place of the obsolete items they did receive in the early 1960's.

In establishing the proposed doctrine for securing land lines of communication the following precepts were used.

A. A guerrilla cannot be defeated or an LLOC secured by defensive actions.

B. The battle for control of the LLOC will be fought on that terrain adjacent to the LLOC and not on the routes themselves.

C. The commander with the responsibility for securing the LLOC must be solely responsible and he must be provided with a mobile force containing excellent fire power and communications.

In accordance with these precepts, it was not envisioned that the units securing the LLOC would be fighting the insurgent alone. Nor was it envisioned that the doctrine which follows, would lead to the general defeat of an insurgent. As presented in this chapter, the tactical doctrine purports to provide a total program which will secure land lines of communication and help to bring about the defeat of an insurgent when utilized in conjunction with a program of civil reform and a national campaign for defeating the guerrilla through strike and consolidation operations.

In that section of this chapter which establishes an organizational concept, a great deal of emphasis is placed on providing the

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commander with what is considered adequate communications, mobility, and firepower. It was not envisioned that the organizations presented here are of such a nature that they, and only they, can solve the problem. The important point to be made concerning the organizations is that they provide for a unified effort and also provide the commander with an adequate intelligence, mobility, firepower, communications, and surveillance capability. In that vein, the important segment of that section on organization is that part which explains why a particular organization or piece of equipment was selected.

Throughout this chapter, reference will be made to an area commander and a local commander. The term area commander refers to the individual who has overall territorial responsibility for an area, to include all military actions. In terms of Vietnam, this man would be a province chief or a Corps commander. The term local commander refers to any commander, from the regimental commander and district chief to a platoon leaders or squad leaders, who is responsible for the security of a key installation, or an area subordinate to either the area commander or another local commander.

III. PROPOSED TACTICAL DOCTRINE FOR SECURING

LAND LINES OF COMMUNICATION

Tactical Concept for Securing Land Lines of Communication

That concept as presented in the joint Vietnamese, American Combined Campaign Plan AB 144 is an excellent expression of a tactical

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concept for securing land lines of communication. It will be utilized as the basis for the specific tactics established in this chapter.

Tactical Techniques for Securing Land Lines of Communication

The explanation of the proposed doctrine for securing land lines of communication has been divided into four categories: (1) convoy security, (2) train security, (3) offensive actions, and (4) security for key installations. The presentation of the doctrine for each of these categories will include an overview of the counterinsurgent's goals, followed by the tactical techniques recommended to accomplish those goals.

This arbitrary division is not meant to imply that any one aspect of LLOC security can be conducted in isolation. All aspects are inter-related and all are essential to the accomplishment of any program for securing LLOC. The battle for control of the land lines of communication encompasses the entire area of the LLOC and involves all the units stationed in that area. The tactical doctrine presented herein envisions that all aspects of this doctrine must be applied simultaneously along the entire route under a single command structure.

A user of this doctrine must realize that vehicular mobility is extremely valuable for moving units from point to point, but the battle for control of the LLOC will be fought away from the roads. Because the guerrilla is not tactically bound to the road, the value of vehicular mobility once a force has arrived in the battle area is limited. In

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order to defeat the guerrilla, he must be met and engaged on all types of terrain under all types of weather conditions. Mobility can be as much a state of mind as it is the ability to move. If a unit is properly trained and thinks that it can move and fight in the jungles, swamps, and mountains, it can and will do so. If a unit is not properly trained and thinks that it is road bound, it will be road bound.

Convoy Security. The counterinsurgent goals are to eliminate the insurgent's capability for conducting surprise actions against convoys and to make the ambushing of convoys so expensive, in terms of lost men and equipment, that the guerrilla will not be willing to pay the price. The goals can be achieved by utilizing the defensive tactics for securing convoys specified in the current field manuals, by eliminating the guerrilla's ambush sites, and by the immediate encirclement and destruction of any guerrilla unit that ambushes a convoy.

In the planning phase of convoy operations, provisions must be made to vary the routes and times of the various convoys, as well as the location of the leaders and automatic weapons between the convoys. Each convoy should have contingency plans for the immediate employment of all available forces should the convoy be ambushed. Prior to a convoy moving along a route, that route should be cleared of enemy mines and road blocks, and intelligence sources should be checked to determine what possible courses of action the enemy may adopt that could affect the convoy.

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Each convoy movement must be treated as a tactical operation. This means that among other things, the convoy will provide security forces to its front, rear, and flanks. The convoy should have air cover, even if that air cover consists solely of an airborne artillery forward observer. Close and continuous fire support and positive communications throughout the convoy and with local area commanders are a must. When organizing a convoy, consideration should be given to using every possible means of detecting ambushes. Among the most effective are scout dogs, aerial reconnaissance along the route prior to the convoy's movement, and air cover over the convoy in the form of tactical air, light observation aircraft, or helicopter gunships.

An important factor in providing convoy security is the elimination of the guerrilla's ambush sites. One of the measures taken to accomplish this is the removal of all trees and underbrush from along the route for a distance of 200 to 300 meters. This will make it easier to discover ambushes, and will provide the reaction forces with room to maneuver against any ambush. Additional measures that will help to eliminate the guerrilla's ambush sites are the paving of the roads and the widening of the road to eliminate any restriction to movement that provides the enemy with a natural site for initiating an ambush.

It was stated previously that each convoy movement had to be treated as a tactical operation. In accordance with this statement, it is essential that distinct lines of command and coordination be

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established. The convoy commander must have operational control over all the forces, both tactical and logistical, in that convoy. By the same token, the local area commander, normally the district chief or regimental commander, must have operational control over a convoy while that convoy is in his area of responsibility. The coordination between the convoy commander and the local commander should be accomplished using the Area Coordination Center, as prescribed by current doctrine. Both the convoy commander and the area commander must establish contingency plans for the destruction of a guerrilla force that attacks the convoy and each of these commanders should know the other's plan. Contingency plans must emphasize a rapid, relentless response to a guerrilla attack, with the ultimate goal of that response being the encirclement and destruction of the guerrilla force.

Train Security. The counterinsurgent's goals for securing trains are basically the same as those for providing convoy security. The guerrilla's ability to conduct surprise attacks must be eliminated, and the losses a guerrilla sustains in such attacks must be such that he will hesitate to pay the price. These goals can be achieved by using the same basic techniques that are utilized in providing convoy security. Because of this, those convoy security techniques specified above, in conjunction with the doctrine that follows, will be considered as the proposed doctrine for securing trains.

The long haul capability of the trains, and the restrictions placed on them because they are bound to a fixed path, provides aspects

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of train security which are different from convoy security and require special consideration. A special force, called the National Railway Security Force, (see Appendix D) should be established to provide train security. That force, organized on a national level, must work very closely with the personnel operating the railroad and the local area commanders to insure a coordinated effort is made to protect not only the trains, but also the railroad property.

In establishing a recommended doctrine for providing train security, it is essential to establish definite lines of responsibility. The railroad personnel (it makes no difference whether the railroad is operated by a civilian firm, a government agency, or by the military) are to be responsible for the mechanical functioning of the railroad, the programing of cargo shipments, the makeup of the trains, the maintenance or repair of the track and bridges, and a myriad of other technical details. The National Railway Security Forces are to be responsible for securing the trains while they are en route, securing repair and reconstruction parties, and protecting key way stations and railroad equipment in coordination with the local and area commanders. The area commander is to be responsible for the security of the rail line, for the security of the key installations along that rail line, and for providing rapid reaction forces should a train come under attack. The line of command as shown graphically in figures 3, 9, and 14 place the railway security battalions under the operational command of the area commander. In turn, the Railway Security Forces will provide the forces

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in command of the trains while en route, and provide the forces to secure all reconstruction and repair sites.

The fixed path over which the train must run provides the guerrilla with two advantages he does not possess when ambushing a convoy. First, he knows the route a train will take. Second, any mine placed under the rail is extremely difficult to detect because a mine detector is ineffective near the iron rails. Because of the advantages, more emphasis must be placed on track sweeps by troops or track walkers, and on the train security forces and the local reserve forces reacting immediately to encircle and destroy any guerrilla attacking force.

Additional techniques for providing train security are dispatching by the positive block method, pushing flat cars in front of the engine to detonate pressure mines, giving each train two engines or sets of engines located at opposite ends of the train so that if one is destroyed the other can pull the train to safety, and using armored train patrols at irregular intervals to patrol the tracks.

Security of Key Installations. The ultimate objectives to be obtained by a force with a mission of securing a key installation are to retain that installation for the government, deprive the insurgent of its use, and protect the people living near it. In this regard, the counterinsurgent's objectives are: (1) deter guerrilla offensive actions, (2) keep the guerrilla out of the area, (3) deny the guerrilla

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the people's support, (4) destroy the guerrilla when he attacks, and (5) develop favorable conditions for the conduct of a "nation building" program. In accomplishing these goals the commander will incorporate both passive and active defensive measures into his overall defensive plan.

Passive defensive measures begin with a counterintelligence program. The commanders at all levels must deny the enemy specific information about their units. They must insure that information such as their total strength, losses, equipment shortages, and shortages or weaknesses in other areas is denied the enemy by an effective counterintelligence program. The commander of an installation has to vary the daily routine of his defense. Not only must he vary the times guards are changed, but he must vary the location of those guards. The time for meals, recreation, and ceremonies also must be varied in order to keep from setting a pattern the enemy can utilize in planning detailed operations against the installation. Passive defensive measures also include those measures taken to insure that the local labor force working in or near a key installation is properly identified, is present only when needed, and is properly supervised at all times.

One of the most important problems facing a commander charged with securing a key installation is that of combating the lethargy that develops when troops are given a defensive mission. Once a unit has been committed to a routine in which little or no movement takes place and in which they can see very little visible results, they tend to

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become complacent and careless. It is at precisely this time that such a unit is most susceptible to attack and destruction by a guerrilla force.

The active defensive measures taken by a commander must be based on the selection of sound defensive positions, the utilization of all available barrier materials, and the employment of standard defensive tactics. In establishing his defensive positions, the commander should insure that adjacent positions are mutually supporting and, if at all possible, the adjacent camps are mutually supporting. In the latter case it may not be possible for the camps to be mutually supporting with small arms, but they should be mutually supporting using mortars and/or artillery. Each position and each camp must provide for an all around defense even though other positions and units are nearby. In the defense of his position, the commander must establish both a reliable internal communications system and a reliable communications system with higher headquarters and all adjacent units that might be able to fire in support of his unit. In planning his defense, the commander in charge of defending a key installation must plan for the use of illumination to assist in his night defensive plans.

Even if all the techniques mentioned in the preceding paragraphs are employed, the counterinsurgent will risk defeat in detail unless he employs patrols operating at a distance from the defensive site to provide a measure of security and a great deal of surveillance over the area immediately surrounding the key installations. In this light,

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the commander with a static security mission has to have the capability of employing small units or elements, armed with automatic weapons and supported by artillery, as an economy of force in defense of the key installation, while the bulk of his force is employed patrolling, ambushing, and screening the area in search of guerrillas.

Careful coordination will be required between the LLOC security unit conducting a defensive operation in support of a key installation and other LLOC security units conducting offensive operations to insure that the two forces do not come into conflict, or saturate one area to the exclusion of all others. It is for this reason that one man, the area commander, is being held responsible for the total security of the redefined LLOC¹ in this proposed doctrine.

Offensive Actions. The ultimate goals of offensive operations are to provide the government with a secure LLOC, to establish a protective umbrella under which the civilian administrators along the LLOC can effectively carry out their "nation building" program, and to completely destroy the guerrilla force. These goals will be accomplished by strike operations designed to keep a constant pressure on the insurgent in order to defeat him in detail, deny him freedom of movement, deny him the flexibility he needs to mass his units, and deny him the support of the people. The key to effective offensive operations lies in being able to develop, process, and interpret

¹See the glossary (Appendix A) for this definition.

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intelligence rapidly enough so that it can be used by the tactical commander before the guerrilla can change the situation. Once this intelligence has been developed, the commander must possess the mobility and flexibility to take advantage of that knowledge.

Because of the emphasis placed on intelligence, the intelligence staffs of the proposed units have been augmented to make them more responsive to the needs of the commander. The assignment of the scout reconnaissance platoon to the armored cavalry regiment and the district headquarters gives those commanders a force similar to the British "ferret force" which proved so successful in Malaya.² The force proposed in this thesis is a platoon composed of nine teams of four men each. It should be employed by assigning each team to a specific area and allowing the team members several months to learn the terrain and their enemy's habits. Once the teams are totally familiar with the area and the enemy, they should be utilized as guides for the combat units, and/or as intelligence assistants to help provide the rapid interpretation of intelligence so necessary to a successful operation.

That basic tactical doctrine for conducting strike operations specified by the current field manuals is sound doctrine which should be utilized by the forces securing the LLOC. This doctrine emphasizes the conduct of small unit actions and the continuous pursuit and destruction of those guerrilla forces contacted during the course of those small unit actions. In conducting operations of this type, the

²Heilbrunn, *Partisan War*, loc. cit., p. 67.

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commander sends out numerous small units or elements to seek out his opponent or to lie in wait for him, and yet retains the ability to mass in a relatively short period of time so that he may encircle and destroy any elements of the guerrilla force found in the reconnaissance. In order to effectively put these techniques to work, the commander's reconnaissance elements, normally his platoons and/or squads, must possess the communications equipment that will enable them to receive his orders and the mobility that will enable them to mass on order.

When a unit is conducting a strike operation, the artillery support must be dispersed so as to provide total area coverage. No unit should be committed to a strike mission unless that unit is supported by artillery and/or heavy mortars. This is not a limitation on the employment of the units, however, because in the proposed TOE's the squadrons have been given self-propelled 155mm howitzers, and each regiment has been provided with an air transportable 105mm howitzer battalion and an aviation company with which to move it.

Application of the Proposed Doctrine

In considering this doctrine it must be realized that all commanders, regardless of the level, could be applying all four aspects of the doctrine presented here or they could be concerned with the application of only one aspect of that doctrine. In that light, it must be realized that this doctrine, while designed specifically for a unit with the mission of securing LLOC will also serve the needs of a commander who is concerned with LLOC security as a secondary or part-time mission.

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
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IV. PROPOSED ORGANIZATIONS FOR LAND LINE OF COMMUNICATION SECURITY UNITS

The organizations presented in this section are type organizations and should be considered in that light. The point concerning these organizations that should be extracted from this section is not that the proposed organizations are the solution to the problem of securing the LLOC, but that the solution lies in organizing the units for LLOC security in such a manner that they can effectively employ the tactics presented in the last section. In order to organize effectively, due consideration must be given to the critical areas of unity of command, mobility, intelligence, firepower, communications, and surveillance.

Two type organizations are presented as being capable of providing security for a LLOC. The first type unit is an armored cavalry unit (Figure 3) modelled after an augmented American armored cavalry regiment. This unit is the preferred solution to the organization and equipment needed to secure a LLOC and would normally be used when the security mission is given to regular army units. The second type organization is a modification of the US and ARVN mechanized infantry and cavalry TOE's. The unit (Figure 4), while not the preferred solution, has the forces and equipment that would enable it to utilize the proposed doctrine for accomplishing LLOC security. The second unit would normally be employed to secure the LLOC when paramilitary units such as the Vietnamese RF and PF forces are employed

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^aThe area commander may be either a military officer or a civilian official who is responsible for a large geographical area. In terms of Vietnam, this man could be either the corps commander or a province chief.

^bThe number of armored cavalry regiments assigned to the area commander will depend on the size of the LLOC area that must be secured and the area commanders priority. Augmentations are shown in Figures 5 through 9.

^cThis company is organized in accordance with the referenced TOC with the following alterations: (1) Delete the Air Defense Team, (2) Add a Political Section of two officers and two enlisted men, (3) Add a Psychological Warfare Section of three officers and thirteen enlisted men.

^dFor augmentations see Figure 2.


LEGEND

- Command.
- (-) — Command minus.
- x — Operational control.

MISSION: To provide security for land lines of communication by engaging in a combination of offensive and defensive actions.

Figure 3. Proposed organization for providing LLOC security using an armored cavalry type unit. (Complete details provided in Appendix B).

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION FOR LLOC SECURITY UNITS



^aSee Figure 2 for details of this company.

^bOrganized in accordance with US TOE 6-115G.

^cOrganized in accordance with US TOE 1-258G.

^dNumber of units based on need.

MISSION: To provide security for LLOC by engaging in a combination of offensive and defensive actions.

Figure 4. Proposed organization for providing LLOC Security using Paramilitary Forces (complete details provided in Appendix C).

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in that role. A third type unit, the National Railway Security Force (Figures 14 through 17), is proposed for providing train security in conjunction with both of the proposed solutions.

The organizations presented here are very sophisticated organizations that raise the inevitable question, will a lesser organization in terms of manpower and equipment accomplish the same mission? The answer to this question is not a simple yes or no. Given a different enemy threat than that assumed or given an insurgent organization that is less cohesive than past communist organizations have been, and the answer may well be yes. Given a situation such as that in Vietnam, and the answer is probably no. Each insurgency will have to be judged separately, and the units and equipment used to fight that insurgency must be considered in the light of the technology of the times and the immediate needs of the nation involved. In that light the organizations presented here represent the optimum organization considering current technology.

a word of caution is appropriate at this point lest the US find itself involved in another Vietnam. One does not save money by providing the bare minimum forces to accomplish the tasks inherent to defeating an insurgent, because there is no way to know exactly how much force is needed. A better solution to the problem appears to be to provide a significant force, which is well armed and well trained, in the early stages of an insurgency, rather than wait until the conflict has developed into an all out fight for survival.

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Since the organizations presented in this chapter are not totally new, but adaptations of existing units, the organizational charts do not purport to be complete TOE charts. Rather, these charts show only those items of personnel and equipment which directly affect the tactical employment of the unit and/or those items of personnel and equipment that are changed. All changes on the organizational charts are marked with an asterisk.

The basic organizational structures proposed follow standard military principles of organization and as such are fairly self-explanatory. The principles which guided the selection of the type units are not readily evident and will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Unity of Command

It was established in previous sections of this thesis that to secure an LLOC, it is necessary to eliminate the guerrilla threat by offensive action. An essential element of any offensive action is unity of command. It is imperative that the man responsible for securing a particular LLOC be given the total mission of providing security and total control over the forces employed in support of that mission. This means that the commander with such a mission must have under his control, either by means of direct command or operational control, all forces engaged in LLOC security within his area of responsibility. This would include those forces securing bridges, hamlets, and convoys, those securing trains, and those conducting

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offensive operations. By establishing such a command relationship, the commander of the security forces is able to coordinate and integrate all actions into one plan that will provide for a systematic campaign employing the maximum number of forces in offensive actions to rob the insurgent of the initiative and destroy him in combat.

In establishing the command relationships and organizational structures, great care was taken to insure that the span of control was a manageable one. It is a well established fact that one man can effectively control a limited number of other men. Whether that number is three, nine, or some other number as the various experts claim, is immaterial. What is significant is that the number of units subordinate to a commander must be a manageable number in place of the twenty to forty units that often come under the direct control of the district and province chiefs in Vietnam today. Armored cavalry units present no problem in this respect because their normal TOE establishes a set ratio that is not radically changed in this chapter. A district or province chief, however, must be provided a sufficient number of subordinate headquarters to enable him to accomplish his mission. In the solution presented here, this has been accomplished by providing them with several subordinate battalion headquarters.³

³Figures 3 and 4 provide the detailed information in the command relationships.

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Tactical Mobility

Mobility provides the means for a counterinsurgent force commander to react rapidly to the intelligence he develops and the threats created by the insurgent. The capability of a counterinsurgent force to react rapidly and effectively is the key that enables a commander to practice economy of force on defensive positions and to employ the maximum number of units on offensive operations. Based on the techniques employed so successfully by the American units in Vietnam, it is felt that a counterinsurgent force securing the LLOC must be 100 percent mobile, and that they should possess the capability of airlifting a sizeable force into an area in a single lift. The organizations presented in this chapter possess that mobility deemed essential to provide their commanders with an excellent reaction capability in the form of helicopters, ACAV combat vehicles, and other motor transport vehicles.⁴

Intelligence Collection and Evaluation

The intelligence effort in support of a unit securing lines of communication must place emphasis on the following elements: (1) overt intelligence collection, (2) covert intelligence collection, (3) rapid evaluation of the intelligence acquired, and (4) detailed evaluation of the terrain in which the force is working. An examination of the current

⁴Figures 9 and 13 provide detailed information on the tactical mobility of the key units, the armored cavalry troop and the regional force company.

organizations, such as the American armored cavalry regiment, the squadron, and the company,⁵ and the Vietnamese districts and provinces,⁶ revealed that their intelligence organizations did not contain interrogation elements, men to maintain the order of battle, and scout reconnaissance elements. For this reason, they have been augmented. In establishing part of the augmentation, a page was borrowed from the British book on insurgent war, with the establishment of intelligence teams that are designed to live for months at a time in the guerrilla's territory and then be used as guides for small units committed in offensive actions to ferret out the guerrillas.⁷ The proposed augmentation of the intelligence units includes a section for processing intelligence, and a means for rapid evaluation of the intelligence gained, in addition to the scout reconnaissance platoon.⁸

Superior Firepower

Firepower superior to the guerrilla is essential if the counter-guerrilla is to practice economy of force in defensive positions and employ major portions of his force in offensive operations. Superior firepower also enables the counterguerrilla to operate efficiently with

⁵Department of the Army, TOE 17-51G, Armored Cavalry Regiment (31 October 1966).

⁶See Section VII, Chapter IV for a discussion of these intelligence units.

⁷Heilbrunn, loc. cit., p. 67.

⁸See Figure 5 for detailed information on this organization.

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smaller elements covering a greater area. In considering the problem of firepower and the individual soldier, emphasis was placed on giving the individual soldier a rapid firing, lightweight, shoulder weapon. The units are provided with a large number of crew served automatic weapons⁹ and sufficient medium and heavy mortars to provide small unit commanders with medium and/or heavy mortar support on very short notice. It should also be noted that the squadrons, battalions, regiments, and districts have been given organic artillery to increase their firepower and the responsiveness of artillery fire support. These units will enable a commander to disperse his artillery and establish an integrated fire plan for supporting all elements. It will also give that commander a rapid reaction capability to assist in countering the guerrilla's attacks.¹⁰

Communications

In selecting the communications equipment for the proposed organizations, the following factors were considered: (1) the size of units needing the radios, (2) the range of the radios available, (3) the need for establishing dual communications, (4) communications security, and (5) the responsiveness of the communication system. In

⁹In addition to the nine M-16 rifles and two M-79 grenade launchers each squad which is mounted in an ACAV has two machineguns which are part of the armament kit of the ACAV.

¹⁰For details on the artillery support see Figures 3, 4, 6, and 11.

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establishing the number and type of radios needed by a particular force, consideration was given to the fact that radio sets operated at their maximum ranges do not provide for dependable, responsive communications. For this reason, sufficient radios with long range capabilities are provided at the appropriate levels to give the small unit commander a dependable, responsive communications system.¹¹ Inherent in the establishment of a dependable communications system is the availability of an alternate communications means. This capability has been provided in the form of sufficient radios to establish alternate nets. It was felt that key commanders should also have a secure voice means of communication. For this reason, commanders at platoon, company, battalion and regimental level were given radios that provide them with that capability.

Adequate Surveillance

The best and most accurate means of conducting surveillance over the territory of a LLOC is to position men so that they can observe the entire area. Obviously, this technique would require a large number of men, normally more than any government can provide. The solution to the problem of limited manpower for this purpose, adopted in this study was to augment the men assigned the missions of ambushing, patrolling, and securing key installations with the best possible

¹¹For example each platoon was given two radio sets AN/PRC-47 or its equivalent with a rated range of 32 kilometers.

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surveillance equipment. In establishing requirements for surveillance equipment, it was felt that much of this equipment had to be placed at the lowest level at which it could be maintained effectively in order to make it responsive to the needs of the local commander. In accordance with this solution the platoons and squads were given starlight scopes, and night vision devices and the companies or troops were given medium range night vision devices and radar sets AN/PPS-5.

V. SUMMARY

In accomplishing the purpose of this thesis it was deemed essential to establish both a tactical and organizational concept for providing security to the LLOC. The tactical concept developed here is based on the precepts that: (1) the guerrilla cannot be defeated or a LLOC secured by defensive combat, (2) the battle for control of the lines of communication will be fought on that terrain adjacent to the LLOC and not on the route itself, and (3) the commander with the responsibility for securing the LLOC must be solely responsible and he must be provided with a mobile force containing excellent firepower and communications equipment. The organizational concept was developed to provide the commander assigned a LLOC security mission unity of command, adequate mobility, adequate firepower, adequate communications, adequate surveillance equipment, and adequate intelligence.

The tactical concept presented here is not an entirely new one. The tactics and techniques used represent a composite of the US doctrine

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for securing trains, convoys, and key installations, and for conducting strike and consolidation operations, with some slight modifications. Most of the tactics and techniques have been tried by American units in Vietnam and have proved successful. What is new in the proposed doctrine is the concept of a single counterinsurgent force commander controlling all tactical operations in the area of a redefined LLOC, and the idea that securing an LLOC is more than simply protecting convoys, bridges, and trains. The proposed doctrine for securing LLOC emphasizes establishing a good intelligence system, making the maximum use of organic mobility, retaining command flexibility, and conducting offensive actions at every opportunity.

The basic organizational concept, that of having an armored cavalry unit secure an LLOC, is not a new concept. It has also been tried and tested in Vietnam. What is new, however, is the idea that a paramilitary force assigned the LLOC security mission has to have the resources to enable it to effectively employ the broadened doctrine for securing the redefined LLOC. Although specific type organizations for securing the LLOC were presented here, they are only a vehicle used to emphasize the following principles upon which any organization for securing LLOC must be based:

A. Unity of command established in the form of a single commander within any given geographical area of the redefined LLOC is a must.

B. Tactical mobility in the form of vehicles to move men and equipment about the area of an LLOC is critical. To achieve the maximum effectiveness, the LLOC security force should be 100 percent mobile.

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C. It is essential that adequate firepower be made available to the commanders at every level. Adequate firepower is considered to be a lightweight automatic shoulder weapon for each man, a machinegun in each squad, and supporting weapons in the form of mortars, recoilless rifles, and artillery available to each commander.

D. Adequate communications is considered to be achieved when sufficient FM radios of medium range (32 kilometers) are provided at platoon level to enable them to enter and maintain dependable communications. Higher level organizations should have both an FM and AM radio communications capability.

E. Intelligence organizations must provide for interrogation of prisoners, interpretation of intelligence at the lower levels, and scout reconnaissance.

F. Surveillance equipment in the form of radars and night vision devices must be given to the squads and platoons in order to extend their night vision capability and enable them to overcome the guerrilla's natural advantage at night.

In developing this doctrinal concept and organizational structure, the major emphasis has been placed on providing a sound tactical concept for securing the LLOC. Once this concept was established, a type organization was developed to employ that concept.

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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. GENERAL

The purpose of this thesis was to "determine a tactical concept for securing land lines of communication (LLOC) that can be used by US military personnel assigned to an advisory team in an underdeveloped nation fighting an insurgency. The tactical concept derived must be within the capabilities of the underdeveloped nation using their own resources and whatever assistance that may be provided by the United States under the Military Assistance Program."

The approach taken in solving this problem was to determine the nature and extent of the problem, and establish guidelines for solving that problem. After the problem had been defined and guidelines established, US Army doctrine was examined to see if it offered a solution. After analyzing American doctrine, a typical indigenous force was examined to determine its tactical doctrine for securing the LLOC, and to determine its capability for securing a LLOC. After these examinations had established the facts, conclusions were drawn from those facts resulting in a tactical and organizational concept which was presented in Chapter V in the form of proposed doctrine and organizations.

Herein is a brief summary of the preceding chapters and conclusions drawn as a result of the information found in those chapters.

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At the completion of these conclusions a recommendation is made concerning the LLOC security problem and areas for further study.

II. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Examination of the insurgent in Chapter II revealed that the insurgent "hard core" cadre of recent insurgent organizations were dedicated soldiers who were willing to undergo extreme hardships to gain their objectives. Also revealed was the fact that recent insurgents have chosen to adopt Mao Tse-Tung's technique of fighting a protracted war with "battles of quick decisions" as the vehicle for defeating an established government. In conducting the protracted war, the insurgent attempts to win the support of the people and increase his strength, while avoiding combat that would lead to the destruction of his own forces. Ultimately the insurgent hopes to gain enough strength to be able to defeat the counterinsurgent in a mobile war. In the battle for control of the LLOC, the guerrilla has nine strategic goals which affect that battle. These goals are: (1) preserve the guerrilla force, (2) annihilate the enemy, (3) gain and maintain the initiative, (4) provide a system of supply, (5) deny the government free use of the roads, (6) gain the support of the people, (7) isolate the government, (8) develop the revolution into a mobile war, and (9) establish an effective command relationship.

Once these goals were identified, they were used as the basis for determining strategic and tactical goals a counterinsurgent force

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should use to defeat the insurgent. Those countermeasures recommended are: (1) deny the insurgent the support of the people, (2) prevent the insurgent from isolating the government's forces, (3) prevent the guerrilla from maintaining the initiative, (4) prevent the destruction of the counter guerrilla force, (5) prevent the guerrilla from obtaining supplies, (6) destroy the guerrilla force, and (7) keep the LLOC open for the use of the people and governmental forces. It was determined to be an absolute necessity in all aspects of operations to secure a LLOC that the guerrilla be destroyed. This determination results in offensive actions receiving special emphasis.

That an American advisor to an indigenous force will attempt to employ those tactics he knows best was assumed in Chapter I. With this in mind, current US Army doctrine for securing the LLOC was examined to determine: (1) what is doctrine as stated in the field manuals, (2) how that doctrine is employed in Vietnam, and (3) whether that doctrine, as modified, is valid doctrine for securing the LLOC in an insurgent war.

An analysis of current American doctrine shows that the precepts upon which all counterinsurgency doctrine is based are valid precepts which encompass all the actions deemed necessary to secure LLOC. This analysis indicates, however, that the specific doctrinal approach to securing the LLOC has apparently assumed a rather limited view of the geographical limitations of an LLOC and because of this, prescribes a doctrine which appears too defensive in nature. The specific doctrine for securing LLOC appears to be solely concerned with providing security for trains, convoys, and key installations.

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When the manner in which the US units in Vietnam secured the roads was examined, it was determined that they took a more liberal view concerning the geographical limits of a land line of communication. They appear to consider the LLOC as not only the road, but the land on either side of that road which enable a force to control the road. In their operations to secure roads in Vietnam, the units have operated not only on the road, but have considered it necessary to conduct simultaneous operations on that terrain adjacent to the road. By conducting these operations, the US units in Vietnam appear to have included the tactics and techniques for the conduct of strike and consolidation operations together with those standard LLOC security procedures of convoy, train, and key installation security in their tactical concept for securing LLOC.

Some doctrine for securing LLOC is provided specifically for advisors to use. While this doctrine addresses problems inherent to securing a LLOC in a little more detail than does the standard doctrine, it also appears to have assumed a limited view of the area of a LLOC. This limited view has caused emphasis to be placed on defensive tactics for securing the LLOC in much the same manner as standard US doctrine.

It was concluded that US doctrine was not only that written in the field manuals, but included those tactics practiced in the field. In that light, it is concluded that, the expanded US doctrine for securing lines of communication did meet the requirements for defeating an insurgent. On this basis it is also concluded that current US

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doctrine for securing the LLOC appears to be valid and should be considered for use as doctrine for advisors to a unit charged with securing the LLOC.

The organization, doctrine, and forces which an advisor might reasonably be expected to encounter in an underdeveloped nation were examined using South Vietnam as a case study. The purpose of this case study was to determine whether or not the organizational structure and tactics of an indigenous force were adequate to provide security for the LLOC. The case study was also to determine whether or not a typical indigenous force was equipped adequately to enable it to employ a doctrine, such as US doctrine, which would provide security for the LLOC.

It was determined that the Vietnamese concept for securing the LLOC was a valid concept that placed emphasis on offensive actions and encompassed the majority of the tactical tasks considered essential to securing a LLOC. It was further determined, that the manner in which that concept was executed relied heavily on the standard defensive measures for securing convoys, trains, and key installations. In effect, it may be concluded that despite the fine written concept for securing LLOC, the tactical techniques for securing the LLOC in Vietnam are defensive in nature and do not provide an adequate defense for the LLOC, since they do not provide for the destruction of the guerrilla force.

It was also shown that the Vietnamese have serious deficiencies in their units which may be the cause of their defensive attitude. The

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Vietnamese chain of command in many areas provides for two independent commanders occupying the same geographical area with both being engaged in various overlapping aspects of the fight against the Viet Cong. While this can be and usually is a serious problem, it could conceivably be solved by establishing the proper coordination.

A more serious problem than that of unity of command is the one associated with the mission assignment and the targeting of units. The mission of securing the LLOC has been assigned to the Regional and Popular Forces who are targeted against specific Viet Cong units. Although they have been given the mission of securing the LLOC by destroying the Viet Cong under an aggressive operational concept, they have not been given the resources necessary to accomplish that mission. The RF and PF forces lack a cohesive organizational structure, and adequate mobility, communications equipment, and supporting firepower.

Based on these facts it can be concluded that the Vietnamese forces, representing a typical indigenous force, do not have the organization, firepower, communications equipment, or mobility to employ their own tactical concept for securing the LLOC nor can they employ American doctrine.

Chapter V presents a proposed doctrine and organizational concept for advisors to use if the force they are advising has been assigned a mission of securing land lines of communication. Although specific organizations have been presented along with the proposed tactical and organizational concepts, they are not to be taken as the solution to

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the problem. The proposed solution to the problem of providing a tactical concept for securing LLOC lies in the tactical doctrine and organizational concept upon which the specific organizations have been based.

In establishing what appears to be a valid tactical concept for securing the LLOC, it was necessary to broaden the definition of a LLOC to include that terrain which enables one force or the other to control the route. When considering the LLOC as areas, rather than as roads, or railroads, several questions were raised and answered which served as the basis for the proposed tactical concept. These questions were:

- A. Could a LLOC be defended by relying on defensive tactics?
- B. Where was the battle for the control of the LLOC going to be fought?
- C. Was it necessary for a commander to be responsible for the entire area of the redefined LLOC?
- D. What type of force does a commander with a LLOC security mission need?

The answers to the above questions were determined to be:

- A. An insurgent force cannot be defeated or a LLOC secured by defensive actions alone.
- B. The battle for control of the LLOC will be fought throughout the area of a LLOC and not specifically on the roads or railroads.

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C. It is essential for a commander with the mission of securing the LLOC to be given full responsibility for the security of the total area of a LLOC and that he be given sufficient mobile forces with adequate firepower and communications equipment to accomplish that mission.

With this as a basis, it was concluded in the proposed doctrine, as stated in Chapter V, that the tactical concept for securing the LLOC should include those techniques for: (1) securing trains, (2) securing convoys, and (3) securing key installations, (4) conducting strike operations, and (5) conducting consolidation operations.

The organizational concept for securing LLOC was based on the above tactical concept and, as presented, emphasized the need for establishing an organization that provided a commander securing the LLOC with unity of command and adequate firepower, communications, surveillance, intelligence, and mobility.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of the previous conclusions concerning the manner in which land lines of communication should be secured, it is recommended that the proposed tactical doctrine and organizational concept as presented in Chapter V be adopted for the use of advisors to an underdeveloped country engaged in an insurgent war.

It is further recommended that the current doctrine for securing lines of communication, as printed in the field manuals, be reevaluated

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in the light of the findings of this thesis, and those portions of current doctrine that are vague, incomplete, or not in tune with the actual happenings in Vietnam be revised.

IV. RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY

This thesis touched upon several questions which should be studies in more detail. While this author considers the solution presented here as feasible, other studies are needed to provide a full understanding of the following points:

A. What would the implementation of this proposed doctrine and organizational concept require in the way of a training base in the US and/or emerging nation?

B. How fast could the forces in an indigenous country reasonably be expected to be upgraded to the desired combat strength, equipment level, and combat effectiveness?

C. What effect would the implementation of the proposed solutions have on the basic American policy under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961?

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APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

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GLOSSARY

ACAV: An armored personnel carrier M113 modified with weapons kits to make it a fighting vehicle.

Area Commander: A term used in connection with the proposed doctrine presented in Chapter V meaning, an individual who has overall territorial responsibility for an area, to include all military actions. In terms of Vietnam, this man could be the Corps commander or a province chief.

Battles of Quick Decision: Battles in which the insurgent attempts to achieve victory in a very short time. The guerrilla's purpose in utilizing this technique is to achieve a victory before his opponent's artillery, airpower, and reinforcements can influence the action. (Mao Tse-Tung, Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, Vol. 1, p. 250)

Counter guerrilla Warfare: Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces or nonmilitary agencies of a government against guerrillas. (AR 320-5, 31 Oct 67, p. 124)

Counterinsurgency: Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency. (AR 320-5, 31 Oct 67, p. 124)

Doctrine: Fundamental principle by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.

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It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (AR 320-5, 31 Oct 67, p. 151)

Guerrilla: A combat participant in guerrilla warfare. (AR 320-5, 31 Oct 67, p. 197)

Guerrilla Warfare: Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory, by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. (AR 320-5, 31 Oct 67, p. 197)

Insurgency: A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily communist inspired, supported or exploited. (AR 320-5, 31 Oct 67, p. 220)

Insurgent: A combat participant in an insurgency.

Insurgent Warfare: A struggle between a constituted government and organized insurgents frequently supported from without, but acting violently from within, against the political, social, economic, military and civil vulnerabilities of the regime to bring about its internal destruction or overthrow. Such wars are distinguished from lesser insurgencies by the gravity of the threat to government and the insurgent object of eventual regional or national control. (AR 320-5, 31 Oct 67, p. 220)

Interdict: To prevent or hinder, by any means, enemy use of an area or route. (AR 320-5, 31 Oct 67, p. 223)

Key Installations: Those bridges, tunnels, pumping stations, etc., that if destroyed or damaged will stop traffic on a LLOC or

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greatly reduce the capacity of that LLOC to handle the transportation of cargo or passengers. (Proposed definition for key installations to support doctrine presented in Chapter V: Key Installations: The definition of key installations under the proposed doctrine must be expanded to include villages, hamlets, and other population centers which are located along the LLOC and which are undergoing pacification.)

Land Lines of Communication: Land lines of communication are the roads and railroads used to transport both the civilian and military materials. (AR 320-5, 31 Oct 67, p. 239) (Proposed definition for land lines of communication to support doctrine presented in Chapter V: Land Lines of Communication (LLOC): Are the roads, railroads, and pipelines used to transport personnel and cargo, and that terrain immediately adjacent to those routes that allows one force or the other to control access to, and the use of, the road, railroad, or pipeline.)

Lines of Communication Security Goals: (Taken from the Combined Campaign Plan AB 144, pp. R-17 and R-18)'

A. Green: Segment of the LOC between two points is physically open. RVN/FWMAF control of the surrounding area is such that traffic can move during daylight hours with relative freedom from VC sabotage, attacks, or harassment. Armed escort is not required. Isolated incidents may occur.

B. Amber: Segment of the LOC between two points is physically open. Security of surrounding area is such that thorough security measures, including armed escorts, are required. Frequent incidents may occur.

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C. Red: LOC between two points is closed by enemy military control of the area or by extensive physical interdiction. Requires tactical operations and/or engineering efforts to open and/or restore for traffic.

Local Commander: A term used in connection with the proposed doctrine presented in Chapter V meaning any commander from the regimental commander or district chief to a platoon leader or squad leader who is responsible for the security of a key installation, or an area subordinate to either the area commander or another local commander.

Mobile War: "That form of exterior-line quick decision attack in campaigns and battles which is undertaken by regular army corps along an extensive front in a vast theatre of war." Mobile war is characterized by offensive action and a fluid situation. It permits corps and armies to advance and retreat in great strides, since its aim is to annihilate the enemy rather than gain territory. (Mao Tse-Tung, Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, Vol. 2, p. 222)

Static Security: A tactical concept that emphasizes the securing of key installations as the best means of securing a LLOC. This security will be accomplished at the expense of providing troops for patrols and ambushes.

Surveillance: The systematic observation of air, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means for intelligence purposes. (FM 31-23, December 1967, p. 150)

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Tactical Doctrine: Fundamental principles by which the military forces and elements thereof guide the employment of units in combat.

Tactics: The employment of units in combat. The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to utilize their full potentialities. (AR 320-5, 31 Oct 67, p. 424)

Technique: Method of performance of any act, especially the detailed methods used by troops or commanders in performing assigned tasks. Technique refers to the basic methods of using equipment and personnel. The phrase "tactics and technique" is often used to refer to the general and detailed methods used by commanders and forces in carrying out their assignments. (AR 320-5, 31 Oct 67, p. 430)

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
APPENDIX B

ARMORED CAVALRY TYPE ORGANIZATIONS

This appendix contains detailed organizational charts, Figures 5 through 9, for the proposed armored cavalry type units recommended for securing land lines of communication.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNIT




^aThis Scout Reconnaissance Section of 36 men is organized into nine scouting teams of four men capable of living for extended periods of time in guerrilla territory. They will learn the terrain, learn the guerrillas' habits, conduct patrols, report intelligence, and guide other units on offensive operations against the guerrilla force.

*Indicates change from standard TOE.

MISSION: To perform specialized intelligence and counterintelligence functions which require the employment of special skills in support of an Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Figure 5. Military Intelligence Unit.

ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON




^aThis TOE was not modified. This battery is a standard armored cavalry 155-mm howitzer battery.

*Indicates that the TOEs have been modified. See Figures 7-9.

MISSION: To provide security for land lines of communication by engaging in a combination of defensive and offensive actions.

Figure 6. Armored Cavalry Squadron.



^aSee Figures 7a, 7b and 7c for details on these units.

^{*}Indicates change from standard TOE—for equipment list see continuation.

MISSION: To furnish command, administration, supply, mess, and maintenance for the Armored Cavalry Squadron assigned a mission of securing land lines of communication.


Figure 7. Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Armored Cavalry Squadron.

EQUIPMENT LIST

Troop Headquarters		Squadron Hq Section		Ground Surveillance		Communications Platoon		Maintenance Platoon		Air Control Team	
Qty	Nom	Qty	Nom	Qty	Nom	Qty	Nom	Qty	Nom	Qty	Nom
1	Detector mine, portable	4	Carriers, C.P.	2	ACAV*	1	Carrier C.P.	2	Grenades L. M-79	1	Radio AN/GRC-106
1	Detector mine, microwave	2	ACAV*	2	Grenades L. M-79	1	M.G. 50-cal	4	M.G. 50-cal	1	Radio AN/VRC-24
4	M.G., 50-cal	2	Grenades, L. M-79	2	Radios AN/PPS-5*	1	Radio AN/VRC-47	4	Radios AN/VRC-46	1	Radio AN/VRC-46
1	Radio, AN/VRC-47	3	Radios, AN/GRC-106	2	Radios AN/VRC-46	1	Radio AN/VRC-49	1	Lt recovery vehicle*	3	Radio AN/PRC-25
1	Radio, AN/VRC-53	1	Radio, AN/GRC-5	2	Radios AN/PRC-25	11	Rifles M-16*	1	Hvy recovery vehicle*	3	Rifles M-16
32	Rifles, M-16*	2	Radios, AN/VRC-12	6	Rifles M-16*	1	Truck 3/4-ton	1	Truck 3/4-ton	1	Truck 3/4-ton
4	Starlight scopes	1	Radio AN/VRC-24	2	Weapon sights, infrared	3	Trucks 1/2-ton	26	Rifles M-16*		
1	Truck, 3/4-ton	6	Radios, AN/VRC-46			2	Weapon sights, infrared	2	Submachineguns cal. 45		
4	Trucks, 2 1/2-ton*	6	Radios, AN/VRC-47					2	Trucks 3/4-ton		
1	Truck, wrecker, 5-ton	2	Radios, AN/VRC-29					4	Trucks 2 1/2-ton		
2	Trucks, 3/4-ton	47	Rifles, M-16*					1	Truck 3/4-ton		
		2	Speech Security devices, KY-8					2	Trucks, wrecker 5-ton		
		4	Trucks, 3/4-ton*								
		1	Truck, 2 1/2-ton								
		8	Trucks, 3/4-ton*								
		2	Weapon sights, infrared								

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
Figure 7. (continued).



EQUIPMENT	
Platoon Headquarters	Scout Dog Squad
*4 Rifles, M-16	4 M.G., M-60
*1 Radio, AN/GRC-106	*24 Rifles, M-16
1 Truck, ¼-ton	4 Radios, AN/PRC-125
	4 Trucks, ½-ton
	24 Dogs

MISSION: To support offensive and defensive operations conducted to secure an LLOC.

Figure 7a. Scout Dog Platoon.



9-5604


EQUIPMENT

Platoon Headquarters	Aidman Section	Aid Station Section	Evacuation Section
1 Radio, AN/VRC-46	11 Aidman kits	2 Blanket sets	6 Blanket sets
*2 Rifles, M-16		6 Litters	1 Carrier, C.P.
1 Truck, ¼-ton		1 Medical Instrument set	3 Carriers, Personnel
		6 Medical Supply sets	24 Litters
		*6 Rifles, M-16	*4 Radios, AN/VRC-53
		4 Splint sets	*4 Trucks, ambulance
		1 Surgical Instrument set	
		3 Surgical Instrument sets (individual)	
		1 Truck, 2½-ton	

*Indicates change from standard TOE.

MISSION: To provide medical support and evacuation to the Armored Cavalry Squadron.

Figure 7b. Medical Platoon.




EQUIPMENT

Support Platoon Headquarters	Transportation Section	Supply Section
1 Radio, AN/GRC-106	7 M.G., 50-cal.	2 M.G., 50-cal.
1 Radio, AN/VRC-46	1 Radio, AN/VRC-46	*7 Rifles, M-16
*3 Rifles, M-16	*30 Rifles, M-16	2 Trucks, 5-ton
1 Truck, 3/4-ton	*12 Trucks, 5-ton	1 Radio, AN/VRC-46
	1 Truck, 3/4-ton	
	*4 Trucks, tank, 2 1/2-ton	

MISSION: To provide supplies and transportation to the squadron.

*Indicates change from TOE.

Figure 7c. Support Platoon.



EQUIPMENT

Troop Headquarters	Troop Mess Team	AERO Weapons Sec	Flight Operations Sec	Utility Helicopter Platoon
1 Helicopter, UH-1D w/M-60 M.G.	1 MG, 50-cal.	4 Helicopters, UH-1B	1 Helicopter, UH-1B	*5 Helicopters, UH-1D w/M-60
1 M-79	*7 Rifles, M-16	AERO Weapons system	AERO Weapons system	*1 Radio, AN/PRC-25
1 Radio, AN/VRC-47	1 Truck, 2½-ton	1 Radio, AN/PRC-25	1 Radio, AN/GRC-106	*1 Rifle, M-16
*1 Rifle, M-16			1 Radio, AN/VRC-24	
1 Truck, ¼-ton			1 Radio, AN/GRR-5	
			1 Radio, AN/VRC-47	
			5 Rifles, M-16	
			1 Truck, 2½-ton	
			1 Truck, ¼-ton	


^aAD team has been deleted and one utility helicopter section added from U.S. TOE 17-58G.

^bFor detailed organizations, see figures 8a, 8b, and 8c.

*Indicates change from standard TOE.

MISSION: To perform air and ground reconnaissance throughout the area of responsibility assigned an Armored Cavalry Squadron; to engage in offensive and defensive combat within its capabilities; to provide a rapid reaction capability to the squadron commander.

Figure 8. Air Cavalry Troop.



EQUIPMENT	
Maintenance section	Supply section
1 Helicopter, UH1B	1 Helicopter, UH1B
AERO Weapons System	AERO Weapons System
2 M.G., 50-cal.	5 M.G., 50-cal.
1 Radio, AN/VRC-47	*13 Rifles, M-16
*34 Rifles, M-16	3 Trucks, 2½-ton
2 Trucks, ¾-ton	2 Trucks, 5-ton
2 Trucks, 2½-ton	4 Trucks, tank, 2½-ton
1 Truck, ¾-ton	*1 Radio, AN/VRC-47
1 Truck, Shop van	

MISSION: To provide supplies and maintenance for the Air Cavalry Troop.


* Indicates change from standard TOE.

Figure 8a. Service Platoon.

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AERO RIFLE PLATOON



EQUIPMENT

Platoon Headquarters	Aero Rifle Squad
1 Helicopter, UHID w/door mtd M-60	2 Grenade launchers, M-79
1 Radio, AN/PRC-25	1 M.G., M-60
1 Rifle, M-16	1 Radio, AN/PRC-25
	*8 Rifles, M-16
	2 Starlight scopes

*Indicates change from standard TOE.


MISSION: To perform air and ground reconnaissance throughout the area of an LLOC; to provide security for other units as required; to provide a rapid reaction reserve force as needed

Figure 8b. Aero rifle platoon.

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NOTE: For equipment list see next page.

MISSION: To provide security and perform reconnaissance for the unit to which it is assigned; to engage in offensive and defensive actions in support of an LLOC security mission.

Figure 9. Armored Cavalry Troop.

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
EQUIPMENT

Headquarters Section	Ground Surveillance Sec.	Troop Mess	Maintenance Section
*1 ACAV	*2 ACAV	1 M.G., 50-cal.	1 Armored Personnel Carrier
1 Carrier, C.P.	2 M-79	*7 Rifles, M-16	1 M-79
1 M-79	2 Night weapon sights	1 Truck, 2½-ton	2 Night vision sights
1 M.G., 50-cal.	2 Radar, PPS-5		1 Radio, AN/VRC-46
2 Night vision sights	2 Radios, AN/GRC-125		1 Radio, AN/VRC-47
1 Radio, AN/GRC-106			1 Radio, AN/VRC-53
1 Radio, AN/VRC-12			1 Lt Recovery Vehicle
3 Radios, AN/VRC-46			*10 Rifles, M-16
1 Radio, AN/VRC-47			1 Submachinegun, 45 cal.
9 Rifles, M-16			1 Truck, ¾-ton
2 Starlight scopes			1 Truck, ¼-ton
1 Truck, 2½-ton			
1 Truck, ¼-ton			
*5 Searchlights: DC28V 100 amp			
1 Special security device, KY-8.			

*Indicates change from TOE.

Figure 9. (Continued).

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EQUIPMENT

Platoon Headquarters	Scout Section	Tank Section	Rifle Squad	Support Section
*1 ACAV 1 Night vision sight 1 Night observation device 1 Radio, AN/VRC-12 *1 Rifle, M-16 *2 Mine detecting sets, portable *2 Radios, AN/XM 77	*4 ACAV 4 M-79 4 Night vision devices 2 Radios, AN/GRC-125 2 Radios, AN/VRC-46 *6 Rifles, M-16 4 Starlight scopes	*3 Tanks, combat 3 M-79 3 Night vision sights 3 Radios, AN/VRC-12 2 Radios, AN/VRC-53 2 Submachineguns, 45 cal.	*1 ACAV 2 M-79 1 M.G., M-60 1 Night vision device 1 Radio, AN/PRC-25 1 Radio, AN/VRC-53 *9 Rifles, M-16 2 Starlight scopes	1 Night vision device *1 Radio, AN/VRC-46 *4 Rifles M-16 1 Carrier, M106 1 Mortar, 4.2 in

MISSION: To provide security and perform reconnaissance for the troop to which it is assigned; to engage in offensive or defensive actions in support of an LLOC security mission.

Figure 9a. Armored Cavalry Rifle Platoon.


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APPENDIX C

PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

This appendix contains detailed organizational charts, Figures 10 through 13, for the proposed paramilitary units recommended for securing land lines of communication.

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
^aNumber of teams will be provided on an as needed basis.

MISSION: To perform specialized intelligence and counterintelligence functions which require the employment of special skills in support of an Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Figure 10. Psychological Operations Team.

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
^aSee figure 5 for details.

^bSee US TOE 6-37G for details of organization.

MISSION: To provide security for LLOC by engaging in a combination of offensive and defensive actions.

Figure 11. Regional Forces Battalion.

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^aSee Figure 5 for details of this organization.

^bSee Figures 12a and 12b for details.

MISSION: To furnish command, administration, supply, mess, and maintenance for the Regional Force Battalion assigned a mission of securing LLOC.

NOTE: See following page for personnel and equipment lists.

Figure 12. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Regional Force Battalion.


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PERSONNEL				
Battalion Hq	Company Hq	Battalion Hq Sec	Battalion Comm Plat	Battalion Maint Plat
1 Commanding Off 1 Executive Off 1 S-1 1 S-2 1 S-3 1 S-3 Air 1 S-4 1 S-5 1 Comm Off 1 Motor Off 1 Sgt Major	1 Company CO 1 Company XO 1 First Sgt 1 Motor Sgt 1 Supply Sgt 1 Sr. track mech 1 Armorer 6 Track mech 1 Clerk 1 Wheel mech 3 Mech helpers 2 Parts clerks 1 Mess steward 2 First cooks 2 Cooks helpers	2 Liaison Off 1 Intelligence Sgt 1 Operations Sgt 1 Asst Intelligence Sgt 1 Asst Ops Sgt 1 Pers Staff NCO 1 Psy War NCO 2 Radio Team Chiefs 2 Clerks 6 IS radio operators 6 Drivers 1 Mail clerk 4 TT operators 3 Psy War specialists 1 Intelligence sqd ldr 2 Informant handlers 6 Intelligence scouts	1 Comm Chief 1 Sr. radio mech 1 Radar mech 2 Radio mech 1 Sr. message clerk 1 Switchboard operator 2 Motor messengers 1 Message clerk	1 Motor Sgt 2 Sr. recon mech 4 Sr. truck mech 3 Ports clerks 1 Powerman 2 Recov mechs 10 Track mechs 1 Welder 5 Mech helpers 2 Wheel veh mech
Air Control				
1 Op Sgt, Air 2 Rad operators				
EQUIPMENT				
1 Mine detector, ptbl 1 Mine detector, micro 4 M.G., 50 cal. 1 Radio, AN VRC-47 1 Radio, AN VRC-53 25 Rifles, M-16 4 Starlight scopes 1 Truck, ¾-ton 3 Trucks, 2½-ton 1 Truck wrecker 5-ton 2 Trucks, ¼-ton	2 ACAV 2 Grenades, L. M-79 3 Radios, AN GRC-106 2 Radios, AN VRC-12 1 Radio, AN VRC-24 6 Radios, AN VRC-46 2 Radios, AN VRC-47 2 Radios, AN VRC-29 39 Rifles, M-16 2 Speech scy devices, KY-8 4 Trucks, ¾-ton 8 Trucks, ¼-ton 2 Wpn sights, infrared	1 M.G., 50 cal. 1 Radio, AN VRC-47 1 Radio, AN VRC-49 10 Rifles, M-16 1 Truck, ¾-ton 3 Trucks, ¼-ton 2 Wpn sights, infrared	2 Grenades, L. M-79 4 M.G., 50 cal. 4 Radio, AN VRC-46 1 Lt recovery vehicle 1 Hvy recovery vehicle 27 Rifles, M-16 2 Submachineguns 2 Trucks, ¾-ton 4 Trucks, ¼-ton 2 Truck wreckers, 5-ton	1 Radio, AN GRC-106 1 Radio, AN VRC-24 1 Radio, AN VRC-46 1 Radio, AN PRC-125 3 Rifles, M-16 1 Truck, ¾-ton

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Figure 12. (Continued)

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PERSONNEL

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
Support Platoon Headquarters	Transportation Section	Supply Section
1 Platoon Leader	1 Section Commander	1 Supply Sgt
2 Radio Operators	1 Truck master	1 Asst Supply Sgt
	4 Sr. truck drivers	2 General supply spec
	1 Ammo specialist	2 Supply clerks
	12 Heavy truck drivers	
	8 Asst truck drivers	
	1 Light truck driver	
	2 Ammo handlers	

EQUIPMENT

1 Radio, AN/GRC-106	7 M.G., M-60	2 M.G., M-60
1 Radio, AN/VRC-46	1 Radio, AN/VRC-46	6 Rifles, M-16
3 Rifles, M-16	30 Rifles, M-16	2 Trucks, 5-ton
1 Truck, 3/4-ton	12 Trucks, 5-ton	1 Radio, AN/VRC-46
	1 Truck, 1/4-ton	
	4 Trucks, tank	

MISSION: To provide supplies and transportation to the battalion.

Figure 12a. Support Platoon.



PERSONNEL


Platoon Headquarters	Aidman Section	Aid Station Section	Evacuation Section
1 Doctor 1 Platoon Sgt	12 Company Aidmen	2 Medical Assistants 2 Senior Aidmen 2 Aidmen	1 Section Sgt 6 Drivers 6 Aidmen

EQUIPMENT

1 Radio, AN/VRC-46 1 Rifle, M-16 1 Truck, ¼-ton	12 Aidmen kits	2 Blanket sets 6 Litters 1 Medical instrument set 6 Medical Supply sets 6 Rifles, M-16 4 Splint sets 1 Surgical instrument set 3 Surgical instrument sets (indiv) 1 Truck, 2½-ton	6 Blanket sets 3 Carriers, Personnel 24 Litters 3 Radios, AN/VRC-53 3 Trucks, ambulance
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MISSION: To provide medical support and evacuation to the Armored Cavalry Squadron.

Figure 12b. Medical Platoon.




NOTE: See following page for personnel and equipment lists.

MISSION: To provide security and perform reconnaissance for the unit to which it is assigned; to engage in offensive and defensive actions in support of an LLOC security mission.

Figure 13. Regional Force Company.

PERSONNEL			
Headquarters Section	Ground Surveillance Section	Company Mess Section	Maintenance Section
1 Company CO	1 Section Leader	1 Mess Stewart	1 Motor Sgt
1 Company Ex O	2 Operators	2 Senior Cooks	1 Sr. Radio mech
1 First Sgt	2 Drivers/operators	2 Cooks	1 Sr. Recovery mech
1 Supply Sgt		2 Cooks helpers	1 Track vehicle mech
1 Comm Chief			1 Radio mech
3 Drivers			1 Recovery mech
1 Clerk			2 Repair parts clerks
2 Radio operators			5 Track vehicle mech
1 Supply specialist			2 Mechanic helpers
1 Sr. Radio operator			
9-3406			
EQUIPMENT			
3 Weapons Sights	2 ACAV	1 M.G., M-60	1 carrier, personnel
Infrared	2 M-79	7 Rifles, M-16	1 Lt recovery vehicle
1 ACAV	2 Night weapon	1 Truck, 2½-ton	1 Radio, AN/VRC-46
1 M.G., M-60	sight devices		1 Radio, AN/VRC-47
2 Night vision devices	2 Radar, PPS-5		1 Radio, AN/VRC-53
1 Radio, AN/GRC-106	2 Radios, AN/GRC-125		1 Truck, ¾-ton
3 Radios, AN/VRC-47			1 Truck, ¼-ton
11 Rifles, M-16			1 M-79
2 Starlight scopes			1 Submachinegun, 45 cal.
1 Truck, 2½-ton			10 Rifles, M-16
1 Truck, ¼-ton			
1 Special Security device, KY-8			

Figure 13. (Continued).



PERSONNEL


Platoon Headquarters	Weapons Squad	Rifle Squad
1 Platoon Leader	1 Squad Leader	3 Squad Leaders
1 NCO, Platoon Sgt	1 ACAV driver	3 ACAV Drivers
1 Radio tel operator	1 60-mm Mortar Squad Leader	6 Team Leaders
	1 60-mm Mortar Gunner	6 Grenadiers
	1 60-mm Mortar Leader	15 Riflemen
	1 M-60 M.G. Squad Leader	
	1 M-60 M.G. Gunner	
	1 M-60 M.G. Asst Gunner	
	1 Ammo bearer	

EQUIPMENT

1 Radio AN/VRC-46	1 Radio AN/VRC-46	3 ACAV
3 Rifles, M-16	1 ACAV	2 Radios, AN/GRC-125
1 Radio, XM/PRC-77	1 Mortar, 60-mm	6 M-79
2 Night Obs devices	1 M.G., M-60	27 Rifles, M-16
2 Mine detecting sets, portable	1 Starlight scope	3 Night vision devices
1 Night vision device	7 Rifles, M-16	6 Starlight scopes
	1 ACAV	

MISSION: To provide security and perform reconnaissance for the Regional Force Companies to which it is assigned; to engage in offensive and defensive actions in support of an LLOC security mission.

Figure 13a. Regional Force Rifle Platoon.



PERSONNEL

Platoon Headquarters	Section Headquarters	81-mm Mortar Squads	Section Headquarters	57-mm Recoilless Rifle Squads
1 Platoon Leader 1 Platoon Sergeant 1 Radio Operator	1 Section Leader 2 Drivers	3 Squad Leaders 3 Gunners 3 Asst Gunners 3 Ammunition Bearers 3 Drivers	1 Section Leader	3 Squad Leaders 3 Gunners 3 Asst Gunners 3 Ammunition Bearers 3 Drivers

EQUIPMENT

1 Radio, AN/VRC-46 1 Truck, ¼-ton 3 Rifles, M-16	3 Rifles, M-16 2 Trucks, ¼-ton 1 Radio, AN/GRC-125	3 mortar carriers, M-125 3 mortars, 81-mm 12 Rifles, M-16 3 Radios, AN/VRC-53 3 night vision devices	1 Rifle, M-16	3 ACAV 3 57-mm Recoilless Rifles 3 Radios, AN/VRC-53 3 night vision devices 3 starlight scopes 12 rifles, M-16
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MISSION: To provide supporting fires to the Regional Force Rifle platoons.

Figure 13b. Regional Force Weapons Platoon.


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APPENDIX D

RAILWAY SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

This appendix contains detailed organizational charts, Figures 14 through 17, for the proposed National Railway Security Forces recommended to provide train and repair crew security.

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^aNumber of rail security battalions based on track mileage. One battalion authorized for every 300 km of track.


MISSION: To provide security for the trains, reconstruction and repair sites, and railroad materiel as directed.

LEGEND

- Command.
- - - (-) - - - Command minus.
- x ——— Operational command.

Figure 14. National Railway Security Force.


RAIL SECURITY BATTALION



*Indicates that the TOE has been modified. See Figure 16.

MISSION: To protect the nation's railroad trains and repair and reconstruction sites. To provide protection for railroad assets in coordination with the area commander.


Figure 15. Rail Security Battalion.



*Indicates change from standard TOE.

MISSION: To provide command and control, administration, and logistical support as required.

Figure 16. Rail Security Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company.



*Indicates change from standard TOE.

MISSION To protect passengers, freight, and the equipment of the railroad.

Figure 17. Rail Security Company.

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APPENDIX E

QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER 1

This appendix contains a copy of the questionnaire distributed to selected members of the USACGSC class of 1968-1969, who have served in American units in Vietnam, a discussion of the methodology used in distributing that questionnaire, and a brief discussion of the results of the questionnaire.

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METHODOLOGY

Objectives of the Questionnaire

- A. To determine the type of tactics being used in Vietnam to secure lines of communication.
- B. To determine the extent to which American units are actively engaged in securing land lines of communication.
- C. To determine how the men in the field rated the tactics they employed.

Preparation and Distribution of the Questionnaire

After careful research into the manner in which surveys should be conducted, a pilot questionnaire was prepared and given to two members of the USACGSC class of 1969 for them to complete. After the men had completed the questionnaire, it and the results were examined and minor revisions were made prior to the publishing of Questionnaire No. 1. At the same time the questionnaire was being prepared, a survey of USACGSC class of 1969 was conducted to select those members who might have had some experience in securing LLOC in Vietnam. One hundred forty-four men met this criteria and were sent copies of the questionnaire under a cover letter (see Tab A) which explained the purpose of the questionnaire and requested their assistance.

Analysis of the Questionnaire

General. Of the one hundred twenty-two (122) questionnaires which were returned, only seventy-two (72) were of any use in this study. Thirty-four (34) of the men stated that they had no experience in the area of

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securing LLOC and sixteen men either checked multiple contradictory answers (1), or they failed to answer numerous questions (6).

The men who answered the questionnaire represented a variety of assignments ranging from company commanders, through the full range of staff assignments, to an Aviation unit commander. The breakdown of the various assignments shows: (1) Battalion Executive Officers - 12, (2) S-3 or G-3 - 38, (3) S-4 - 5, (4) S-2 - 3, (5) Engineer - 4, (6) Military Police - 2, (7) Gunship Platoon Leaders - 4, (8) Troop or Company Commanders - 3, and (9) Assistant Fire Support Coordinator - 1.

While trying to analyze questions J through M, it became apparent that the questions were poorly written, were not answered in the manner it was intended for them to be answered, and were often left unanswered or only partially answered. For these reasons questions J through M were not included in the tabulation. Question R also received a generally poor response due to the everchanging tactical situation in Vietnam and had to be discarded.

Question N, the tabulation of which is not shown on the questionnaire, revealed that 61 of the units were involved in active patrolling and ambushing in support of the LLOC missions and nine units did not patrol or ambush. Two men did not answer the question. Of the 61 men who answered the question affirmatively, twenty-two stated they used only foot patrols, and 36 stated that they used a combination of foot and mounted patrols. Four of the men did not state what type of patrolling they conducted.

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The complete questionnaire tabulation is presented on the questionnaire its f (Tab A) with the exception of questions J through N, R and portions of B which are discussed above.

Objective A. Based on the responses to question I, the interviews, and the comments on the questionnaire, it was concluded that the tactics employed by the units in Vietnam emphasized offensive combat techniques along the LLOC and throughout the area adjacent to the LLOC.

Objective B. Based on the responses to questions B and D, it was concluded that very few American units have a primary mission of securing LLOC, but that many units have been engaged in securing the LLOC as a secondary mission or had a primary mission of securing LLOC for short periods of time in connection with specific operations.

Objective C. Based on the answers to questions O and P, it can be concluded that the men rated their tactics and units as being successful. The comments on the questionnaires and the interviews conducted later, (see Tabs B through E), cause this author to view the responses to these questions, particularly question P, with some misgivings. It was readily apparent that a sense of unit loyalty and pride entered into many of these responses. For this reason, this author did not really feel this objective was met by the questionnaire.

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TAB A

QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER 1 WITH TABULATIONS

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SUBJECT: Student Questionnaire on Securing Lines of Communication

TO: _____ Section _____

1. While serving in Vietnam last year, my job involved providing security for ground lines of communication. Shortly after assuming my duties I requested assistance from the Infantry School, the Command and General Staff College and other agencies in the form of a request for doctrine on the tactics and techniques my counterpart and I should use to accomplish our mission. I was informed at that time that no doctrine existed specifically dealing with the problem of securing lines of communication. When I returned to CONUS in July of 1968, I discovered that doctrine on securing lines of communication had recently been published, but that it was inadequate in certain respects.
2. I am presently conducting research to determine a valid concept for securing land lines of communication that can be used by US Advisors to assist a host nation involved in an insurgent war. In view of my rather limited experience in some aspects of this problem, I would like to solicit your assistance in filling the gape in my knowledge.
3. A check of the student records has indicated that you may have some experience in securing ground lines of communication. If you would fill out the attached questionnaire, it would be greatly appreciated.
4. In answering this questionnaire you may find that some of the selections offered will not accurately describe the situation as you know it, in that case you may find a combination of selections is the best answer. If you find a combination of selections is the best answer, check both answers and state the reason you did this at the end of the question or in the

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blank marked other. If none of the answers to a question describe the situation in your unit please check the blank marked "other" and answer the question in the blanks provided.

5. The following definitions will apply to the terms and abbreviations used in this questionnaire.

a. Land Lines of Communication (LLOC); For the purposes of this questionnaire, land lines of communication will be limited to the roads, railroads, and pipelines used to support both the civilian economy and the military forces.

b. Key Installations: Those bridges, tunnels, pumping stations, etc., that if destroyed or damaged will stop traffic on a LLOC or greatly reduce the capacity of that LLOC to handle the transportation of cargo or passengers.

c. Static Security: A tactical concept that emphasizes the securing of key installations as the best means of securing a LLOC. The securing of key installations will be accomplished at the expense of providing troops for patrols and ambushes.

d. Surveillance: The systematic observation of air, surface, or sub-surface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means for intelligence purposes.

/s/ Dale R. Sweetwood
DALE R. SWEETWOOD
Major, Infantry
Section 24

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QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 1

A. Check one of the following answers.

[34] I was assigned to an American unit, but my job did not bring me into contact with the problem of securing lines of communication,

[10] I was assigned to an American unit, but my job brought me into infrequent contact with the problem of securing lines of communication.

[34] I was assigned to an American unit and my job brought me into frequent contact with the problem of securing lines of communication.

[44] I was assigned to an American unit and my job brought me into daily contact with the problem of securing lines of communication.

B. Fill in the blanks.

My job in Vietnam was _____

My unit's primary mission was men gave their primary mission as being LLOC security.

My unit was located in _____ Province(s).

C. Check those blanks below that apply to you. If none of them apply go to the next question.

[70] I am willing to participate in a personal interview to assist in further developing the area covered by this questionnaire.

[52] I have little knowledge of the procedures used to secure lines of communication and do not desire to complete this questionnaire.

D. My unit's mission to secure LLOC was best defined as; (Check the one block that best applies to your situation,)

[8] My unit did not have a specific mission of securing LLOC.

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[10] My unit had the mission of providing security for the MSR leading into our base camps and for providing a reaction force if ARVN units securing other LLOC needed assistance,

[23] My unit had the mission of providing security for LLOC only for short periods of time, usually only in connection with an operation.

[31] My unit had the mission of securing the MSR leading into our base camps, providing reaction forces to support the ARVN units, and securing specific LLOC for short periods of time as part of other operational missions.

[0] My unit's mission concerning the security of LLOC was never clearly defined or understood.

[0] Other _____
(please specify)

E. My unit's mission concerning LLOC was: (Check one)

[22] Given in broad general terms that allowed for considerable latitude in the accomplishment of that mission.

[8] Given as a requirement to secure specific key installations and provide convoy security.

[9] Given as a requirement to secure specific key installations, provide convoy security, and provide surveillance of the rest of the LLOC,

[16] Given as a requirement to secure specific key installations, provide convoy security, and provide for limited patrolling and ambushing along the LLOC when the troops were available,

[15] Given as a requirement to provide short term security in conjunction with specific operations,

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F. My unit was: (Check one and circle the appropriate words)

[70] A standard TOE (Inf) (Mech Inf) (Armor) (Cav) (Air Cav) unit with (no) (the following) significant augmentations in personnel and equipment. Infantry - 44; Mechanized Infantry - 3; Armor 1; Cavalry - 9;
(List only major items of equipment and personnel and units
Air Cavalry - 7; Military Police - 2; Engineer - 2; Aviation - 2,
that were significant from an operational standpoint.)

[1] A specially organized unit organized and equipped in the following manner. Brigade which included infantry, artillery, cavalry and aviation
(List only major items of equipment and personnel and units that
elements.
were significant from an operational standpoint.)

[1] Other. One man failed to answer the question.

G. (Circle the appropriate words) My unit (did) (did not) have significant shortages of equipment that (prevented) (would have prevented) the accomplishment of the unit's mission to secure LLOC. One man failed to answer the question; three had shortages of equipment and 68 did not.

H. (Answer only if applicable) The significant items of equipment that my unit was short were. One needed mine detectors and radars, one needed
(List only major items of equipment such as
vehicles and radars, and the third just needed radars,
radars, APC's, weapons, etc, the amount short is not significant for this
questionnaire.)

I. How would you describe the tactics used in your unit to accomplish your assigned mission of securing LLOC? (Check the most appropriate answers).

[6] Static security of key installations and security for convoys,

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[31] The security of key installations, convoy security, detailed surveillance of the LLOC, and the establishment of priorities for the protection of key or primary LLOC.

[27] Securing of key installations, convoy security, and limited patrolling and ambushing along the LLOC.

[8] Other. These eight were merely variations of the three listed (please specify)

above. In all cases these variations emphasized some form of offensive action.

J. Could the LLOC in your area be used on a 24 hour basis without armed escorts? (Circle one) Yes. No. Could the Primary LLOC in your area be used on a 24 hour basis without armed escort? Yes. No.

K. Could the (LLOC) (primary LLOC) be used on a 24 hour basis with armed escort? Yes. No. (Circle the appropriate words).

L. Could the (LLOC) (primary LLOC) in your area be used during the day light hours without armed escorts? (Circle the appropriate words).

M. Could the (LLOC) (primary LLOC) in your area be used during the day light hours with armed escorts? Yes, No, (Circle the appropriate words).

N. (Circle the appropriate words to complete the sentence,) During the night my unit (was) (was not) involved in active (foot) (mounted) (foot and mounted) patrolling and ambushing along the LLOC in our TAOR,

O. I would rate my unit's ability, in terms of equipment and personnel, to provide security for LLOC as:

[15] Good [21] Very Good [27] Outstanding [6] Poor [0] Very Poor

[3] Marginal [] Other _____

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P. I would rate the tactics employed by my unit as: [1] Marginal
[38] Very Successful [3] Very Unsuccessful [] Unsuccessful [30]
Successful

Q. The Viet Cong were able to interdict the LLOC that was secured by my
unit: [6] Whenever they chose to do so [9] Frequently [3] Often
[21] At infrequent intervals [24] Very Seldom [8] Never.

R. An estimated _____ V.C. battalions and _____
V.C. companies were operating in my area. There were _____
NVA battalions operating in my area.

S. Please list any operations in which you participated that had a
primary or secondary mission of securing a LLOC. Many men stated that
they could not remember the names of the operations. Virtually all the
operations conducted in Vietnam in the last three years were mentioned.

T. Comments. (Please make any comments that you feel would be of benefit
in my research. The comments made in this section were generally aimed
at pointing out the need for offensive actions to secure an LLOC. In
numerous cases, the men went to great lengths to explain in detail the
concept they employed to secure the LLOC, In every case where the man
took the time and effort to explain his concept he emphasized the need for
controlling the terrain through which the LLOC ran and the need for
continuous day and night patrolling and ambushing all along the route
and away from the route.

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TAB B

INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR LAWRENCE L. MILLS, SN 0-74396
ON THE SUBJECT OF SECURING LINES OF COMMUNICATION CONDUCTED
ON 17 APRIL 1969

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INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR LAWRENCE L. MILLS, SN 0-74396

SUBJECT: SECURING LAND LINES OF COMMUNICATION

DATE: 17 APRIL 1969

General Information

Major Mills is an Infantry Officer who has some thirteen years of experience at a variety of jobs in normal infantry units. Major Mills' assignment in Vietnam was as a Brigade S-4 in the 1st Air Cavalry Division. In the comments on his questionnaire, Major Mills said, "our operations pertaining to LLOC security were generally for short periods of time, usually conducted by one battalion. Their mission was usually to open Highway 19 or other roads for the movement of convoys." He stated also that normally they did not have a requirement to maintain the LLOC open after darkness. He further stated that they never had a convoy ambushed except for a little sniper fire, and that they found that normal alertness on the part of the troops in a convoy, a reaction force with helicopters being available, and armed helicopters flying over the column were all the deterrent needed.

Questions and Answers From the Interview

Question No. 1. In planning for operations to secure the LLOC, how much consideration was given to the needs of the people, i.e. were your operations designed primarily to support a military objective, or was consideration given specifically to opening the LLOC for the primary purpose of allowing the people to get their products to market?

Answer: Usually both the civilian and military needs were considered.

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Question No. 2. Who had the continuing responsibility for securing the LLOC in your area?

Answer: I do not know.

Question No. 3. How much of your unit's time was taken up with LLOC security missions?

Answer: I don't know and would not hazard a guess.

Question No. 4. What was the general security condition of the MSR in your area?

Answer: Green.

Question No. 5. What was the security condition of the other LLOC in your area?

Answer: Amber.

Question No. 6. Was there conflict of missions with the Vietnamese units in your area? How was that conflict handled?

Answer: There was no conflict. There were very few ARVN units in our area and there were no RF and PF forces at all.

Question No. 7. What were your specific objectives regarding LLOC security?

Answer: The primary objective was to keep the road open in the day light hours for use by military and civilian traffic.

Question No. 8. When answering the questionnaire, did you consider mining incidents, sniping, etc., and other similar incidents as interdiction?

Answer: No, mining and sniping were not considered as interdiction.

Question No. 9. When you answered question F, what criteria did you use?

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Answer: The fact that there were no ambushes and very few confrontations with the Viet Cong. (He checked "very successful" in answer to question P).

Question No. 10. How long did your operations for securing the LLOC last?

Answer: From one to ten weeks usually.

Question No. 11. When you conducted operations to secure a LLOC, were operations conducted on all parts of the LLOC?

Answer: Yes and no. Sometimes they were and other times they were not.

Question No. 12. When you were in Vietnam conducting operations to secure the LLOC, did you feel the doctrine in the field manuals covered the subject thoroughly? How did you establish your procedures for securing the LLOC?

Answer: Since I was not the S-3 or in a battalion with the mission, I can't answer the question. I would guess that the techniques were arrived at by trial and error.

END OF INTERVIEW

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TAB C

INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR THOMAS R, BLOCK, XN 0-82429
ON THE SUBJECT OF SECURING LINES OF COMMUNICATION CONDUCTED
ON 21 APRIL 1969

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INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR THOMAS R. BLOCK SN 0-82429

SUBJECT: SECURING LAND LINES OF COMMUNICATION

DATE: 21 APRIL 1969

General Information

Major Block is an infantry officer with 11 years experience in a variety of infantry jobs. The time frame covered by his tour in Vietnam was 1966-1967. Major Block's unit, in which he was the S-3, was involved in a pacification effort near Nha Be in Gia Dinh Province. Major Block stated in his questionnaire, "During the 10 months of pacification in the Nha Be district, we secured LLOC's by using a combination of PF and US units. The PF secured the key installations, while the US troops conducted offensive operations (patrols and ambushes) in the area contiguous to the LLOC. The primary LLOC was green 24 hours without armed escort both day and night. The secondary LLOC was amber without armed escort during the day and with armed escort at night. We did travel on the secondary routes without armed escort at night, when it was necessary, without incident."

Questions and Answers From the Interview

Question No. 1. In planning for operations to secure the LLOC, how much consideration was given to the needs of the people, i.e., were your operations designed primarily to support a military objective, or was consideration given specifically to opening the LLOC for the primary purpose of allowing the people to get their produce to market?

Answer: Military objective only. The roads in that area were not denied to the people by the Viet Cong.

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Question No. 2. Who had the continuing responsibility for securing the LLOC in your area?

Answer: I don't really know.

Question No. 3. What was the general security condition of the MSR in your area?

Answer: Daylight, green. Night, amber.

Question No. 4. What was the security condition of the other LLOC in your area.

Answer: Amber for some of them. Highway Five was red.

Question No. 5. Was there a conflict of missions with the Vietnamese units in your area. How was that conflict handled?

Answer: There was no conflict of interest. The area of responsibility was divided. The ARVN had a section they were responsible for, the US had a section they were responsible for, and the PF had a section they were responsible for. There were no PF or ARVN in the Battalion area of operations. There were no incidents in that area secured by the ARVN (a ranger battalion) or the US, but there were numerous incidents in that area secured by the PF.

Question No. 6. When answering the questionnaire, did you consider mining incidents, sniping, and other similar incidents as interdiction?

Answer: I considered any military action as an interdiction.

Question No. 7. When you answered question P, what criteria did you use?

Answer: I considered the low incident rate as the criteria.

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Question No. 8. When you conducted operations to secure a LLOC, were operations conducted on all parts of the LLOC?

Answer: Yes, we covered the entire area.

Question No. 9. When you were in Vietnam conducting operations to secure the LLOC, did you feel the doctrine in field manuals covered the subject thoroughly? How did you establish your procedures for securing LLOC?

Answer: No. We used common sense in arriving at our techniques.

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TAB D

INTERVIEW WITH LTC EDGAR EGELAND, SN 0-89472
ON THE SUBJECT OF SECURING LINES OF COMMUNICATION CONDUCTED
ON 18 APRIL 1969

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INTERVIEW WITH LTC EDGAR EGELAND SN 0-89472

SUBJECT: SECURING LAND LINES OF COMMUNICATION

DATE: 18 April 1969

General Information

LTC Egeland is an Infantry LTC with 14 years experience in a variety of infantry jobs. LTC Egeland was both an S-2 and a S-3 in an Infantry brigade located in southern I Corps during the time frame 1967 to early 1968. LTC Egeland requested an interview to discuss the problems he encountered and did not put any comments on his questionnaire.

Questions and Answers from the Interview

Question No. 1. In planning for operations to secure the LLOC, how much consideration was given to the needs of the people, i.e., were your operations designed primarily to support a military objective, or was consideration given specifically to opening the LLOC for the primary purpose of allowing the people to get their produce to markets?

Answer: The primary consideration for opening and securing the MSR was for military operations.

Question No. 2. Who had the continuing responsibility for securing the LLOC in your area?

Answer: There was only one road in the Area and that was Highway 1, we assisted in securing that route.

Question No. 3. How much of your unit's time was taken up with LLOC security missions?

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Answer: One company at all times. Everything else was used to conduct offensive operations. Security of the LLOC was a by-product of the offensive operations.

Question No. 4. What was the general security condition of the MSR in your area?

Answer: Green in the day time.

Question No. 5. Was there a conflict of missions with the Vietnamese units in your area? How was that conflict handled?

Answer: There were no problems. The RF and PF did not assume their total responsibility.

Question No. 6. What were your specific objectives regarding LLOC security?

Answer: Keep it open during the day. It was closed at night, because the civilians had a curfew.

Question No. 7. When answering the questionnaire, did you consider mining incidents, sniping, and other similar incidents as interdiction?

Answer: No, I did not. They did do a lot of mining, some of which were command detonated.

Question No. 8. When you answered question P, what criteria did you use?

Answer: The fact that we were able to use the LLOC when we needed to do so. The fact that we were never short of supplies. I equated success to a high kill ratio and a low casualty rate.

Question No. 9. When you considered question P, did your normal pride for your unit's accomplishments affect your answer?

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Answer: Now that you mention, it, I guess it did.

Question No. 10. When you conducted operations to secure a LLOC, were operations conducted on all parts of the LLOC.

Answer: Yes and No. When we operated to the south, other units would conduct similar operations with us. When we operated to the north, this was not the case.

Question No. 11. When you were in Vietnam conducting operations to secure the LLOC, did you feel the doctrine in the field manuals covered the subject thoroughly? How did you establish your procedures for securing the LLOC?

Answer: I was not aware of printed doctrine on the subject. We established our program based on experience.

END OF INTERVIEW

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TAB E

INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR LADDIE B. LOGAN, SN 0-75390
ON THE SUBJECT OF SECURING LINES OF COMMUNICATION CONDUCTED
ON 17 APRIL 1969

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INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR LADDIE B. LOGAN SN 0-75390

SUBJECT: SECURING LAND LINES OF COMMUNICATION

DATE: 17 APRIL 1969

General Information

Major Logan is an Infantry officer who has approximately 13 years of experience at a variety of jobs in infantry units. Major Logan was assigned as the Brigade S-2 of the 196th Infantry Brigade. The 196th Infantry was in I Corps reserve, located in the vicinity of Tam Ky. Major Logan checked the block on question I indicating that they had employed a mobile type of defense when they were securing the LLOC. He also stated that as a part of that defense they "made a habit of periodically illuminating all night long where we were not ambushing, thus driving them into us." He also stated that the techniques he used were the following:

1. ARVN (RF, PF, and Army) had the bridges.
2. The 196th ran 20-40 patrols/ambushes per night per battalion, or roughly 90 for the Brigade.
3. The engineers swept the road for mines every morning.
4. On the roads used by the Americans, they kept an H-23 which surveilled the road at irregular intervals.
5. They maintained agents along the road.
6. They paid well for information on mines.
7. They used the same people on the mine sweep every day because the mine detector won't pick up a non-metallic mine, and by using the same

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men each day they could pick out unnatural discolorations indicating the planting of a mine.

8. He stressed the importance of ambushes at night. The procedures they used were to put a few men, normally in teams of six, armed with M-16 and claymore mines, in ambushes around the road, more within 300 meters of the road, and "a whole hell of a lot about 2 kilometers out. We tried to pick them up away from the road. Any one half-smart dink [sic] will be cautious near the road, but it always surprised me how careless they were 2,000 meters out." He also stated that they were very successful.

9. He also stated that they would put up a lot of trip flares, in locations that did not have ambushes and then had their artillery registered and laid on those points. If one of the trip flares popped they would start firing immediately.

Questions and Answers from the Interview

Question No. 1. In planning for operations to secure the LLOC, how much consideration was given to the needs of the people, i.e., were your operations designed primarily to support a military objective, or was consideration given to opening the LLOC for the primary purpose of allowing the people to get their produce to market?

Answer: Normally only as part of a military objective.

Question No. 2. Who had the continuing responsibility for securing the LLOC in your area?

Answer: ARVN.

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Question No. 3. How much of your unit's time was taken up with LLOC security missions?

Answer: The entire time.

Question No. 4. How much of your force was involved in the security of the LLOC?

Answer: A squadron on Highway 1 every day and two companies on the other routes.

Question No. 5. What was the general security condition of the MSR in your area?

Answer: Amber.

Question No. 6. What was the security condition of the other LLOC in your area?

Answer: Amber.

Question No. 7. Was there a conflict of missions with the Vietnamese units in your area? How was that conflict handled?

Answer: There was no conflict.

Question No. 8. What were your specific objectives regarding LLOC security?

Answer: Keep the roads open during the daylight hours.

Question No. 9. When answering the questionnaire did you consider mining, incidents, sniping, and other similar incidents as interdiction?

Answer: No, I did not consider mining as interdicting, only ambushes and blowing bridges.

Question No. 10. When you answered question P, what criteria did you use?

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Answer: The criteria we used was a low casualty rate.

Question No. 11. When you were in Vietnam conducting operations to secure the LLOC, did you feel the doctrine in the field manuals covered the subject thoroughly? How did you establish procedures for securing LLOC.

Answer: We developed our own tactics using the trial and error method.

END OF INTERVIEW

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APPENDIX F

QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER 2

This appendix contains a copy of the questionnaire distributed to selected members of the USACGSC class of 1968-1969 who have served as advisors in Vietnam, a discussion of the methodology used in distributing that questionnaire, and a brief discussion of the results of the questionnaire.

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METHODOLOGY

Purpose of the Questionnaire

- A. To determine who has been assigned the mission of securing LLOC in Vietnam.
- B. To determine the restrictions under which the units assigned LLOC security missions have worked.
- C. To determine the priorities assigned to LLOC security by the units assigned the mission.
- D. To determine what tactics have been employed by South Vietnamese units assigned missions of securing LLOC.
- E. To determine whether or not equipment has been a limiting factor for units assigned the mission of securing LLOC.
- F. To determine how the advisors rated their counterpart's tactics for securing LLOC.
- G. To determine if personnel shortages and training have been limiting factors for units assigned the mission of securing LLOC.
- H. To determine the span of control for leaders assigned LLOC security missions.
- I. To determine the threat a unit with an LLOC security mission faces.

Preparation of the Questionnaire

A pilot questionnaire designed to accomplish the objectives listed above was drafted and given to three members of the USACGSC class of

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1968-1969 for them to complete. Based on an evaluation of the answers to the pilot questionnaire, an interview with those who filled out the questionnaire, and the experience gained by analyzing the results of Questionnaire Number 1, the pilot questionnaire was revised and became Questionnaire Number 2.

A search of the student records was conducted to determine which members of the class had been assigned as advisors to South Vietnamese combat units that might logically have been expected to perform a LLOC security mission. Two hundred and thirty-six officers were found that met these requirements. Questionnaire Number 2 was sent to these 236 men under the same cover letter that accompanied Questionnaire Number 1.

Analysis of the Questionnaire

General. Of the 236 questionnaires dispatched, 184 or 80 percent of them were returned. Only 125 of the 184 that were returned, however, were useable in this study. The fifty-nine questionnaires that were discarded were unuseable for the following reasons: (1) no experience at securing LLOC - 40, (2) failed to completely fill out the questionnaire (did not complete three or more questions) - 15, and (3) filled out the questionnaire improperly - 4. Those personnel who filled out the questionnaire properly were divided into categories based on their job assignment. This categorization revealed that there were fifty-one officers who had been advisors to the Vietnamese Army, thirty officers who had been assigned to Province Advisory Teams, twenty-eight officers who had served as District Advisors, and sixteen officers who had served

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in more than one capacity. A subsequent check of the records revealed that more than sixteen of the men had held two jobs, however, since it was not reflected on their questionnaire their category was not changed.

The time the officers who answered the questionnaire served in Vietnam varied from the 1962-1963 time frame to the 1967-1968 time frame. Each of the year groups 1965-1966 and 1967-1968 were represented with the largest number of officers, approximately thirty-three percent in each group. Very few officers were found to have served in the time period 1962-1963 and 1963-1964. Because of the nature of the conflict, and the fact that most of the officers came from widely separated areas in which the enemy threat was equally varied, it was found impossible to correlate the time the officers were in Vietnam to the security status or the enemy threat.

Questions J and L were found to be extremely difficult questions to tabulate because many of the men left the questions blank and many of the answers to these questions were vague. In several cases the answers to Question J conflicted with the answers to Question R (span of control). It was determined that Question R was of more value to this study. For these reasons, these two questions have been discarded.

The ever changing situation made the responses to Question X very poor. Many of the officers gave both extremes of the enemy situation, i.e., from 2 Viet Cong battalions to three NVA regiments, or indicated that they could not answer the question because of the constant changes. For this reason the question was discounted in the tabulation.

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The initial tabulation of the questionnaire revealed that 84 of the 125 advisors, or 67 percent, were involved directly with the problem of securing LLOC. These 84 questionnaires were tabulated a second time (see Tabs C, D, E, and F) by category of advisor and by the mission. It was this second tabulation that served as a basis for the majority of the conclusions reached in the following paragraphs. In the mind of the author, those answers submitted by the District Advisors carry more weight than the other responses because they were principal advisors to the district chief, whereas many of the other officers were assistant advisors or advisors to principal staff officers.

Objective A. It was determined by examining Question D that all types of South Vietnamese units have been assigned LLOC security missions, with a significantly higher percentage of the districts and provinces being assigned specific LLOC security missions.

Objective B. The answers to Question E showed that a significant number of advisor's counterparts, thirty-four out of eighty-four, were restricted in the tactics they could employ by the manner in which the LLOC mission was assigned. Question E further showed that the ARVN units tended to have less restrictions placed on the manner in which they could operate than did the district and province leaders.

Objective C. By examining Question T it was determined that only eight of the eighty-four advisors whose counterpart had a specific mission of securing LLOC was that mission given first priority. In only

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fourteen of the eighty-four cases was the mission of securing the LLOC given second priority. This combination represents only twenty-six percent of all the cases examined. Based on the analysis completed in Tabs C, D, E, and F it would appear that LLOC security has a very low priority even in cases where the officers have been given such security as a specific mission.

Objective D. The tactics generally employed by the South Vietnamese units tended to be those of static security with limited patrolling. The answers to Question M showed that in seventy of the eighty-four cases, the tactics used by the leaders were either static security or static security with limited patrolling. In view of the LLOC security missions presented in the tabulations of Question T, what is even more revealing about the tactics employed by the Vietnamese is that in only four cases involving advisors other than ARVN was number one priority given to a mission of search and destroy, which by its very nature would provide security for the LLOC. In thirty-seven of the fifty-five cases involving the advisors province and district, and those who held two jobs, the number one priority went to the static security missions of providing security for hamlets and key installations other than LLOC key installations.

Objective E. The manner in which Question G was worded was such that the answers to the question did not provide the response desired. The question was meant to provide an answer which would indicate the

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adequacy of the organization and equipment. Rather than point out the inadequacies of the current organizational concept, the answers to Question G provided an equipment status, although, in some cases the officers did take the opportunity to state that they were not authorized enough equipment. While equipment shortages do not appear to have been an extreme limiting factor, they do appear to have been significant.

Objective F. In answering Question P only thirty of the 84 advisors felt that their counterpart's tactics were effective. Of these thirty, sixteen were advisors to ARVN units. It is interesting to note that in answering Question M the ARVN advisors also had a significantly higher percentage of personnel using mobile security tactics indicating there may be a correlation between mobile security tactics and effectiveness.

Objective G. There appears to be a definite problem in the personnel area. Thirty of the eighty-four units with specific LLOC commitments has significant personnel shortages. In addition, thirty-one of the eighty-four advisors stated that their counterpart's personnel were not well enough trained for them to accomplish their mission.

Objective H. The vast majority of the advisors other than those advising ARVN units stated that their counterpart had a span of control in excess of 10 with a significant number of men saying that their counterpart's span of control was in excess of thirty.

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Objective I. Because of the poor responses to Question X, and generally changing situation it was impossible to determine the extent of the enemy threat except to say that a definite threat existed, that it was a significant threat, and that the threat was not generally aimed at the people, but at the governmental forces.

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TAB A

QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER 2

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SUBJECT: Student Questionnaire on Securing Lines of Communication

TO: _____ Section _____

1. While serving in Vietnam last year, my job involved providing security for ground lines of communication. Shortly after assuming my duties I requested assistance from the Infantry School, the Command and General Staff College and other agencies in the form of a request for doctrine on the tactics and techniques my counterpart and I should use to accomplish our mission. I was informed at that time that no doctrine existed specifically dealing with the problem of securing lines of communication. When I returned to CONUS in July of 1968, I discovered that doctrine on how to secure lines of communication had recently been published, but that it was inadequate in certain respects.

2. I am presently conducting research to determine a valid concept for securing land lines of communication that can be used by US Advisors to assist a host nation involved in an insurgent war. In view of my rather limited experience in some aspects of this problem, I would like to solicit your assistance in filling the gaps in my knowledge.

3. A check of the student records has indicated that you may have some experience in securing land lines of communication. If you would fill out the attached questionnaire, it would be greatly appreciated.

4. In answering this questionnaire you may find that some of the selections offered will not accurately describe the situation as you knew it, in that case you may find a combination of selections is the best answer. If you find a combination of selections is the best

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answer, check both answers and state the reason for checking both answers in the blank marked "other." If none of the answers to a question describe the situation in your unit please check the blank marked "other" and answer the question in the blanks provided.

5. The following definitions will apply to the terms and abbreviations used in the questionnaire.

a. Land Lines of Communication (LLOC): For the purpose of this questionnaire, land lines of communication will be limited to the roads, railroads, and pipelines used to support both the civilian economy and the military forces.

b. Key Installations: Those bridges, tunnels, pumping stations, etc., that if destroyed or damaged will stop traffic on a LLOC or greatly reduce the capacity of that LLOC to handle the transportation of cargo and passengers.

c. Static Security: A tactical concept that emphasizes the securing of key installations as the best means of securing a LLOC. The securing of key installations will be accomplished at the expense of providing troops for patrols and ambushes,

d. Surveillance: The systematic observation of air, surface, or sub-surface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means for intelligence purposes.

/s/ Dale R. Sweetwood
DALE R. SWEETWOOD
Major, Infantry
Section 24

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QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER 2

A. Check one of the following blocks.

☐ I was assigned as the advisor to an ARVN unit at (Bn) (Regt) (Div) level, but my job did not bring me into contact with the problem of securing land lines of communication.

☐ I was assigned to a Provincial Advisory Team, but my job did not bring me into contact with the problem of securing land lines of communication.

☐ I was assigned as an advisor at District level, but my job did not bring me into contact with the problem of securing land lines of communication.

☐ I was assigned as the advisor to an ARVN unit at (Bn) (Regt) (Div) level and my job brought me into contact with the problem of securing land lines of communication.

☐ I was assigned to a Provincial Advisory Team and my job brought me into contact with the problem of securing land lines of communication.

☐ I was assigned as an advisor at District level and my job brought me into contact with the problem of securing land lines of communication.

☐ Other _____

B. Fill in the blanks.

My job in Vietnam was _____

The unit I advised had a primary mission of _____

The unit I advised was located in _____ Province.

C. Check the blank that applies to you. If neither statement applies go on to the next question.

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☐ I am willing to participate in a personnel interview to assist in further developing the areas covered by this questionnaire.

☐ I have little knowledge of the procedures used to secure land lines of communication and cannot complete this questionnaire.

D. My counterpart's mission to secure LLOC was best defined as: (Check the block that best describes your situation.)

☐ My counterpart did not have a specified mission to secure LLOC.

☐ My counterpart had the mission of providing security for the MSR running through his area of responsibility.

☐ My counterpart had the mission of providing security for all LLOC in his area of responsibility.

☐ My counterpart had the mission of providing security for key LLOC in his area of responsibility.

☐ My counterpart's mission of providing security for LLOC was never clearly defined or understood.

☐ Other _____

E. My counterpart's mission concerning LLOC was: (Check one)

☐ Given as a requirement to secure specific key installations,

☐ Given as a requirement to secure specific key installations and provide for detailed surveillance of the rest of the LLOC,

☐ Given in broad general terms that allowed for considerable latitude in the accomplishment of the mission,

☐ Given as a requirement to secure specific key installations and provide for limited patrolling and ambushing along the LLOC.

☐ Other _____

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F. The unit or units directly under my counterpart's command were:

(Check one and circle the appropriate word or words,)

☐ Standard ARVN (Inf) (Mech Inf) (Armor) (Cav) units with (no)
(the following) augmentations in personnel and equipment,

(List only)

major items of equipment and personnel and units that were significant
from an operational standpoint.)

☐ Standard Regional Force (RF) and Popular Force (PF) units with
(no) (the following) augmentations in personnel and equipment,

(List only)

major items of equipment and personnel and units that were significant
from an operational standpoint.)

☐ A mixture of standard TOE ARVN, RF and PF units,

☐ Specially organized units organized and equipped as follows:

☐ Other

G. (Circle the appropriate words.) My counterpart's units (did) (did not)
have significant shortages of personnel and equipment that (prevented)
(would have prevented) the accomplishment of a mission to secure LLOC,

H. (Answer only if applicable.) The significant items of equipment and
personnel that my counterpart's units were short were

(List only major

items of equipment and personnel who were essential for combat operations,)

I. The personnel in my counterpart's units (were) (were not) well enough
trained to accomplish their assigned mission, (Circle one)

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J. My counterpart had _____ ARVN companies, _____ RF companies, _____ PF platoons under his command. (Put the number of units in the blank.)

K. Were all the units assigned to your counterpart available to provide security for LLOC? Yes No (Circle one)

L. If the answer to the previous question was no, how many units were available to provide security for the LLOC? _____ ARVN _____ RF _____ PF

M. How would you describe the tactics employed by your counterpart to secure the LLOC in his area?

☐ Primarily static security of key installations.

☐ Static security of key installations with a limited amount of patrolling being conducted.

☐ A mobile type security with small security detachments on key installations, a large reserve or reaction force, and detailed surveillance of the LLOC which includes a lot of patrolling.

N. My counterpart provided security in the form of escort troops for (all) (all important) (no) (very few) convoys that travelled through his area.

O. How far could the RF and PF units in your counterpart's command operate from their base camp while patrolling and conducting ambushes?

☐ The limitations placed on the RF and PF units in my counterpart's area were based on the range of their organic supporting weapons which were located in their base camp.

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☐ There were no limitations placed on the RF and PF units in my counterpart's area,

☐ My counterpart placed the strictest controls on the RF and PF units. He allowed only the minimum number of patrols and ambushes to be conducted.

☐ Other _____

P. Did you consider your counterpart's tactics for securing LLOC effective?

- ☐ very effective ☐ effective ☐ marginally effective
☐ ineffective ☐ very ineffective

Q. Under the restrictions placed upon your counterpart in the way of manpower, trained personnel, equipment, span of control and operational missions, how would you describe your counterpart's efforts to secure the LLOC in his area of responsibility?

- ☐ He did the best he could with the available resources.
☐ He did an adequate job.
☐ He did not fully utilize the resources at his command.
☐ He did not properly utilize the resources at his command.
☐ Other _____

R. What was your counterpart's span of control (Add together all the village chiefs, hamlet chiefs, district chiefs, ARVN units, RF and PF units, etc., that reported directly to your counterpart and received orders directly from him. If the exact number is known, please list it, if not known make an estimate.

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☐ 0-10 ☐ 11-20 ☐ 21-30 ☐ 31-40 ☐ 41 or more

S. In addition to his mission of securing LLOC, what other missions were assigned to your counterpart? (Check all appropriate boxes.)

☐ Revolutionary development ☐ Hamlet, village security

☐ Civic action ☐ Search and destroy ☐ Security of key installations other than those on a LLOC, i.e., power plant, district headquarters.

T. List the relative priorities assigned to the missions by your counterpart.

_____ Revolutionary development

_____ Hamlet, village security

_____ Search and destroy

_____ Civic action

_____ Security of LLOC

_____ Security key installations
other than LLOC

U. Describe the security situation on the LLOC in your area. Could the LLOC be used both day and night? Did you need armed escorts to use the LLOC during the day? the night? Was the security condition the same for all LLOC or was it much better for the primary or key LLOC?

V. The Viet Cong were able to interdict the LLOC in my area (whenever they chose to do so) (frequently) (often) (at infrequent intervals) (very seldom) (never),

W. There were (many) (several) (a few) (no) LLOC that could not be used at any time due to VC interdiction.

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X. An estimated _____ VC battalions and _____ VC companies were operating in my counterpart's area. There were _____ NVA units operating in my counterpart's area. (Give average figures. It is realized that these figures would vary from time to time based on the activity of the VC.)

Y. Was the amount of time the LLOC were open in your counterpart's area adequate to allow the people in that area to conduct their normal business? Yes No (Circle one)

Z. Comments. (Use this area to clarify those areas that you felt were neglected in the questionnaire.)

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TAB B

INITIAL TABULATION

This tab contains the initial tabulation of the questionnaires received from the 125 officers who indicated some experience in securing land lines of communication

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TABLE II

QUESTION D

My counterpart's mission to secure LLOC was best defined as:

Advisor's Assignment	No Specified Mission*	Security for MSR	Security All LLOC*	Security Key LLOC	Mission Never Defined*	Other*
Advisor to ARVN units	15	11	8	10	4	3
Advisor at province level	9	3	8	8	1	5
Advisor at district level	5	4	11	7	2	1
Held two or more jobs	1	1	8	5	2	0
TOTAL	30	19	35	30	9	9

*NOTE: Three province advisors, two district advisors, and one man who held two jobs checked more than one answer to this question. In all but one case the two answers included no specified mission. Two of the five who answered twice to this question included as their second answer that the mission for providing security was never clearly defined. One man failed to answer this question. The one man who failed to answer the question was a provincial advisor and is carried in the other column. All missions carried in the other column are simply variations of first five types.

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TABLE III

QUESTION E

My counterpart's mission concerning LLOC was:

Advisor's Assignments	To Secure Key Installation	Security and Provide Detailed Surveillance	Given in Broad General Terms	Security and Limited Patrolling and Ambushing	Other
Advisor to ARVN units	8	8	25	15	3
Advisor at province level	5	5	9	10	3
Advisor at district level	4	3	11	9	3
Held two or more jobs	2	2	9	4	2
TOTAL	19	18	54	38	11

NOTE: Fifteen men, six ARVN advisors, three province advisors, three district advisors, and three persons who had two or more jobs answered this question with two answers. Seven of the fifteen selected the statement that the mission was given in broad general terms as one of the two choices. Four men failed to answer this question and are carried in the other column. One man listed his counterpart's mission as being convoy security only, one man misread the question, all other missions carried in the other column were variations of those restrictive mission statements presented.

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TABLE IV

QUESTION F

The units directly under my counterpart's command were:

Advisor's Assignments	Standard ARVN ¹	Standard RF & PF ²	Mixture ARVN, RF, PF ³	Special Units ⁴	Other ⁵
Advisor to ARVN units	48	0	0	0	3
Advisor at province level	0	18	11	0	1
Advisor at district level	2	24	4	0	0
Held two or more jobs	3	8	4	1	0
TOTAL	53	50	19	1	4

1. The 53 ARVN units were divided as follows: 32 infantry, one mechanized infantry, one armor, nine armored cavalry, one artillery, two airborne, five ranger, two engineer battalions. One infantry unit was augmented with 4.2-inch mortars, 81mm mortars, 50 cal machineguns, 105mm howitzer and 155mm howitzer.
2. Of the 50 advisors whose counterparts had only RF and PF units 17 had significant augmentations of personnel and equipment. Two provinces were augmented with an ACAV troop, two had three sections of 105 artillery, and one province had a rail security company. At district level one district had an ACAV platoon, one had a national police platoon, one had a national police platoon and a 155mm howitzer battery, one had mine detectors, one had an armored cavalry unit, one had 105mm howitzer, additional radios, automatic weapons and mortars, and one had a platoon of mercenaries, a platoon of national police, 81mm mortars, and M60 machineguns. Of those advisors with two or more jobs five had significant augmentations to their units. Two elements were augmented with two 105mm howitzers, one had an armored car platoon, one had a CAG team and one had a scout company.
3. One province with the mixture of ARVN RF and PF units also had a specially organized armored car platoon.
4. The one specially organized unit consisted of five light guerrilla companies and one reconnaissance platoon.
5. Three ARVN advisors and one province advisor failed to answer this question.

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TABLE V

QUESTION G

My counterpart's units (did) (did not) have significant shortages of personnel that (prevented) (would have prevented) the accomplishment of a mission to secure LLOC.*

Advisor's Assignments	Did Have Significant Shortages	Did Not Have Significant Shortages
Advisor to ARVN units	17	34
Advisor at province level	14	13
Advisor at district level	14	13
Held two jobs	10	6
TOTAL	54	67

*Four men failed to answer this question.

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TABLE VI

QUESTION H

The significant items of equipment and personnel that my counterpart's units were short were:

	Adequate		Personnel		Armor		Commo		Units		Helicopters		Mortars		Night		Air	
	Indiv	Wpns	Indiv	Wpns	Indiv	Wpns	Equipment	Units	Indiv	Wpns	Indiv	Wpns	Indiv	Wpns	Indiv	Wpns	Indiv	Wpns
ARVN	1		13		0		2	1			1		1		0		0	
Province	6		7		2		3	1			1		2		1		1	
District	6		9		0		3	2			0		3		1		3	
Dual	1		10		0		2	1			0		0		0		0	
TOTAL	14		39		2		10	5			2		6		2		7	

	Adequate Arty Spt	Auto Wpns	Surv1 Devices	Mines & Booby Traps	Barrier Materiel	Mine Detectors	APC	Engr Const Equip	Fire Direction	General Equip
ARVN	0	7	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	2
Province	5	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
District	1	8	2	4	2	2	1	0	0	0
Dual	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
TOTAL	8	17	2	4	2	3	3	1	1	2

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TABLE VII

QUESTION I

The personnel in my counterpart's units (were) (were not) well enough trained to accomplish their assigned mission.*

<u>Advisor's Assignments</u>	<u>Were</u>	<u>Were Not</u>
Advisor to ARVN units	40	11
Advisor at province level	13	16
Advisor at district level	10	14
Held two or more jobs	10	5
TOTAL	73	46

*Four failed to answer this question. Two answered the question yes and no.

TABLE VIII

QUESTION K

Were all the units assigned to your counterpart available to provide security for LLOC?*

<u>Advisor's Assignments</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Advisor to ARVN units	31	20
Advisor at province level	3	27
Advisor at district level	1	25
Held two or more jobs	4	12
TOTAL	39	84

*One answered yes and no. One failed to answer the question.

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TABLE IX

QUESTION M

How would you describe the tactics employed by your counterpart to secure the LLOC in his area?

Advisor's Assignments	Static Security of Key Installations	Static Security with Limited Patrolling	Mobile Security	Other
Advisor to ARVN units**	12	26	14	0
Advisor at province level	9	17	4	0
Advisor at district level	6	18	4	0
Held two or more jobs*	6	7	4	1
TOTAL	33	68	26	1

* One man failed to answer the question, two men put down two answers-- the man who failed to answer is carried as other.

**One man answered this question with two answers.

TABLE X

QUESTION N

My counterpart provided security in the form of escort troops for (all) (all important) (no) (very few) convoys that travelled through his area.

Advisor's Assignment	All	All Important	No	Very Few	Other
Advisor to ARVN units	3	16	3	17	12***
Advisor at province level	10	13	0	6	1**
Advisor at district level	1	6	6	12	3*
Held two or more jobs	3	4	3	6	0
TOTAL	17	39	12	41	16

*Failed to answer the question.

**All trains were secured.

***Eleven men failed to answer the question and one man answered it as, some.

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TABLE XI

QUESTION 0

How far could the RF and PF units in your counterpart's command operate from their base camp while patrolling and conducting ambushes?

Advisor's Assignment	Based on Range of Supporting Weapons	No Limits	Strict Control	2,000 Meters	500 Meters	Two RF by Hrs PF by	District Village	No Answer	RF		
									No Limits	But	Limited
Adviser to ARVN unit	6	8	4	0	0	0	0	33	0	0	0
Adviser at province level*	9	9	6	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	0
Adviser at district level	8	10	6	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
Held two jobs	2	8	3	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0
TOTAL	25	35	19	1	1	1	1	36	4	1	2

*One man put down two answers to this question.

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TABLE XII

QUESTION P

Did you consider your counterpart's tactics for securing LLOC effective?

Advisor's Assignment	Very Effective	Effective	Marginally Effective	Very Ineffective			No Answer	Other
				Effective	Ineffective	Ineffective		
Advisor to ARVN unit	5	24	20		0	0	2	0
Advisor at province level	1	7*	18		2	0	2	0
Advisor at district level	5**	3	11		6	2	1	0
Held two jobs	2***	4	7		1	1	0	1***
TOTAL	13	38	56		9	3	5	1

*One man stated the tactics effective, however, only employed in day-time.

**One man stated very effective considering limited resources.

***One man stated very effective considering the available assets. One man stated his counterpart had no tactics.

TABLE XIII

QUESTION Q

Under the restrictions placed upon your counterpart in the way of manpower, trained personnel, equipment, span of control, and operational missions, how would you describe your counterpart's efforts to secure the LLOC in his area of responsibility?

Advisor's Assignment	Best He Could	Adequate	Resources Not		Resources Not Properly Used	Outstanding		No	
			Fully Used	Used		Good	Other	Answer	
Advisor to ARVN units*	20	15	11		3	4	0		0
Advisor at province level**	8	11	9		3	0	2		0
Advisor at district level	12	5	8		3	0	0		0
Held two jobs**	7	5	3		1	0	0		1
TOTAL	47	36	31		10	4	2		1

*Two men answered question twice--stating the circumstances varied.

**Three men answered this question twice. One man stated that his counterpart did the best he could, but that national doctrine on the use of RF and PF precluded the proper use. One man answered the question by stating his counterpart not only didn't fully utilize his resources, he also didn't use them properly. The third man stated that his counterpart did not properly utilize his resources because they functioned poorly at night.

***One man stated his counterpart did not properly utilize the resources at his command, but that he did the best he could.

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TABLE XIV

QUESTION R

What was your counterpart's span of control?

Advisor's Assignment	0-10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41 or More	No Answer
Advisor to ARVN units	34	12	0	2	1	2
Advisor at province level	7	12	5	1	3	2
Advisor at district level	6	7	4	4	7	0
Held two jobs	4	3	3	1	3	2
TOTAL	51	34	12	8	14	6

TABLE V

QUESTION S

In addition to his mission of securing LLOC what other missions were assigned your counterpart?

Advisor's Assignment	Revolutionary Development	Hamlet Security	Civic Action	Search & Destroy	Security Key Installations
Advisor to ARVN units	15	29	20	41	27
Advisor at province level*	20	23	19	23	25
Advisor at district level	28	28	27	26	28
Held two jobs	12	14	12	13	15
TOTAL	75	94	78	103	75

*Two men did not answer this question.

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TABLE XVI

QUESTION T

List the relative priorities assigned to the missions by your counterpart.

Advisor's Assignment	Revolutionary Development	Search & Destroy	Security of LLOC	Hamlet Security	Civic Action	Security Key Installations
<u>1st Priority Selections</u>						
Advisor to ARVN units ***	2	21	8	6	1	10
Advisor at province level*	5	4	1	5	0	12
Advisor at district level**	6	1	0	8	0	13
Held two jobs***	3	4	1	4	0	5
TOTAL	16	30	10	23	1	40
<u>2d Priority Selections</u>						
Advisor to ARVN units	0	11	12	10	3	12
Advisor at province level	3	6	5	8	0	5
Advisor at district level	6	3	2	11	3	4
Held two jobs	2	2	3	5	1	4
TOTAL	11	22	22	34	7	25

*Two answered there were no priorities, one stated the priorities changed, five men only went as far as five priorities, none zeroed out LLOC.

**One man stated priorities changed although he answered the question, five men only went as far as five priorities, none zeroed out LLOC.

***One man answered with two priority one, not all men gave priorities one through six, two stopped at three, three more stopped at four, three more stopped at five. LLOC was zeroed out twice.

****Three advisors failed to answer the question, four advisors only went as far as two priorities, thirteen advisors only went as far as three priorities, eight advisors only went as far as four priorities, eight advisors only went as far as five priorities.

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TABLE XVI (continued)

Advisor's Assignment	Revolutionary Development	Search & Destroy	Security of LLOC	Hamlet Security	Civic Action	Security Key Installations
<u>3d Priority Selections</u>						
Advisor to ARVN units	3	4	13	10	2	12
Advisor at province level	4	5	6	5	3	4
Advisor at district level	4	6	8	3	3	4
Held two jobs	3	2	5	1	2	4
TOTAL	14	17	32	19	10	24
<u>4th Priority Selections</u>						
Advisor to ARVN units	4	4	8	8	6	1
Advisor at province level	5	5	9	3	2	3
Advisor at district level	4	8	5	3	5	3
Held two jobs	1	2	4	4	2	2
TOTAL	14	19	26	18	15	9
<u>5th Priority Selections</u>						
Advisor to ARVN units	7	2	1	3	8	2
Advisor at province level	5	2	5	4	8	3
Advisor at district level	5	4	7	3	7	2
Held two jobs	4	2	1	1	3	1
TOTAL	21	10	14	11	26	8
<u>6th Priority Selections</u>						
Advisor to ARVN units	5	0	0	1	7	2
Advisor at province level	4	4	1	1	12	0
Advisor at district level	2	5	6	0	9	1
Held two jobs	1	2	0	1	6	0
TOTAL	12	11	7	3	34	3

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TABLE XVII

QUESTION V

The Viet Cong were able to interdict the LLOC in my area (whenever they chose to do so) (frequently) (often) (at infrequent intervals) (very seldom) (never).

Advisor's Assignment	Whenever They Chose To Do So	Frequently	Often	At Infrequent Intervals	Very Seldom	Never
Advisor to ARVN unit*	20	12	6	8	7	1
Advisor at province level**	15	6	5	3	2	0
Advisor at district level***	15	5	2	2	2	1
Held two jobs****	10	3	1	2	0	1
TOTAL	60	26	14	15	11	3

*Three men answered the question with two answers.

**One man answered the question with two answers.

***One man failed to answer the question.

****One man answered the question with two answers.

TABLE XVIII

QUESTION W

There were (many) (several) (a few) (no) LLOC that could not be used at any time due to VC interdiction.

Advisor's Assignment	Many	Several	A Few	No	No Answer
Advisor to ARVN unit	11	14	15	11	0
Advisor at province level	2	7	11	9	1
Advisor at district level	4	7	8	8	1
Held two jobs	6	1	6	3	0
TOTAL	23	29	40	31	2

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TABLE XIX

QUESTION Y

Was the amount of time the LLOC were open in your counterpart's area adequate to allow the people in that area to conduct their normal business?

<u>Advisor's Assignment</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Advisor to ARVN units*	35	15
Advisor at province level**	23	3
Advisor at district level***	20	7
Held two jobs****	11	5
TOTAL	89	30

*One man failed to answer the question.

**Four men stated prior to TET 1968 yes, after TET 1968 no.

***One man failed to answer the question, one man said yes to the question, but stated the economy was being badly hurt. One man stated yes but only before TET 1968, after TET 1968 no.

****One man stated yes and no.

QUESTION Z

Comments

The following comments were considered to be especially pertinent to this study.

A. Comments by personnel who held two jobs: Two men stated that the LLOC could be used by the civilians in their area only if they paid the Viet Cong taxes.

B. Comments by personnel who were district advisors:

1. The people could use the road but the military couldn't.
2. Four men stated that the people could use the road if they paid the Viet Cong taxes.

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3. Province failed to utilize resources on securing road, they relied on helicopter to effect resupply.

4. One advisor stated his counterpart's units were poorly trained and poorly motivated.

5. One advisor stated that it took a major operation to open all but the major route (Highway 14) whenever anyone wanted to use them.

C. Comments by personnel who were provincial advisors:

1. One advisor said all advisors travelled by chopper because the roads were insecure.

2. One advisor said Americans were prohibited from using the roads because they were insecure.

3. Two advisors stated that the road was always interdicted near the province border.

4. One advisor stated that the morning mine clearing detail always found many mines.

5. One advisor emphasized the need for intelligence.

6. Major Dodge doubts if LLOC can ever be secure until the people are pacified.

7. Two advisors stated roads could be used if people paid the Viet Cong taxes.

8. Major Schwoppe states no attempt was made to keep the road open because of low priority in neighboring province.

9. One advisor suspected the LLOC (railroad) was kept open because the Viet Cong were paying customers.

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10. One advisor stated that the RF, PF, and Reconnaissance Platoon were used as static security and the roads were left to the Viet Cong.

11. Many secondary roads were cut, bridges blown, etc., there was little effort to open them because of a lack of force.

12. One advisor stated that any time you travelled over a route a chance meeting with Viet Cong was a possibility.

13. One advisor stated his counterpart relied too much on static security.

14. One advisor said limitations were placed on the RF and PF employment due to range of supporting weapons, fear of Viet Cong, inadequate leadership, fear of failure, and a lack of positive mandate from superiors.

15. One advisor stated the LLOC in his area were open not secure.

16. One advisor stated the bulk of the operations were pointed toward security (static security implied) operations.

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TAB C

TABULATION OF THE DISTRICT ADVISORS QUESTIONNAIRES

This tab contains a subsequent tabulation of those questionnaires filled out by officers who were advisors to district chiefs. This tabulation was based on the type security mission assigned to the district with only those questionnaires that indicated a specific land line of communication security responsibility being considered

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TABLE XX

QUESTION D

My counterpart's mission to secure LLOC was best defined as:

Advisor's Assignment	No Specified Mission	Security for MSR	Security for All LLOC	Security for Key LLOC	Mission Never Defined
Advisor to district chief	0	4	11	7	0

TABLE XXI

QUESTION E

My counterpart's mission concerning LLOC was:

Type of Security	To Secure Key Installations	Security & Provide Detailed Surveillance	Given in Broad & General Terms	Security & Limited Patrolling & Ambushing
Secure MSR	1	1	1	1
Secure all LLOC	1	1	3	6
Secure key LLOC	2	0	3	2
TOTAL	4	2	7	9

TABLE XXII

QUESTION F

Those units directly under my counterpart's command were:

Type of Security	Mixed	Standard RF/PF	RF/PF with Augmentations
Secure MSR	0	3	1
Secure all LLOC	2	8	1
Secure key LLOC	1	2	4
TOTAL	3	13	6

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TABLE XXIII

QUESTION G

My counterpart's units (did) (did not) have significant shortages of personnel that (prevented) (would have prevented) the accomplishment of the mission to secure LLOC.

Type of Security	Did	Did Not	No Answer
Secure MSR	3	1	0
Secure all LLOC	5	5	1
Secure key LLOC	5	2	0
TOTAL	13	7	1

TABLE XXIV

QUESTION H

The significant items of equipment and personnel that my counterpart's units were short were:

Type of Security	Personnel	Mines and Flares	Units	Small Arms Weapons	Mortar	Radio	Vehicle
Secure MSR	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Secure all LLOC	4	2	0	2	1	0	1
Secure key LLOC	3	0	1	3	1	1	0
TOTAL	7	2	1	5	2	2	2

Type of Security	Automatic Weapons	Artillery Support	Mine Detector	APC	Infrared	Tanks	Barrier Material
Secure MSR	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Secure all LLOC	3	0	0	0	0	0	1
Secure key LLOC	2	0	1	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	6	1	2	1	1	1	2

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TABLE XXV

QUESTION I

The personnel in my counterpart's units (were) (were not) well enough trained to accomplish their assigned mission.

Type of Security	Were	Were Not	No Answer
Secure MSR	0	3	1
Secure all LLOC	5	6	0
Secure key LLOC	3	4	0
TOTAL	8	13	1

TABLE XXVI

QUESTION K

Were all the units assigned to your counterpart available to provide security for LLOC?

Type of Security	Yes	No
Secure MSR	1	4
Secure all LLOC	0	11
Secure key LLOC	1	6
TOTAL	2	21

TABLE XXVII

QUESTION M

How would you describe the tactics employed by your counterpart to secure LLOC in his area?

Type of Security	Static Security of Key Installations	Static Security with Limited Patrolling	Mobile Security
Secure MSR	1	3	0
Secure all LLOC	1	10	0
Secure key LLOC	2	4	1
TOTAL	4	17	1

TABLE XXVIII

QUESTION N

My counterpart provided security in the form of escort troops for (all) (all important) (no) (very few) convoys that travelled through his area.

Type of Security	All	All Important	No	Very Few	No Answer
Secure MSR	0	0	2	2	0
Secure all LLOC	2	2	1	5	1
Secure key LLOC	1	2	0	4	0
TOTAL	3	4	3	11	1

TABLE XXIX

QUESTION O

How far could the RF and PF units in your counterpart's command operate from their base camp while patrolling and conducting ambushes?

Type of Security	Based on Support Weapons	No Limits	Strict Control	1,000 & 500	No Patrol
Secure MSR	0	0	3	1	0
Secure all LLOC	4	5	2	0	0
Secure key LLOC	3	2	1	0	1
TOTAL	7	7	6	1	1

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TABLE XXX

QUESTION Q

Under the restrictions placed upon your counterpart in the way of manpower, trained personnel, equipment, span of control, and operational missions, how would you describe your counterpart's efforts to secure the LLOC in his area of responsibility.

Type of Security	Best He Could	Adequate	Resources Not Fully Used	Resources Not Properly Used
Secure MSR	0	1	3	0
Secure all LLOC	4	2	3	2
Secure key LLOC	3	1	2	1
TOTAL	7	4	8	3

TABLE XXXI

QUESTION P

Did you consider your counterpart's tactics for securing LLOC effective?

Type of Security	Very Effective	Effective	Marginally Effective	Ineffective	Very Ineffective
Secure MSR	0	0	2	2	0
Secure all LLOC	2	1	3	3	2
Secure key LLOC	2	0	3	2	0
TOTAL	4	1	8	7	2

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TABLE XXXII

QUESTION R

What was your counterpart's span of control? (Add together all the village chiefs, hamlet chiefs, districts chiefs, ARVN units, RF and PF units, etc., that reported directly to your counterpart and received orders directly from him.)

Type of Security	0-10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41 or more	No Answer
Secure MSR	1	0	2	0	1	0
Secure all LLOC	0	4	0	4	3	0
Secure key LLOC	2	2	0	0	3	0
TOTAL	3	6	2	4	7	0

TABLE XXXIII

QUESTION S

In addition to his mission of securing LLOC, what other missions were assigned your counterpart?

Type of Security	Revolutionary Development	Hamlet Security	Civic Action	Search & Destroy	Security of Key Installations
Secure MSR	4	4	4	4	4
Secure all LLOC	11	11	11	10	10
Secure key LLOC	7	7	6	7	7
TOTAL	22	22	21	21	21

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TABLE XXXIV

QUESTION T

List the relative priorities assigned to the missions by your counterpart.

Type of Security	Revolutionary Development	Search and Destroy	Security of LLOC	Hamlet Security	Civic Action	Security of Key Installations
<u>1st Priority</u>						
Secure MSR	1	0	0	1	0	2
Secure all LLOC	4	0	0	2	0	5
Secure key LLOC	1	1	0	2	0	3
TOTAL	6	1	0	5	0	10
<u>2d Priority</u>						
Secure MSR	0	0	0	3	0	1
Secure all LLOC	3	1	2	2	1	2
Secure key LLOC	2	2	0	3	0	1
TOTAL	5	3	2	8	1	4
<u>3d Priority</u>						
Secure MSR	1	0	1	0	1	1
Secure all LLOC	1	1	4	2	1	2
Secure key LLOC	1	2	2	1	0	1
TOTAL	3	3	7	3	2	4

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TABLE XXXIV (continued)

Type of Security	Revolutionary Development	Search and Destroy	Security of LLOC	Hamlet Security	Civic Action	Security of Key Installations
<u>4th Priority</u>						
Secure MSR	1	2	1	0	0	0
Secure all LLOC	0	3	2	2	3	1
Secure key LLOC	1	2	2	1	1	1
TOTAL	2	7	5	3	4	2
<u>5th Priority</u>						
Secure MSR	1	2	1	0	0	0
Secure all LLOC	2	1	2	3	3	0
Secure key LLOC	1	0	2	0	2	1
TOTAL	4	3	5	3	5	1
<u>6th Priority</u>						
Secure MSR	0	0	1	0	3	0
Secure all LLOC	1	4	1	0	3	0
Secure key LLOC	1	0	1	0	4	0
TOTAL	2	4	3	0	10	0

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TABLE XXXV

QUESTION V

The Viet Cong were able to interdict the LLOC in my area (whenever they chose to do so) (frequently) (often) (at infrequent intervals) (very seldom) (never).

Type of Security	Whenever They Chose To Do So	Frequently	Often	At Infrequent Intervals	Very Seldom	Never	No Answer
Secure MSR	2	0	1	0	0	0	1
Secure all LLOC	6	3	0	1	0	0	0
Secure key LLOC	4	1	1	1	1	0	0
TOTAL	12	4	2	2	1	0	1

TABLE XXXVI

QUESTION W

There were (many) (several) (a few) (no) LLOC that could not be used at any time due to Viet Cong interdiction.

Type of Security	Many	Several	A Few	No	Two
Secure MSR	0	0	2	2	0
Secure all LLOC	1	2	4	3	1
Secure key LLOC	1	4	0	2	0
TOTAL	2	6	6	7	1

TABLE XXXVII

QUESTION Y

Was the amount of time the LLOC was open in your counterpart's area adequate to allow the people in that area to conduct their normal business?

Type of Security	Yes	No	No Answer
Secure MSR	3	1	0
Secure all LLOC	7	3	1
Secure key LLOC	5	2	0
TOTAL	15	6	1

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TAB D

TABULATION OF THE MEMBERS OF A PROVINCIAL ADVISORY TEAM QUESTIONNAIRES

This tab contains a subsequent tabulation of those questionnaires filled out by officers who were advisors to a provincial advisory team. This tabulation was based on the type security mission assigned to province with only those questionnaires that indicated a specific land line of communication security mission being considered.

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TABLE XXXVIII

QUESTION D

My counterpart's mission to secure LLOC was best defined as:

Advisor's Assignment	No Specified Mission	Security for MSR	Security for All LLOC	Security for Key LLOC
Provincial advisory team	0	3	8	8

TABLE XXXIX

QUESTION E

My counterpart's mission concerning LLOC was:

Type of Security	Secure Key Installations	Security & Provide Detailed Surveillance	Given in Broad & General Terms	Security & Limited Patrolling & Ambushing
Secure MSR	1	1	1	0
Secure all LLOC	0	1	2	5
Secure key LLOC	0	3	4	1
TOTAL	1	5	7	6

TABLE XL

QUESTION F

Those units directly under my counterpart's command were:

Type of Security	Standard RF & PF	Augmented RF & PF	Mixed
Secure MSR	1	1	2
Secure all LLOC	3	1	4
Secure key LLOC	4	1	3
TOTAL	8	2	9

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TABLE XLI

QUESTION G

My counterpart's units (did) (did not) have significant shortages of personnel that (prevented) (would have prevented) the accomplishment of the mission to secure LLOC.

Type of Security	Did	Did Not	No Answer
Secure MSR	1	2	0
Secure all LLOC	4	4	0
Secure key LLOC	4	3	1
TOTAL	9	9	1

TABLE XLII

QUESTION H

The significant items of equipment and personnel that my counterpart's units were short were:

Type of Security	Commo	Automatic Weapons	Small Arms	Personnel	Mortar	Artillery	Vehicles	Night Vision	Aerial Reconnaissance
Secure MSR	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Secure all LLOC	2	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	0
Secure key LLOC	0	1	1	2	0	2	0	0	1
TOTAL	3	3	4	4	1	4	1	1	1

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TABLE XLIII

QUESTION I

The personnel in my counterpart's units (were) (were not) well enough trained to accomplish their assigned mission.

Type of Security	Were	Were Not	No Answer
Secure MSR	2	1	0
Secure all LLOC	2	6	0
Secure key LLOC	2	5	1
TOTAL	6	12	1

TABLE XLIV

QUESTION K

Were all the units assigned to your counterpart available to provide security for LLOC?

Type of Security	Yes	No
Secure MSR	0	3
Secure all LLOC	0	8
Secure key LLOC	2	6
TOTAL	2	17

TABLE XLV

QUESTION M

How would you describe the tactics employed by your counterpart to secure LLOC in his area?

Type of Security	Static Security of Key Installations	Static Security with Limited Patrolling	Mobile Security
Secure MSR	1	1	1
Secure all LLOC	3	5	0
Secure key LLOC	0	7	1
TOTAL	4	13	2

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TABLE XLVI

QUESTION N

My counterpart provided security in the form of escort troops, for (all) (all important) (no) (very few) convoys that travelled through his area.

Type of Security	All	All Important	No	Very Few	No Answer
Secure MSR	1	2		0	0
Secure all LLOC	2	3		2	1
Secure key LLOC	1	4		3	0
TOTAL	4	9		5	1

TABLE XLVII

QUESTION O

How far could the RF and PF units in your counterpart's command operate from their base camp while patrolling and ambushing?

Type of Security	Based on Support Weapons	No Limits	Strict Control	2,000 Meters	Two Hours	500 Meters	No Answer
Secure MSR	0	1	0	1	1	0	0
Secure all LLOC	3	2	1	0	0	1	1
Secure key LLOC	3	4	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	6	7	1	1	1	1	1

TABLE XLVIII

QUESTION P

Did you consider your counterpart's tactics for securing LLOC effective"

Type of Security	Very Effective	Marginally Effective	Very Ineffective	No Answer
Secure MSR	0	2	1	0
Secure all LLOC	0	1	4	2
Secure key LLOC	0	1	6	0
TOTAL	0	4	11	2

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TABLE XLIX

QUESTION Q

Under the restrictions placed upon your counterpart in the way of manpower, trained personnel, equipment, span of control, and operational missions, how would you describe your counterpart's efforts to secure the LLOC in his area of responsibility?

Type of Security	Best He Could	Adequate	Resources Not Fully Used	Resources Not Properly Used
Secure MSR	3	0	0	0
Secure all LLOC	2	4	0	2
Secure key LLOC	2	2	4	0
TOTAL	7	6	4	2

TABLE L

QUESTION R

What was your counterpart's span of control? (Add together all the village chiefs, hamlet chiefs, district chiefs, ARVN units, RF, and PF units, etc., that reported directly to your counterpart and received orders directly from him.

Type of Security	0-10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41 or More	No Answer
Secure MSR	0	2	1	0	0	0
Secure all LLOC	2	4	1	0	0	1
Secure key LLOC	1	3	1	1	1	1
TOTAL	3	9	3	1	1	2

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TABLE LI

QUESTION S

In addition to his mission of securing LLOC, what other missions were assigned your counterpart?

Type of Security	Revolutionary Development	Hamlet Security	Civic Action	Search & Destroy	Security of Key Installations	No Answer
Secure MSR	1	1	1	2	2	1
Secure all LLOC	6	7	5	7	8	0
Secure key LLOC	7	7	7	8	7	0
TOTAL	14	15	13	17	17	1

TABLE LII

QUESTION T

List the relative priorities assigned to the missions by your counterpart.

Type of Security	Revolutionary Development	Search and Destroy	Security of LLOC	Hamlet Security	Civic Action	Security of Key Installations
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1st Priority

Secure MSR	0	0	0	0	0	2
Secure all LLOC	1	1	0	1	0	5
Secure key LLOC	1	1	0	2	0	3
TOTAL	2	2	0	3	0	10

2d Priority

Secure MSR	0	1	1	0	0	0
Secure all LLOC	0	0	3	4	0	1
Secure key LLOC	3	2	0	2	0	0
TOTAL	3	3	4	6	0	1

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TABLE LII (continued)

Type of Security	Revolutionary Development	Search and Destroy	Security of LLOC	Hamlet Security	Civic Action	Security of Key Installations
<u>3d Priority</u>						
Secure MSR	1	1	0	0	0	0
Secure all LLOC	2	1	3	2	0	1
Secure key LLOC	0	1	3	1	1	1
TOTAL	3	3	6	3	1	2
<u>4th Priority</u>						
Secure MSR	0	0	1	1	0	0
Secure all LLOC	3	3	1	0	0	1
Secure key LLOC	1	2	2	0	1	1
TOTAL	4	5	4	1	1	2
<u>5th Priority</u>						
Secure MSR	1	0	0	1	0	0
Secure all LLOC	1	1	1	0	4	0
Secure key LLOC	2	1	1	1	0	2
TOTAL	4	2	2	2	4	2
<u>6th Priority</u>						
Secure MSR	0	0	0	0	2	0
Secure all LLOC	0	2	0	0	3	0
Secure key LLOC	0	0	1	1	5	0
TOTAL	0	2	1	1	10	0

TABLE LIII

QUESTION V

The Viet Cong were able to interdict the LLOC in my area (whenever they chose to do so) (frequently) (often) (at infrequent intervals) (very seldom) (never).

Type of Security	Whenever They Chose To Do So	Frequently	Often	Infrequent	Very Seldom	Never
Secure MSR	1	1	0	1	0	0
Secure all LLOC	5	1	2	0	0	0
Secure key LLOC	2	4	2	0	0	0
TOTAL	8	6	4	1	0	0

TABLE LIV

QUESTION W

There were (many) (several) (a few) (no) LLOC that could not be used at any time due to Viet Cong interdiction.

Type of Security	Many	Several	A Few	No	No Answer
Secure MSR	0	0	1	1	1
Secure all LLOC	0	2	2	4	0
Secure key LLOC	0	1	6	1	0
TOTAL	0	3	9	6	1

TABLE LV

QUESTION Y

Was the amount of time the LLOC were open in your counterpart's area adequate to allow the people in that area to conduct their normal business?

Type of Security	Yes	No	Yes & No
Secure MSR	2	1	0
Secure all LLOC	5	1	1
Secure key LLOC	8	0	0
TOTAL	15	2	2

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TAB E

TABULATION OF THE OFFICERS WHO HELD TWO ADVISORY JOBS QUESTIONNAIRES

This tab contains a subsequent tabulation of those questionnaires filled out by officers who as advisors held two jobs. This tabulation was based on the type security mission assigned to their counterparts, with only those questionnaires that indicated a specific land line of communication security mission being considered.

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TABLE LVI

QUESTION D

My counterpart's mission to secure LLOC was best defined as:

Advisor's Assignment	No Specified Mission	Security for MSR	Security for All LLOC	Security for Key LLOC	Other
Held two jobs	0	1	8	5	0

TABLE LVII

QUESTION E

My counterpart's mission concerning LLOC was:

Type of Security	Secure Key Installations	Security & Provide Detailed Surveillance	Given in Broad & General Terms	Security & Limited Patrolling & Ambushing	No Answer
Secure MSR	0	0	0	0	1
Secure all LLOC	0	2	5	1	0
Secure key LLOC	1	0	1	2	1
TOTAL	1	2	6	3	2

TABLE LVIII

QUESTION F

Those units directly under my counterpart's command were:

Type of Security	ARVN	Standard RF, PF	Augmented RF, PF	Mixed	Special
Secure MSR	0	0	0	0	1
Secure all LLOC	0	5	2	1	0
Secure key LLOC	1	0	1	3	0
TOTAL	1	5	3	4	1

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TABLE LIX

QUESTION G

My counterpart's units (did) (did not) have significant shortages of personnel that (prevented) (would have prevented) the accomplishment of their mission to secure LLOC.

Type of Security	Did	Did Not
Secure MSR	0	1
Secure all LLOC	7	1
Secure key LLOC	4	1
TOTAL	11	3

TABLE LX

QUESTION H

The significant items of equipment and personnel that my counterpart's units were short were:

Type of Security	Vehicles	Personnel	Radios	Artillery Support	Logistical Support	Automatic Weapons	Small Arms	Air Support	Engr Const Equip
Secure MSR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Secure all LLOC	2	6	1	1	1	3	1	0	0
Secure key LLOC	1	4	1	2	0	1	1	1	1
TOTAL	3	10	2	3	1	4	2	1	1

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TABLE LXI

QUESTION I

The personnel in my counterpart's units (were) (were not) well enough trained to accomplish their assigned mission,

Type of Security	Were	Were Not	No Answer
Secure MSR	1	0	0
Secure all LLOC	4	4	0
Secure key LLOC	3	1	1
TOTAL	8	5	1

TABLE LXII

QUESTION K

Were all the units assigned to your counterpart available to provide security for LLOC?

Type of Security	Yes	No
Secure MSR	1	0
Secure all LLOC	1	7
Secure key LLOC	1	4
TOTAL	3	11

TABLE LXIII

QUESTION M

How would you describe the tactics employed by your counterpart to secure LLOC in his area?

Type of Security	Static Security of Key Installations	Static Security with Limited Patrolling	No Answer	Mobile Security
Secure MSR	0	0	0	1
Secure all LLOC	2	3	1	2
Secure key LLOC	4	1	0	0
TOTAL	6	4	1	3

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TABLE LXIV

QUESTION N

My counterpart provided security in the form of escort troops, for (all) (all important) (no) (very few) convoys that travelled through his area.

Type of Security	All	All Important	No	Very Few	No Answer
Secure MSR	1	0	0	0	0
Secure all LLOC	1	2	3	1	1
Secure key LLOC	1	1	0	3	0
TOTAL	3	3	3	4	1

TABLE LXV

QUESTION O

How far could the RF and PF units in your counterpart's command operate from their base camp while patrolling and conducting ambushes?

Type of Security	Based on Support Weapons	No Limits	Strict Control	No Answer
Secure MSR	0	0	0	1
Secure all LLOC	1	5	1	1
Secure key LLOC	1	2	1	1
TOTAL	2	7	2	3

TABLE LXVI

QUESTION P

Did you consider your counterpart's tactics for securing LLOC effective?

Type of Security	Very Effective	Effectively Effective	Marginally Effective	Ineffectively Ineffective	Very Ineffective	No Tactics
Secure MSR	0	0	0	0	0	1
Secure all LLOC	3	1	4	0	0	0
Secure key LLOC	0	1	2	1	1	0
TOTAL	3	2	6	1	1	1

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TABLE LXVII

QUESTION Q

Under the restrictions placed upon your counterpart in the way of manpower, trained personnel, equipment, span of control, and operational missions, how would you describe your counterpart's efforts to secure the LLOC in his area of responsibility?

Type of Security	Best He Could	Adequate	Resources Fully Used	Resources Not Properly Used	Misunderstood Question
Secure MSR	0	0	0	0	1
Secure all LLOC	3	3	2	0	0
Secure key LLOC	2	2	0	1	0
TOTAL	5	5	2	1	1

TABLE LXVIII

QUESTION R

What was your counterpart's span of control? (Add together all the village chiefs, hamlet chiefs, district chiefs, ARVN units, RF, and PF units, etc., that reported directly to your counterpart and received orders directly from him.)

Type of Security	0-10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41 or More	No Answer
Secure MSR	1	0	0	0	0	0
Secure all LLOC	1	4	1	0	1	1
Secure key LLOC	1	0	1	1	1	1
TOTAL	3	4	2	1	2	2

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TABLE LXIX

QUESTION 5

In addition to his mission of securing LLOC, what other missions were assigned to your counter part?

Type of Security	Revolutionary Development	Hamlet Security	Civic Action	Search & Destroy	Security of Key Installations	No Answer
Secure MSR	0	0	0	0	0	1
Secure all LLOC	6	7	7	7	8	0
Secure key LLOC	4	4	4	3	5	0
TOTAL	10	11	11	10	13	1

TABLE LXX

QUESTION T

List the relative priorities assigned to the missions by your counterpart.

[illegible]

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TABLE LXX (continued)

Type of Security	Revolutionary Development	Search & Destroy	Security of LLOC	Hamlet Security	Civic Action	Security of Key Installations	Intelligence
<u>2d Priority</u>							
Secure MSR	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Secure all LLOC	0	1	3	2	0	2	0
Secure key LLOC	2	1	0	1	0	1	0
TOTAL	2	2	3	3	1	3	0
<u>3d Priority</u>							
Secure MSR	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Secure all LLOC	1	2	2	0	1	2	0
Secure key LLOC	1	0	2	1	0	0	0
TOTAL	2	2	4	1	1	3	0
<u>4th Priority</u>							
Secure MSR	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Secure all LLOC	1	2	1	2	1	1	0
Secure key LLOC	0	0	0	1	2	0	0
TOTAL	1	2	1	4	3	1	0
<u>5th Priority</u>							
Secure MSR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Secure all LLOC	3	1	1	1	2	0	0
Secure key LLOC	0	1	1	0	0	1	0
TOTAL	3	2	2	1	2	1	0

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TABLE LXX (continued)

Type of Security	Revolutionary Development	Search & Destroy	Security of LLOC	Hamlet Security	Civic Action	Security of Key Installations	Intelligence
<u>6th Priority</u>							
Secure MSR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Secure all LLOC	1	0	0	1	4	0	0
Secure key LLOC	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
TOTAL	1	1	0	1	5	0	0

TABLE LXXI

QUESTION V

The Viet Cong were able to interdict the LLOC in y area (whenever they chose to do so) (frequently) (often) (at infrequent intervals) (very seldom) (never),

Type of Security	Whenever They Chose To Do So	Frequently	Often	Infrequently	Very Seldom	Never
Secure MSR	1	0	0	0	0	0
Secure all LLOC	5	2	0	0	0	1
Secure key LLOC	3	1	0	1	0	0
TOTAL	9	3	0	1	0	1

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TABLE LXXII

QUESTION W

There were (many) (several) (a few) (no) LLOC that could not be used at any time due to Viet Cong interdiction.

Type of Security	Many	Several	A Few	No	One
Secure MSR	0	0	0	0	1
Secure all LLOC	2	1	2	3	0
Secure key LLOC	3	1	1	0	0
TOTAL	5	2	3	3	1

TABLE LXXIII

QUESTION Y

Was the amount of time the LLOC were open in your counterpart's area adequate to allow the people in that area to conduct their normal business?

Type of Security	Yes	No
Secure MSR	0	1
Secure all LLOC	6	2
Secure key LLOC	3	2
TOTAL	9	5

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TAB F

TABULATION OF THE ADVISORS TO ARVN UNITS QUESTIONNAIRES

This tab contains a subsequent tabulation of those questionnaires filled out by officers who were advisors to ARVN units. This tabulation was based on the type security mission assigned to their units, with only those questionnaires that indicated a specific land line of communication security mission being considered.

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TABLE LXXIV

QUESTION D

My counterpart's mission to secure LLOC was best defined as:

Advisor's Assignment	No Specified Mission	Security for MSR	Security for All LLOC	Security for Key LLOC	Mission Never Defined	Other
Advisor to ARVN units	0	11	10	8	0	0

TABLE LXXV

QUESTION E

My counterpart's mission concerning LLOC was:

Type of Security	Secure Key Installations	Security & Provide Detailed Surveillance	Given in Broad & General Terms	Security & Limited Patrolling & Ambushing	Other
Secure MSR	0	5	2	4	0
Secure all LLOC	1	1	6	0	0
Secure key LLOC	2	0	5	3	0
TOTAL	3	6	13	7	0

TABLE LXXVI

QUESTION F

Those units directly under my counterpart's command were;

Type of Security	Infantry	Ranger	Cavalry	CIDG	RF Battalion	Mixed RF, PF ARVN
Secure MSR	6	2	1	0	0	2
Secure all LLOC	3	0	0	1	0	4
Secure key LLOC	5	1	2	0	1	2
TOTAL	14	3	3	1	1	8

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TABLE LXXVII

QUESTION G

My counterpart's units (did) (did not) have significant shortages of personnel that (prevented) (would have prevented) the accomplishment of mission to secure LLOC.

Type of Security	Did	Did Not	No Answer
Secure MSR	4	6	1
Secure all LLOC	5	3	0
Secure key LLOC	4	6	0
TOTAL	13	15	1

TABLE LXXVIII

QUESTION H

The significant items of equipment and personnel that counterpart's units were short were:

Type of Security	Personnel	Supplies			Mine	
		Equipment	APC	Units	Detectors	Helicopters
Secure MSR	3	0	0	0	1	1
Secure all LLOC	3	0	1	1	0	0
Secure key LLOC	3	1	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	9	1	1	1	1	1

TABLE LXXIX

QUESTION I

The personnel in my counterpart's units (were) (were not) well enough trained to accomplish their assigned mission,

Type of Security	Were	Were Not	No Answer
Secure MSR	5	5	1
Secure all LLOC	7	1	0
Secure key LLOC	10	0	0
TOTAL	22	6	1

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TABLE LXXX

QUESTION K

Were all the units assigned to your counterpart available to provide security for LLOC?

Type of Security	Yes	No
Secure MSR	7	3
Secure all LLOC	5	3
Secure key LLOC	5	6
TOTAL	17	12

TABLE LXXXI

QUESTION M

How would you describe the tactics employed by your counterpart to secure LLOC in his area?

Type of Security	Static Security of Key Installations	Static Security with Limited Patrolling	Mobile Security	No Answer
Secure MSR	1	9	1	0
Secure all LLOC	0	5	3	0
Secure key LLOC	1	6	2	1
TOTAL	2	20	6	1

TABLE LXXXII

QUESTION N

My counterpart provided security in the form of escort troops, for (all) (all important) (no) (very few) convoys that travelled through his area.

Type of Security	All	All Important	No	Very Few	No Answer
Secure MSR	0	5	0	5	1
Secure all LLOC	1	4	0	1	2
Secure key LLOC	1	3	0	4	2
TOTAL	2	12	0	10	5

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TABLE LXXXIII

QUESTION O

How far could the RF and PF units in your counterpart's command operate from their base camp while patrolling and conducting ambushes?

Type of Security	Based on Support Weapons	No Limits	Strict Control	No Answer	2,000 Meters	Area of Operation
Secure MSR	0	0	1	10	0	0
Secure all LLOC	1	4	0	1	2	1
Secure key LLOC	2	1	0	7	0	0
TOTAL	3	5	1	18	2	1

TABLE LXXXIV

QUESTION P

Did you consider your counterpart's tactics for securing LLOC effective?

Type of Security	Very Effective	Effective	Marginally Effective	Ineffective	Very Ineffective
Secure MSR	0	3	6	0	1
Secure all LLOC	2	4	2	0	0
Secure key LLOC	0	7	3	0	0
TOTAL	2	14	11	0	1

TABLE LXXXV

QUESTION Q

Under the restrictions placed upon your counterpart in the way of manpower, trained personnel, equipment, span of control, and operational missions, how would you describe your counterpart's efforts to secure the LLOC in his area of responsibility,

Type of Security	Best He Could	Adequate	Resources Not Fully Used	Resources Not Properly Used	Outstanding - Good	No Answer
Secure MSR	3	3	4	1	0	1
Secure all LLOC	3	1	2	1	1	0
Secure key LLOC	6	2	2	0	0	0
TOTAL	12	6	8	2	1	1

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TABLE LXXXVI

QUESTION R

What was your counterpart's span of control? (Add together all the village chiefs, hamlet chiefs, district chiefs, ARVN units, RF, and PF units, etc., that reported directly to your counterpart and received orders directly from him.

Type of Security	0-10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41 or More	No Answer
Secure MSR	8	1	1	0	0	0
Secure all LLOC	4	3	0	1	0	0
Secure key LLOC	7	3	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	19	7	1	1	0	1

TABLE LXXXVII

QUESTION S

In addition to his mission of securing LLOC, what other missions were assigned your counterparts?

Type of Security	Revolutionary Development	Hamlet Security	Civic Action	Search & Destroy	Security of Key Installations
Secure MSR	5	7	5	10	5
Secure all LLOC	5	6	5	7	6
Secure key LLOC	3	6	2	8	6
TOTAL	13	19	12	25	17

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TABLE LXXXVIII

QUESTION T

List the relative priorities assigned to the missions by your counterpart.

Type of Security	Revolutionary Development	Search and Destroy	Security of LLOC	Hamlet Security	Civic Action	Security of Key Installations
<u>1st Priority</u>						
Secure MSR	1	4	4	1	0	1
Secure all LLOC	0	2	2	1	0	3
Secure key LLOC	0	7	1	1	0	1
TOTAL	1	13	7	3	0	5
<u>2d Priority</u>						
Secure MSR	0	3	1	4	1	2
Secure all LLOC	0	2	1	2	0	3
Secure key LLOC	0	1	3	2	1	3
TOTAL	0	6	5	8	2	8
<u>3d Priority</u>						
Secure MSR	1	2	4	0	0	4
Secure all LLOC	1	2	2	2	0	0
Secure key LLOC	0	0	4	2	0	3
TOTAL	2	4	10	4	0	7

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TABLE LXXXVII (continued)

Type of Security	Revolutionary Development	Search and Destroy	Security of LLOC	Hamlet Security	Civic Action	Security of Key Installations
<u>4th Priority</u>						
Secure MSR	0	1	1	3	3	1
Secure all LLOC	1	1	2	2	0	0
Secure key LLOC	2	0	0	1	2	0
TOTAL	3	2	3	6	5	1
<u>5th Priority</u>						
Secure MSR	3	1	0	1	3	0
Secure all LLOC	1	0	0	0	3	0
Secure key LLOC	0	0	1	2	0	1
TOTAL	4	1	1	3	6	1
<u>6th Priority</u>						
Secure MSR	2	0	0	1	1	2
Secure all LLOC	1	0	1	0	0	0
Secure key LLOC	0	0	0	0	1	0
TOTAL	3	0	1	1	2	2
<u>Not Given Any Priority</u>						
Secure MSR	4	0	1	1	3	1
Secure all LLOC	4	1	0	1	5	2
Secure key LLOC	8	2	1	2	6	2
TOTAL	16	3	2	4	14	5

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TABLE LXXXIX

QUESTION V

The Viet Cong were able to interdict the LLOC in my area (whenever they chose to do so) (frequently) (often) (at infrequent intervals) (very seldom) (never).

Type of Security	Whenever They Chose To Do So	Frequently	Often	Infrequent	Very Seldom	Never
Secure MSR	6	2	2	1	0	0
Secure all LLOC	2	1	3	1	1	0
Secure key LLOC	3	4	1	2	0	0
TOTAL	11	7	6	4	1	0

TABLE XC

QUESTION W

There were (many) (several) (a few) (no) LLOC that could not be used at any time due to Viet Cong interdict: a.

Type of Security	Many	Several	A Few	No	No Answer
Secure MSR	2	4	4	0	1
Secure all LLOC	2	1	0	3	1
Secure key LLOC	2	3	4	0	1
TOTAL	6	8	8	3	3

TABLE XCI

QUESTION Y

Was the amount of time the LLOC were open in your counterpart's area adequate to allow the people in that area to conduct their normal business?

Type of Security	Yes	No
Secure MSR	9	2
Secure all LLOC	4	3
Secure key LLOC	8	2
TOTAL	21	7

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APPENDIX G

MEMORANDUMS FOR RECORD (U)

This appendix contains two memorandums for record written by advisors to the Vietnamese Military Railway Service concerning the mission assignments and security procedures for securing the railroad in Vietnam.

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HEADQUARTERS
RAILWAY SECURITY ADVISORY DETACHMENT
USMACV
APO 96337

RSAD-1

13 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Railroad Security Missions and Operational Limitations on the
RF and PF Units

1. (U) This memorandum is prepared at the request of the Senior Advisor of the Railway Security Advisory Detachment to define and explain the railroad security missions assigned to each of the command levels from the Division Tactical Area to the District. Included in this memorandum is information concerning the operational limitations that have been placed on the RF and PF units stationed along the railroad right-of-way. This information was obtained from:

- a. I Corps Combined Campaign Plan
- b. Corps Advisory Personnel: MAJ H.M. Conrad, G3 Advr Plans, I Corps
- c. Province Advisory Personnel: LTC Harbin, SA, Thua Thien Province
- d. Sector Advisory Personnel: LTC C.R. Froede, SA, DaNang Special

Section

2. (U) There have been no missions of railroad security assigned to the DTA's by the ICTZ CG, specifically; other than a one sentence reference to security of LOC's. According to MAJ Conrad, the absence of any written order in this area is due by and large to the inactivity of the railroad in I Corps,

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3. (U) According to LTC Harbin, of Thua Thien Sector, no orders concerning railroad security have been received from HQ, DTA and consequently, none have been issued to subordinate units. However, several railroad bridges in the sector are being secured by local forces.

4. (K) With the exception of the units listed as having missions of securing the railroad, no PF unit has either a secondary or implied mission of railroad security. MAJ Xang, RF/PF Officer, I Corps, indicated that there is no set policy relative to the deployment and use of RF/PF troops. PF troops usually are committed only within the village from which they come. The local commander determines the area of operation for RF troops, but this usually does not exceed a radius of 5 KM.

/s/ John A Gauthier
JOHN A GAUTHIER
Captain, Artillery
Advisor, Zone 1

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HEADQUARTERS
RAILWAY SECURITY ADVISORY DETACHMENT
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO 96243

RSAD

20 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Railroad Security Missions and Limitations of the RF and PF
Units

1. This memorandum is prepared at the request of the Senior Advisor of the Railway Security Advisory Detachment to define and explain the Railroad security missions assigned to each of the command levels from the Division Tactical Area to the district. Included in this memorandum is information concerning the operational limitations of the RF and PF units stationed along the railroad right of-way. This information was obtained from:

- A. II Corps Combined Campaign Plan
- B. Command Directive from the 22nd DTA
- C. Command Directives from Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Province
- D. Major Hoffman, G-3 Plans Advisor II Corps
- E. Major Johnson, G-3 Advisor 22nd DTA
- F. Major Francis, S-3 Advisor Binh Dinh Province
- G. Major Travis, S-3 Advisor Phu Yen Province
- H. Senior military advisors to the following districts: Tuy An, Dong Xuan, Vanh Canh, An Nhon, Phu Cat and Phu My.

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2. Mission assigned to the 22nd DTA by II Corps: Assist Territorial Forces in maintaining and upgrading highway and rail security as required by providing reaction forces and security for Engineer and VNRS parties beyond the capability of Territorial Forces.

3. Missions assigned to the Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces by II Corps: In coordination with ARVN and FWMAF regular forces. Maintain and expand the security of vital and rail LOC's in consonance with established railway reconstruction goals. In providing forces for LOC security, particular emphasis is placed on the security of critical bridges (i.e. bridges with spans in excess of 10 meters).

4. Missions assigned by the 22nd DTA to Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces.

A. Continue the designated missions of the II Corps Combined Military Plan.

B. Use the local forces in order to provide for security for the service trains when they operate in Binh Dinh or Phu Yen territory as well as the road rescue for them.

C. Continue to provide security for the rail line which has been repaired and establish bases along them.

D. Coordinate with the FWMAF or unilaterally organize operations along the roads and railway to annihilate the enemy.

E. Coordinate closely with the Qui Nhon Railway Security Zone in order to provide effective security for the service trains and the rail line which can be used.

F. Order subordinate units to provide security for the service trains and maintain close contact with these trains for their protection

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G. Be ready to use province reserve forces to support the rescue trains at Tuy Hoa and Qui Nhon performing railway repair should support be required.

H. Establish continuous security in areas bordering the operational railway distances.

5. Missions assigned to the districts by the provinces.

A. Phu Yen Province

(1) Continue to open and provide security for the railway in each district.

(2) Provide protection and security for bridges within the territory of responsibility.

(3) Based on the plans which have been stipulated, RF and PF units must be utilized throughout the whole territory of the district.

(4) Conduct operations in coordination with allied and CIDG Forces within the district area to provide security for all lines of communication.

B. Binh Dinh Province

(1) Provide security in remote areas for work trains while working in the district's area of responsibility.

(2) Use the RF Co's located along the track to support and rescue the work trains in addition to supporting the pacification program.

(3) In coordination with Korean and ARVN units. Conduct operations along the railroad to destroy the enemy. Organize patrol and ambushes to provide adequate security for the railroad.

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(4) Coordinate with units available to provide adequate security for the bridges and track that has been repaired.

6. Mission and limitations of the RF and PF units stationed along the railroad.

A. Mission: The actual missions given to RF and PF units stationed along the railroad seem to vary depending on the district, the priority given to railroad security and the number of troops available. Some districts attempt to carry out their railway security mission by stationing PF or RF elements on key bridges within their area of responsibility. Other districts attempt to carry out their railway security mission by assigning RF or PF units to patrol and ambush along the railroad right-of-way. At this time, it cannot be said that effective security is provided for the railroad in any district within the II Railway Security Zone (Bong Son to Tuy Hoa).

B. Limitations placed on RF and PF units stationed along the railroad.

(1) Inherent Limitations: The organizational structure and the equipment of the RF and PF units limits their effectiveness because those units lack sufficient communications equipment and are inadequately armed. Most of the RF and PF units lack the leadership necessary to enable them to function well as independent units on missions other than static security missions. The static security missions assigned to the RF and PF generally affect only a very small area in the area immediately around their positions. The static security missions are assigned on a 24 hour basis thus greatly reducing the unit's operational capability.

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(2) Limitations placed on RF and PF units by districts: With the exception of a few units in each district that have been assigned specific missions of securing the railroad, the PF units in the second MRS Zone do not have missions of railroad security either as secondary of implied missions and therefore do not influence the security of the railroad to a great degree. Since the RF companies are subject to having their AO's changed they normally influence the security of the railroad only when they are located adjacent to the line. Such security is often of a transitory nature and cannot be depended upon.

/s/ Vallo Truumees
VALLO TRUUMES
Major, Infantry
II Zone Advisor

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